Kenan Camurcu

I.

Immediately after his emigration from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE, Prophet Muhammad spearheaded the signing of a multilateral agreement, known as the “Medina Document” or “Constitution of Medina,” among the city's diverse ethnic and religious groups. Through this social contract, he successfully forged a strong, structural, and institutional peace from the city's complex and conflict-ridden social fabric. It was a perfect pax-Arabiana. Those who accepted Muhammad's prophethood among the participants of this secular 'pax' were called "Muslims," while those who did not believe in his prophethood but were party to the agreement were referred to as "People of the Book" (Ahl al-Kitab). Later, those Muslims who advanced spiritually would be called "believers" (mu'min). However, those who remained within the secular pax perimeter would not be deemed acceptable in considering themselves "believers." This is clearly stated in Surah al-Hujurat, verse 14: "The Arabs say, 'We have believed.' Say, 'You have not believed, but you [only] say, "We have submitted [to Islam] (pax)."'"

The Medina Document, intended and hoped to be a long-term safeguard for both Medina's ethnic and religious diversity and social peace among Muslims, was penned by Ali b. Abi Talib and preserved by him for many years. Michael Lecker cites historical references from Abu Ubayd's (d. 838) Kitab al-Amwal, indicating that Ali safeguarded all of the Prophet's important documents, not just the Medina Document. One such instance describes how Qays b. Sa'd, son of Sa'd b. Ubadah, and Malik al-Ashtar asked Ali b. Abi Talib, "Did the Messenger of Allah entrust you with anything rejected by others?" Ali replied, "No, except for the parchment," after which he drew the Document from his sword's sheath and displayed it (Lecker, pp. 194-195).

In the Medina-Politic, constructed upon the principle of a multi-layered public sphere through this contract, unlike Sparta and Athens, a citizenship characterized by elite rule and upper-lower class categories did not emerge. This held true neither among Muslims themselves nor in their relations with other groups in Medina.

Nancy Fraser theorizes the model of "shared homeland-multiple publicness" led by the Prophet, who was the arbiter, not the ruler, of Medina, within a feminist framework. According to her, the effects of social inequality will intensify only where there is a single, encompassing public sphere (Özbek, p. 117).

The Medina Document (Vesika, Sahifa) failed to capture the interest of a brand of Islam that preferred crude domination. They dismissed it as a "simple agreement."

The social model enshrined in the Medina Document represented a novel historical experience where ethnic and religious differences were acknowledged and their existence secured through a multilateral agreement. It can be described as a social form unprecedented in the ancient Greek city-states and in empires from Rome to Byzantium.

The first steps of deconstruction to the Prophet's model were taken by the first Caliph, Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah (Abu Bakr), with his military campaigns against dissenting Muslim tribes, and by the second Caliph, Umar b. al-Khattab, with his ethnic cleansing of Jewish tribes. However, numerous sabotages were attempted to dismantle the structure established by the Medina Document even while the Prophet was alive. Among the most significant of these were assassination attempts on the Prophet.

Eight years after the Medina Document, upon intelligence that Byzantium would attack Medina (Ibn Sa'd, 2/150), the Prophet led a preemptive expedition to Syria. Approximately 700 km from Medina, in Tabuk, he was subjected to an assassination attempt by individuals in his close circle (Ahmad b. Hanbal, 5/453). Anticipating the assassination attempt, he allowed no one near him except his closest companion Ammar b. Yasir and the young Hudhayfah b. al-Yaman as they ascended steep rocks. Ammar guided him, and Hudhayfah held the reins of his camel. Hudhayfah heard the sounds of camels and the clanging of swords from the assassins lying in ambush ahead. When he approached to identify the attackers, he saw their faces were covered. When he shouted, "I am after you, O enemies of Allah," they fled (Zamakhshari, 2/282).

When Hudhayfah returned, the Prophet asked, "Were you able to recognize them?" Hudhayfah replied that the night was too dark, and their faces were covered, but the camels belonged to "so-and-so" individuals (Bayhaqi, 9/56-57, Hadith: 17867). Although the narrations refer to them as "so-and-so," the identities of the assassins are known. Those who transmitted the narrations preferred to gloss over them because they were shocking names. Without delving into the discussions on this matter, I promise to examine it in detail in another article.

When Hudhayfah asked the Prophet, "Will you not punish them?" the Prophet replied, "I do not want people to say, 'Muhammad is killing his companions'" (Suyuti, 4/182). According to a narration from Ibn Abbas, Hudhayfah stated that he could not recognize them. The Prophet then revealed their identities, listing all their names. Hudhayfah asked, "Did you send anyone to kill them?" The Prophet replied, "I do not want the Arabs to say, 'He killed his companions despite achieving victory with them.' Allah is sufficient as a trial for them" (Khazin, 2/379).

At this point, an important note must be made: The claim that Abu Bakr and Umar were close companions of the Prophet is clearly invalidated by the Tabuk assassination attempt. At this most critical moment, while Ammar and Hudhayfah acted as close protectors against the assassination plot, and after the ambush was thwarted, while they discussed the attackers, there is no record of Abu Bakr and Umar's whereabouts.

After the assassination attempt, the Prophet had Hudhayfah b. al-Yaman record a list of those threatening social peace (Muslim, 1282, hadith 2279), which seems to have had a deterrent effect on the group attempting to cause chaos. Furthermore, there are notes suggesting that influential figures who played a decisive role in the formation of "new Medina" after the Prophet's death were uneasy about the "hypocrite list" maneuver. Sources record that Umar b. al-Khattab relentlessly followed Hudhayfah from that moment on, persistently asking if his name was on the list and trying to learn the other names (Tabari, 14/443, Narration: 17130; Muttaqi al-Hindi, 1/191, Narration: 1618).

The followers of Umar, just as they attributed Umar's outburst to the Prophet during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah ("Are you not the Prophet?" - Bukhari, Hadith: 2731-2732) to his piety and depth of faith, similarly link his persistent inquiry about being on the hypocrite list to his piety.

It might be accurate to attribute the attempt by some companions, whom Sunni scholars, using a defamiliarization effect, labeled as "hypocrites," to kill the Prophet at Tabuk, to his having appointed Ali as the city's leader in his stead when he left Medina. The Prophet's statement, likening Ali to Moses's brother Aaron, whom Moses left in charge when he ascended Mount Tur ("You are to me as Aaron was to Moses, save that there will be no prophet after me" - Muslim, hadith 2404), seems to have alarmed the faction that sought to take the lead in the matter of succession after the Prophet. The assumption that a plan was made to kill the Prophet in Tabuk under the guise of an accident, conduct the election there, and return to Medina with a new leader, has a high degree of plausibility.

When the assassination failed, a backup plan was put into effect, and the Prophet was poisoned in Medina. His unexpected death was certainly due to poisoning (Darimi, 1/474 and Nisaburi, 3/61, Narration: 99/4395). The symptoms that appeared in the Prophet's body also prove that he was killed by poisoning. These included a sudden deterioration of health, high and persistent fever, severe headache, and a worsening condition on the fourth day (Ibn Sa'd, 2/146). Previously, the mother of Bishr b. al-Bara', who died in the assassination attempt at Khaybar where the Prophet and his companions were fed poisoned meat, stated that the Prophet was burning with a fever she had never seen in anyone else (Ibn Sa'd, 2/208). The Prophet also said, "My veins are tearing apart, as it were" (San'ani, 11/29, Narration: 19815).

According to a narration in Darimi's Fath al-Mannan, Ibn Mas'ud (d. 652), one of the early Muslims, very clearly expressed his belief that the Prophet was murdered: "I would rather swear nine times that the Messenger of Allah was murdered, than swear once that he was not. Allah chose him as a prophet and also made him a martyr." It is also stated that this narration is found in Ahmad b. Hanbal's (d. 855) Musnad (1/434). Furthermore, it is mentioned that Ibn al-Qayyim, in his Zad al-Ma'ad, narrated from Zuhri, and Ibn Kathir, in his Tarikh (al-Bidaya), stated, "Would that Muslims could see that the Messenger of Allah died as a martyr in addition to Allah's grace of prophethood upon him." The hadith memorizer Hakim al-Nisaburi (d. 1014) also reports that Sha'bi (d. 722) said, "The Messenger of Allah was definitely poisoned" (al-Mustadrak, 3/61, Narration: 99/4395).

Institutionalized Islam, similar to how Aisha's leadership of the uprising and civil war (Siffin/Basra) was softened and trivialized by calling it an "event," refers to the Prophet's poisoning as an "illness" and his murder as a "demise." These definitions clearly indicate the historical narrative's bias. Yet, despite the historical reality of the Prophet's being killed by poisoning, one must ask why this truth is not a subject of religious education curricula, sermons, or remembrance in popular piety. Because if Islam were to accept the truth that its own Prophet was murdered by those around him, much like the murdered prophets mentioned frequently in the Quran, it would be compelled to seek out the perpetrators of this crime and confront the designated place of the potential names in doctrine, leading it to prefer not to address the issue at all.

After the Prophet's death, the "Medina" established by the Document in the Prophet's Mosque gave way to a "new Medina" with the controversial election of a caliph in the Saqifah (shelter) of the Banu Sa'idah, the city's pre-Islamic political center. The public sphere, too, began a structural transformation from participatory to a dominant understanding. Approximately 1 km from the Prophet's Mosque, which was the center of Muslim society, a small group in the pagan era's consultation assembly of Banu Sa'idah elected Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah (Abu Bakr) as caliph (Ibn Qutaybah, pp. 21-26), after which the news was announced to Medina, and a pledge of allegiance/acceptance ceremony was held in the Mosque.

During the Prophet's time, the mosque (masjid/jami') was a functional public space, even though prayers were also performed there. It was not a sacred and metaphysical space as symbolized by the Muslim identity today. Consultations, individual and social issues, diplomatic negotiations, and all other legal and social affairs were conducted in the mosque. However, after the Prophet's death, the Saqifah of Banu Sa'idah, a pre-Islamic meeting place, was used as a public space for the election of the caliph. Subsequently, the homes of Caliphs Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman emerged as centers for decision-making. The evolution of the home into a public space would reach its ultimate form with Mu'awiya's construction of a palace.

No academic thesis has been written on the model of a forceful, unvoted, club-wielding election in a secular pagan space, followed by the imposition of this fait accompli on society by force of sword in a religious space. If scholarship were being conducted, this crucial historical situation, directly related to the theoretical foundations of Islamic political thought, would certainly be examined.

Following the pledge of allegiance ceremony, which no early Muslim attended, attacks began against those who rejected Abu Bakr's caliphate. The first was the raid on the house of Fatimah, the Prophet's daughter. Caliph Abu Bakr sent a group of forty led by Umar to raid the house with the instruction, "If they turn their backs on you, fight them" (Abu al-Fida Ismail, p. 195).

During the controversial meeting in the Saqifah of Banu Sa'idah, while allegiance was being pledged to Abu Bakr, some of the most prominent figures of Islam, Ali b. Abi Talib, Abbas b. Abd al-Muttalib, Zubayr b. al-Awwam, and Sa'd b. Ubadah, were meeting at Fatimah's house (Maqdisi, 5/151). When the group led by Umar b. al-Khattab went to raid the opposition's meeting, Umar threatened those inside: "Either you come out or I will burn the house down" (Ibn Qutaybah, p. 30). Fatimah came out and said to Umar, "Son of Khattab, have you come to burn our house?" Umar replied, "Yes. Or you come out and join the community" (Abdurabbih al-Andalusi, 5/13 and Abu al-Fida, 1/156).

With Umar's use of the word "umma" (community) to refer to his own faction, the term became politicized for the first time, taking on a new meaning that excluded the opposition. This was similar to how the word "fath" (conquest) began to be used to mean military occupation, invasion, and colonization, departing from its Quranic meaning. Because during the Prophet's lifetime, there was no aim, goal, or ideal of conquering other countries. Therefore, no one understood "fath" to mean invasion. With Abu Bakr's suppression of dissenting Muslim tribes through internal warfare, followed by Umar's period of external expansion and invasion of other countries, a new paradigm began to emerge, and the Muslim identity and its Muslim-political started to take shape.

Umar himself, during his own caliphate, confessed the haste of Abu Bakr's election: "Let no one be deceived by the saying that the pledge to Abu Bakr was made without consultation, suddenly, and completed. Yes, that is true. (...) The Ansar opposed us and gathered in the Saqifah of Banu Sa'idah. Ali and Zubayr and those with them also opposed us. (...) At that time, we had no more important task than securing the pledge to Abu Bakr. We feared that the Ansar community would separate from us and not pledge allegiance en masse to Abu Bakr, and that one of their own would be pledged allegiance to. In this situation, we would either have to pledge allegiance to them against our will or oppose them, which would cause corruption. From now on, if allegiance is pledged to someone without the consultation and consent of the Muslims, both the one pledging and the one receiving the pledge will face the fear of being killed, and there will be no valid pledge" (Bukhari, Hadith: 6830 and Baladhuri, 2/264).

The chaos, ethnic and religious polarization, and social disintegration that occurred during and after the election of Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah (Abu Bakr) as caliph became permanent in later periods. The dominant political system that emerged from the radical and structural transformation of the public sphere destroyed the participatory paradigm of the Medina Document.

Subsequently, a campaign of "wars against apostates" (ridda) began, targeting all political opponents. Tribes that did not accept the caliphate of Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah were accused of apostasy (irtidad) and war was declared on regions where the call to prayer (adhan) was recited. The principle that war should not be declared on a region where the adhan is recited aimed to prevent civil war. The Prophet formulated this principle to avoid mistakes during the extraordinary conditions of war: "When you go on a raid against a people, do not proceed until morning. If you hear the adhan, stop. If you do not hear it, attack after morning" (Bayhaqi, 9/182). Even when Khaybar, whose entire population consisted of Jews, was transformed into a base for conspiracy, attacks, and black propaganda against the Prophet and Islam, the Prophet waited until morning to ascertain whether the adhan was recited before attacking the fortresses (Ibn Ishaq, 3/277, narrated from Anas b. Malik).

Three years after the Prophet's death, in the "new Medina" where political authority was now exalted, public life resembled the categorization reminiscent of restrictions on those not considered citizens in Athens. The symbolic meaning of Caliph Umar shouting at a veiled Muslim slave woman, "Uncover your head, you cannot resemble free women," and beating her (Kandahlawi, 17/55) is significant. Indeed, Caliph Umar himself removed the veil from the woman's head and beat her with a whip (Albani, 6/203, narrated from Ibn al-Mundhir). According to a similar narration, Umar explained his actions by saying: "Why did you make this slave woman cover her head and resemble free women? When I met her because of this, I treated her respectfully. I thought she was a free woman. You cannot make slaves resemble free women" (Bayhaqi, 2/320).

II.

During the reign of the Third Caliph, Uthman b. Affan (d. 656), nepotism, corruption, lawlessness, inequality, and injustice reached their peak, and social unrest was on the verge of erupting in the provinces. Even Aisha, daughter of the First Caliph Abu Bakr, was calling for an uprising against Uthman, motivating the surging opposition by exclaiming, "Kill the Jewish-bearded one!" (Tabari, 3/12). The text reads, "Kill this Na'sal." "Na'sal" was the name of a Jew whose distinguishing feature was a long beard. Aisha likened Uthman to this man because of his long beard. "Na'sal" also means "stupid old man" (Ibn Manzur, p. 4470).

As the crisis and chaos deepened, when leading companions in Medina asked Caliph Uthman to resign to prevent civil war and appease public anger, he replied, "I will not remove the shirt with which Allah has clothed me" (Ibn al-Athir, 3/60). Caliph Uthman's explanation of political authority through the metaphor of "the shirt with which Allah has clothed me" is a student of the doctrine that deifies the state: "The Shadow of God on Earth" (Zillullah fi'l-ard). That is, the concept of Zillullah fi'l-ard emerged in the early period of Islam and subsequently became the undisputed political culture of "existing Islam" in later eras.

The source figure in the creation of the "Shadow of God on Earth" (zillullah fi'l-ard) concept is Abu Hurayra (d. 678), who embraced Islam (or arrived in Medina) three (or four) years before the Prophet's death (Hakim al-Nisaburi, 4/135, Hadith: 6933). Abu Hurayra played a significant role in shaping the religious, political, and social identity of the Sunni Muslim majority through thousands of narrations, more than the combined narrations of other companions who had been Muslim for much longer. The source of the most important principle of Sunni political theory, the ethno-political condition (the caliphate belonging to the Quraysh), is also Abu Hurayra's narration: "The caliphs are from Quraysh" (Ahmad b. Hanbal, 8/249, Hadith: 8226).

According to the narration that built the political culture of Sunnism, the Prophet said: "The Sultan is the shadow of Allah on Earth. Allah honors whoever honors him. Allah humiliates whoever humiliates him" (Shaybani, p. 492, Narration: 1024). Hadith scholars accept this narration as hasan (good). In hadith methodology, the definition of hasan is that while no negative opinion is expressed about the individuals in the chain of narration, the narration is not considered sahih (authentic) due to deficiencies and flaws in its recording, and it is mashhur (well-known) because it has been widely narrated and gained popularity (Uğur, 16/374-375).

The Anas b. Malik (d. 711) version of the narration states: "The Sultan is the shadow of Allah on Earth. Whoever deceives him has gone astray. Whoever advises him has been guided" (Aliyy al-Qari, 7/268, Hadith: 3718, Nabhani, p. 288). Muhammad Abd al-Ra'uf al-Munawi (d. 1622), in his commentary on the hadith, says about the continuation of the narration, "If he acts oppressively or unjustly, the sin is on his neck. It is incumbent upon the people to be patient": "The people must be patient. It is not permissible to revolt against him unless he becomes an infidel" (Munawi, 4/142). Munawi also reports al-Haythami's opinion that Sa'id b. Sinan, in the chain of narration, is matruk (abandoned), meaning that hadith should not be taken from him because he lied.

Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), one of the architects of Sunni political theory, when defending the doctrine "The Sultan is the shadow of Allah on Earth," engages in a reasoning to bolster this political culture with theological explanations and even compares the function of authority to Allah's attribute of "Lord" (Rabb). According to him, for the affairs of servants to proceed well, there is a need for this shadow (the sultan being the shadow of Allah). If there is no shadow, societal affairs cannot be conducted. Therefore, this situation is equal and analogous to the secret of Allah's attribute of "Lordship" (rububiyyah), which ensures the existence of humanity and the continuation of life (Ibn Taymiyyah, 35/30).

In the organizational model presented by the Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) in his Siyasetname (Book of Government), which listed "Sultan, owners of iqta'/timar, ulama, state officials, subjects," the Sultan was also attributed a divine position of controlling affairs.

When Qadizade Mehmed (d. 1635), a member of Ibn Taymiyyah's extremist Salafi school, supported Murad IV's ban on tobacco, and faced the objection that tobacco and coffee were not forbidden by Allah, he equated the Sultan's prohibition with Allah's prohibition (Yilmaz, 42/5-9; Karagöz, p. 518).

The most striking historical example of the sacralization of political position, making it immune to law, is the refusal of the First Caliph Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah (Abu Bakr) to punish Khalid b. Walid, who murdered the Yemeni tribal chief Malik b. Nuwayra, a political opponent, stating, "I will not sheath Allah's drawn sword against the polytheists" (Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, 5/561). The incident of the murder of Malik b. Nuwayra, the Prophet's representative in Yemen, is considered the first political assassination in Islamic history.

The importance and value that authority gained in the rapid structural transformation of public life in early Islamic history were at a level comparable to the ideological postulates of the modern state.

This conception, which assumes that the people must be in a subordinate position before the exalted authority, even re-organized the standing posture (qiyam) in prayer to conform to the theory. In Sunni tradition (except for the Maliki school), clasping hands in prayer was not a practice that existed during the Prophet's lifetime (Subhani, Issue: 41). According to one claim, after the conquest of Persia, when the second Caliph Umar saw Persian prisoners brought to Medina clasping their hands in front of him, he asked why they did so. They replied that it was a sign of respect for their kings in their culture. Umar liked this practice and added it to prayer (Najafi, 11/19). It is noted in the verification of Najafi's book that no source is provided for this narration. However, in the narration books of Shia, the following hadith is transmitted from the Imams of Ahl al-Bayt: "Do not clasp your hands in prayer. For this is something the Majus (Zoroastrians) do" (Kulayni, 3/299). It is stated that the word "Majus" in the narration refers to Iranian Zoroastrians, thereby establishing a connection between clasping hands in prayer and an ancient Persian court custom.

Another symbolic event of the new era, where political authority began to interfere with religious tradition and the civil sphere, was the confiscation of the Fadaq land, which the Prophet had given to his daughter Fatimah during his lifetime, by Caliph Abu Bakr, on the grounds that "Prophets do not leave inheritance" (Bukhari, Hadith: 6725). It is clear that the confiscation of Fatimah's Fadaq land by the caliphate was not actually a matter of property, but a political slogan related to considering the Prophet heirless (abtar/cut off). According to Ibn Abbas, when the Prophet's sons Qasim and Abdullah passed away, As b. Wa'il al-Sahmi, a prominent figure from Mecca, said, "Muhammad's lineage is cut off, he is now abtar. He has no son to maintain his position after him." The Quranic verse "Indeed, it is your enemy who is the one cut off" is related to this (Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, 32/132). The killing of Hasan and Husayn is also directly related to leaving the Prophet heirless.

Because the Prophet likened Ali to Moses's Aaron (Bukhari, Hadith: 3706), he gave his sons the Arabic equivalents of Aaron's children's names (Shabbar, Shubayr, Mushbir), namely Hasan, Husayn, and Muhsin (Baladhuri 3/361).

The institutionalized religious culture's elites romanticize the Prophet's comparison of Ali to Moses's Aaron, presenting it as a compliment to Ali. The reason for this distortion is that they understood the message of the comparison perfectly well.

In conclusion, the metaphysical-authoritarian Islamic state, which Caliph Mu'awiyah b. Abi Sufyan propelled into an imperial stage, was already ready for its birth in terms of the theo-political and ideological historical current it flowed within.

III.

Beginning in the early period of Islam, in the political thought of the Sunni Islamic tradition, the state was more than just a functional and pragmatic organization for managing societal affairs; it was ideology- and doctrine-equipped, oriented towards societal design, and cult-like. Until the concept of sovereignty began to be used in the 17th century, when modern nation-states emerged (Heywood, p. 110), the state was not a political organization. Therefore, according to Foucault, pastoral power (pastor/preacher) in Christianity is one of the three axes determining the genealogy of government (the other two being diplomatic-military technique and police). He argues that until the 16th century, the state, in the sense of territorial administration, was not a political structure. What needed to be governed were people or individuals or groups (Foucault, 2008: 167). The power of the shepherd, by definition, is applied over the flock, not over a territory (Foucault, 2014: 29). This new form of power is a religiously justified new version of Bodin's absolute state authority, inspired by the Roman pater familias (head of the family) depiction (Ağaoğulları, p. 406).

Zygmunt Bauman, a renowned sociologist of postmodern philosophy, states that in the pastoral mode of governance, power concerns itself with individuals under its rule one by one, aiming for their betterment and desiring the improvement of its subjects (Bauman, p. 66). This is the source of the flock's dependence on and gratitude towards the shepherd. Foucault points out that in the pastoral power and obedience mechanism, the shepherd rules over the moving flock/society, not over the land (Foucault, 1997: 68), thereby highlighting a significant difference from Niccolò Machiavelli's (1469-1527) prince who rules over a territorial domain: the shepherd is within the flock/society; he is not beyond or outside it (Danyali, p. 39).

The origin of the pastoral power model goes back further than ancient Greece or Rome, connecting to the ancient East: Egypt, Assyria, Transoxiana, and Judaism (Foucault, 2008: 167). God is the shepherd of humanity, and the king is the subordinate shepherd to whom God has entrusted the flock of humanity (Foucault, 2013: 111).

The Pythagoreans derived "nomos" (law) from "nomeus" (shepherd) and the title "nomios," meaning shepherd-god, for Zeus. In Plato's Critias and Republic and Laws, a good judge is seen as a good shepherd. Plato's Statesman applies the shepherd metaphor to the political leader as well (Rehmann, p. 308).

In Judeo-Christian culture, the form of religious obedience practiced was determined by a promise. This was God's promise of land to His people. This is what Foucault calls pastoral power in the example of Eastern empires and theocratic regimes. The flock believes it owes everything to the shepherd—from sustenance and security to its very life—and views disobedience to his commands as ingratitude.

It is true that in non-Christian Eastern cultures, God is also accepted as a shepherd. For example, in Egypt, the name of the greatest God, "Ra," meant "shepherd." The flock's view of the shepherd is reflected in one of the hymns of supplication to Ra: "The Great Ra, who does not take His eyes off them when everyone sleeps, who desires what is best for the flock" (Foucault, 2014: 28). Similarly, in an Assyrian prayer, the king is addressed as: "Diligent companion of the pastures, you who watch over and nourish your lands, shepherd of abundance" (Foucault, 2014: 29).

In Islam, Allah is not referred to as a shepherd, but shepherding is praised, and it is a source of pride that every prophet engaged in shepherding before becoming a prophet. According to a narration, the Prophet said, "No prophet came but he pastured sheep." They asked him, "Even you, O Messenger of Allah?" He replied, "Yes, even I. I used to pasture the sheep of the Makkans" (Ibn Asakir, 4/86). Another narration, claimed to be a saying of the Prophet, states, "All of you are shepherds, and all of you are responsible for your flock" (Abu Awana, 4/384).

The source of these and similar narrations is Abu Hurayra, who, despite embracing Islam only three years before the Prophet's death, transmitted thousands of questionable, fabricated, or misunderstood reports. Furthermore, the information he provided and such reports he transmitted cannot be corroborated by objective historical narration/writing. The claim that the Prophet, a member of a wealthy Meccan noble family who managed his rich merchant wife Khadijah's caravans at a young age, herded the sheep of the Makkans is unfounded. This is likely a narration fabricated by the Umayyad tribe to demean the Prophet.

In Arabic usage, the etymology of "siyaset" (politics) also includes the meaning of "subduing, educating, reforming," especially concerning animals and extending to humans (Farahidi, 2/206). In this sense, the relationship between ruler and subject can be likened to a "father-child" relationship. In the Ottoman Empire, the sultan was the owner, master, and shepherd of the subjects, just as he held the right of ownership over the land. As İnalcık states, "Absolute obedience is required from the Caliph-Sultan, who is entrusted with leading and administering Muslims on the path of Sharia. In this respect, the Islamic ruler is likened to a shepherd tasked with bringing his flock to salvation" (Halil İnalcık, 1958: 74). In ancient Turkish belief, the state (kut) was also divine. Rulers received their authority from God (Kafesoglu, p. 250).

According to Ottoman-Turkish state philosophy, the Sultan is appointed by God to hold together the various strata of society (Heper, 2018: 52). The historian Tursun Bey (d. 1499), in listing the proofs of God making man His vicegerent on Earth, includes the existence of a Sultan in every era (Keskintaş, p. 305, also citing Tahsin Görgün that Tursun Bey saw the state as a necessary tool for nizam-ı alem - order of the world), stems from the conception that the authority of wilayah (guardianship), which is accepted as belonging to Allah in Islamic theology, is manifested in the Sultan.

Theologians consider wilayah, which is an act of Allah, as one of the most important issues in Islamic theology. The discussions in the West regarding the powers of the monarch correspond to the issue of the Sultan's wilayah in Islam, and the accumulated knowledge on this topic can be found more in Shia books than in Sunni ones. Some have addressed it within the discussion of Imamate, while others examine it as an independent topic. Among the Sunni theological works written on wilayah in Islamic thought history, the books of figures such as Ibn Qutaybah, Tirmidhi, Tabari, and Mawardi can be mentioned (Yazdi Mutlaq, p. 177).

The Ottoman political structure, with its paternalistic and pastoral characteristics, perfectly fits Weber's model of "Oriental patrimonialism" (Weber, p. 239).

In the Ottoman Empire, which Weber cited as an example of his Oriental patrimonialism model (Duran and Çamlı, p. 11), the entire country was considered a single property, and the owner of this property was the Sultan (Halil İnalcık, 2015: 218). It is important to note here that "mulk" signifies both ownership and sovereignty (melikiyet). That is, the country belonged to the Sultan both as immovable property (ownership) and in terms of governance, sovereignty, and wilayah (kingship). The state structure was based on the Sultan's personal political understanding and governance style, and thus there was no principle of separation of powers (Heper, 1977: 59). From 1055, when Tughril Bey entered Baghdad and was granted authority over Islamic lands by the Caliph, the Turkish ruler maintained his absolute character, recognizing no shared authority or higher power than his own (İnalcık, 1999: 7).

Şerif Mardin, arguing for the absence of civil society in the Ottoman Empire and referencing thinkers who compared East and West, observed that the Ottoman Empire lacked the "intermediate" structures that both Machiavelli and Montesquieu believed differentiated Eastern despotism from Western feudalism. In Ottoman society, there was no structural component, as Hegel termed "civil society," that could function independently of the central government and was based on property rights (Mardin, 1969: 258-281).

In the Ottoman Empire, the state, as much as possible, did not consider granting civil society status to peripheral segments and did not allow these segments to play a role in state administration (Metin Heper, 1977: 70). Due to the Empire's developed network of institutions, there was already a strong center. This prevented the formation of a civil society and the resulting intermediate mechanisms as seen in the West (Mardin, 1990: 126).

Starting in 1826, the Tanzimat's agenda of participation in Western-style modernization and integration with the West—or, as İnalcık assesses it, "attempts undertaken to establish a modern society and a state based on liberal principles" (İnalcık, 1993: 29)—ended the type of centralism centered on the Sultan. However, the bundle of authority held by the Sultan, who was the brain of the state organization (Williamson, p. 26) and both its material and spiritual head (Mehrdad Kia, p. 103) in classical periods, largely passed into the hands of the bureaucracy. The new era was the phase of the emergence of the modern centralized state, and the bureaucracy, as the political actor of this period, took over power from the Sultan and began to govern the state (Velidedeoğlu, p. 3).

It would not be incorrect to view the policy of the Secular Republic—which includes organizing public life (Meriç, p. 60) and controlling religious life through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Tarhanlı, p. 167)—as inheriting a history replete with examples of state intervention in religion and civil society. Accepting the Republic as a hybrid regime, a mixture of traditional and modern institutions inherited from the Ottoman Empire, is explanatory.

In some studies, it has been suggested that the Republic, ostensibly based on the will of the people, should be considered a neo-patrimonial regime (Yıldırım, p. 8). Neo-patrimonialism, most notably, is defined as a presidential system (or presidency) where all authority is concentrated in the hands of a single individual, except for the delegation of some insignificant decisions (Bratton and Walle, p. 63). Seyyid Bey, a Deputy from İzmir who made significant intellectual and political contributions to the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate, vehemently opposed granting the President the power to dissolve the Assembly in the February 1924 Constitution (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu) (Erdem, p. 23). He was attempting to prevent the emergence of a hybrid political regime that, while appearing to be a Republic, would in essence be a reincarnation of the "sacred state" from the old monarchical regime.

There is a discernible relationship between the concept of the sacred state, which is central to Islamic political thought, and the failure of autonomous public spheres and civil society formations to emerge through the natural course of history. Without tracing the chronology and adventures of the political, cultural, and religious origins of this 'sacred state,' the defining characteristic of this political culture, it is impossible to understand the contemporary political behaviors of Muslims. It is also noteworthy that the concept of the state explained in Western thought with reference to Eastern political culture and the Biblical "shepherd-flock" conceptualization bears similarities to the state that emerged in the Islamic cultural sphere.

It is clear that the metaphysical (sacred) state model, a defining characteristic of Muslim political thought, has mythological, cultural, political, and religious origins, and that these elements were embodied as the experience of Islam within its historical trajectory.

The reasons why principles, tools, and ideas such as justice, equality, freedom, human rights, social contract, free elections, peaceful transfer of power, accountability of power, separation of powers, transparency, and political participation did not emerge and develop in Muslim societies through a similar historical process as in the West; and why Muslim thinkers, intellectuals, and politicians were forced to adopt these principles, tools, and institutions by translating them from the West in the 19th century, should be sought in the early adventure of the deconstruction of Islam.

Translated by Gemini

References

• Abd al-Rabbih al-Andalusi, Ahmad b. Muhammad. (d. 940). (1983). El-Ikdu'l-Ferid, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• Ağaoğulları, Mehmet Ali. (2015). Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere Batı'da Siyasal Düşünceler, 6. Baskı, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
• Ahmad b. Hanbal, AbuAbd Allah.` (d. 855). (1895). Musnad al-Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal, Kahire: Matbaatu'l-Meymene.
• ``Ali al-Qari, Abu al-Hasan Nur al-Din.` (d. 1605). (2001). Mirqat al-Mafatih, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye; Muhammed b. Abdullah Hatib et-Tebrizî'nin Mişkatu'l-Mesabih'ine şerh.
• ``Asqalani, Ibn Hajar.` (d. 1449). (1995). Al-Isaba fi Tamyiz al-Sahaba, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• Bauman, Zygmunt. (1925-2017). (2012). Yasa Koyucular ve Yorumcular, İstanbul: Metis Yayıncılık.
• Baladhuri, Abu al-Hasan Ahmad b. Yahya. (d. 892). (1996). Kitab Jumal min Ansab al-Ashraf, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Fikr.
• Bayhaqi, Ahmad b. Husayn. (d. 1066). (2003). Al-Sunan al-Kubra, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• Bayhaqi, Abu Bakr Ahmad b. al-Husayn. (d. 1066). (2003). Al-Sunan al-Kubra, Beyrut: Dâru'l-İlmiyye.
• Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicholas. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, London: Cambridge University Press.
• Bukhari, Muhammad b. Ismail.` (d. 870). (2002). Sahih al-Bukhari, Şam-Beyrut: Dâru İbn Kesir, (dijital nüsha).
• Danyalî, Ârif. (Bahar-Yaz 2014). “Şebânkâregî-yi Mesihî, İnkâr ya Âferineş-i Sûje”, Şinâht, Sayı: 68, ss. 37-74.
• Darimi, Abu Muhammad. (d. 869). (1999). Fath al-Mannan (Kitab al-Darimi / al-Musnad al-Jami`), Mekketu'l-Mükerreme: Dâru'l-Beşâiri'l-İslamiyye.
• Duran, Bünyamin ve Çamlı, Ahmet Yavuz. (2019). Klasik dönem Osmanlı toplumunun sosyo-ekonomik yapısı: (Max Weber'in patrimonyalizm teorisi çerçevesinde incelenmesi), İstanbul: Hiper Yayın.
• Abu al-Fida,Imad al-Din Ismail al-Ayyubi. (d. 1331). (1907). al-Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Bashar, Kahire: Matbaatu'l-Huseyniyye.
• Albani, Muhammad Nasir al-Din. (1914-1999). (1979). Irwa' al-Ghalil fi Takhrij Ahadith Manar al-Sabil, Beyrut: al-Mektebetu'l-İslamî.
• Erdem, Sami. (1999). “Seyyid Bey: Hayatı ve Eserleri”, Türk Hukuk ve Siyaset Adamı Seyyit Bey Sempozyumu (16 Mayıs 1997), İzmir Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları.
• Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, AbuAbd Allah.` (d. 1210). (1981). al-Mushtahir bi al-Tafsir al-Kabir wa Mafatih al-Ghayb, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Fikr.
• Farahidi, Khalil b. Ahmad. (d. 791). (2003). Kitab al-Ayn Murattabanala Huruf al-Mu`jam, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• Foucault, Michel. (1926-1984). (2008). The Birth of Bio-politics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
• Foucault, Michel. (1997). “The Punitive Society”, Ethics, Translated by Robert Hurley and others, Edited by Paul Rabinow, London: The Penguin Press.
• Foucault, Michel. (2008). The Birth of Bio-politics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Foucault, Michel. (2013). Güvenlik, Toprak, Nüfus, Collège de France Dersleri 1977-1978, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
• Foucault, Michel. (2014). Özne ve İktidar / Seçme Yazılar 2, Dördüncü Basım, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, s. 28.
• Foucault, Michel. (2014). Özne ve İktidar / Seçme Yazılar 2, Dördüncü Basım, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
• Khazin, Abu al-HasanAla' al-Din.` (d. 1341). (2014). Tafsir al-Khazin, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• Heper, Metin. (1977). Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme İstanbul: Boğazi Üniversitesi Yayınları.
• Heper, Metin. (2018). Türkiye'de Devlet Geleneği, Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları.
• Heywood, Andrew. (2011). Siyaset Teorisine Giriş, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
• IbnAsakir, Abu al-Qasim.` (d. 1176). (1995). Tarikh Madinat Dimashq, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Fikr.
• Ibn Ishaq, AbuAbd Allah Muhammad.` (d. 768). (1990). Al-Sirah al-Nabawiyya, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kitabi'l-Arabî.
• Ibn Qutayba Abu MuhammadAbd Allah.` (d. 889). (1990). Al-Imama wa al-Siyasa, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Edva.
• Ibn Manzur, Abu al-Fadl Jamal al-Din. (d. 1311). Lisan al-`Arab, Kahire: Dâru'l-Mearif.
• Ibn Sad, Abu Abd Allah. (d. 845). (2001). Kitab al-Tabaqat al-Kabir, Kahire: Mektebetu'l-Hânecî.
• *Ibn Taymiyya, Abu al-Abbas Taqi al-Din.** (d. 1328). (2005). *Majmu al-Fatawa, al-Mansura: Dâru'l-Wafa.
• Ibn al-Athir, Abu al-HasanIzz al-Din.` (d. 1233). (1987). al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• İnalcık, Halil. (1916-2016). (Nisan 1958). “Osmanlı Padişahı”, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, Sayı: 13, ss. 68-79.
• İnalcık, Halil. (1993). Osmanlı Devleti, Toplumu ve Ekonomisi, İstanbul: Eren Yayınları.
• İnalcık, Halil. (2015). Devlet-i 'Aliyye, İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
• İnalcık, Halil. (Kasım-Aralık 1999). “Türk Devletlerinde Sivil Kanun Geleneği”, Türkiye Günlüğü, Sayı: 58, ss. 5-11.
• *Isfarayini, AbuAwanah.** (d. 929). (1998). *Musnad AbiAwanah, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Ma'rife.
• Kafesoğlu, İbrahim. (1912-1984). (1997). Türk Milli Kültürü, İstanbul: Ötüken, (Kutadgu Bilig'den nakil).
• Kandahlawi, Muhammad Zakariyya. (1898-1982). (2003). Awjaz al-Masalik ila Muwatta' Malik, Dımeşk: Dâru'l-Kalem.
• Karagöz, Fatma Gül. (Aralık 2020). “17. Yüzyılda Mühimme Defterleri ve Ayntâb Şer'iye Sicilleri Örneklerinde Kahvehânelerin Kapatılması ve Tütün Yasaklarının Uygulanması”, Hacettepe Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 2, ss. 494-554.
• Keskintaş, Orhan. (2017). Adalet, Ahlak ve Nizam: Osmanlı Siyasetnameleri, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
• Kia, Mehrdad. (2017). The Ottoman Empire: A Historical Encyclopedia, Volume I, California: ABC-CLIO.
• Kulayni, Muhammad b. Yaqub.` (d. 941). (1988). al-Kafi, Tehran: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İslamiyye.
• Lecker, Michael. (2004). The “Constitution of Medina”, Muhammad's First Legal Document, New Jersey: The Darwin Press Inc. Princeton.
• Maqdisi, AbuAbd Allah Shams al-Din.` (d. 1000). (2013). Kitab al-Bad' wa al-Tarikh, Kahire: Mektebetu't-Sekafeti'd-Diniyye.
• Mardin, Şerif. (1927-2017). (June 1969). “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11/13, ss. 258-281.
• Mardin, Şerif. (1990). “Türk Siyasasını Açıklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Çevre İlişkileri”, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset, Makaleler I, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
• Meriç, Nevin. (2000). Osmanlı'da gündelik hayatın değişimi: âdâb-ı muâşeret, 1894-1927, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları.
• Mutlaq, Mahmud Yazdi. (2013). [Edisyon], Imamatpazhuhi: Barrasi-yi Didgah-i Imamiyya, Mutazila wa Ashaira, Mashhad: Danishgah-i `Ulum-i Islami-yi Razavi.
• Muttaqi al-Hindi,Ala' al-Din b. Ali. (d. 1567). (1971). Kanz al-`Ummal, Beyrut: Daru’l-Kütübi’l-İlmiyye.
• *Munawi, MuhammadAbd al-Ra'uf.** (d. 1622). (1972). *Fayd al-Qadir Sharh al-Jami al-Saghir, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Ma'rife.
• Muslim, Abu al-Husayn. (d. 875). (2006). Sahih Muslim, Kahire: Dâru Tiba.
• *Nabhani, Yusuf b. Ismail.** (1849-1932). (2010). *Majmu al-Arbain Arbain min Ahadith Sayyid al-Mursalin, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye; al-Bayhaqi takhrijinden: 7124, fi Shu`ub al-Iman.
• Najafi, Muhammad Hasan (d. 1845), Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Shara'i` al-Islam, Beyrut: Dâru Ihya' al-Turath.
• Nisaburi, al-Hakim. (d. 1014). (2009). al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyyye.
• Nisaburi, Hakim. (d. 1014). (1997). Al-Mustadrak `ala al-Sahihayn, Kahire: Dâru'l-Harameyn.
• Fraser, Nancy. (2004). “Kamusal Alanı Yeniden Düşünmek: Gerçekte Varolan Demokrasinin Eleştirisine Bir Katkı”. Özbek, Meral (ed.), Kamusal Alan içinde, Hil Yayın. ss. 103-133.
• Rehmann, Jan. (2020). İdeoloji Kuramları: Yabancılaşmanın ve Boyun Eğmenin Güçleri, İstanbul: Yordam Kitap. Foucault'yu tekzip eden örneklerin aktarıldığı kaynak: Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007, s. 136-138.
• Sanani, Abd al-Razzaq b. Hammam. (d. 1983). Al-Musannaf. Beyrut: El-Mektebetu'l-İslamî.
• **Subhani, Jafar.** (2005). “Bastani Dastaha dar Namaz, Bidat ya Sunnat?”, Majalla-yi Fiqh-i Ahl-i Bayt, Sayı: 41.
• Suyuti, Abu al-Fadl Jalal al-Din. (d. 1505). (2015). Durr al-Mansur, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Fikr.
• Shaybani, Abu BakrAmr b. Abi Asim. (d. 900). (1980). Kitab al-Sunna, Beyrut: al-Kutub al-Islami.
• Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir. (d. 923). (2009). Tafsir al-Tabari, Jamial-Bayanan Ta'wil Ayat al-Qur'an, Kahire: Mektebetu İbn Teymiyye.
• Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir. (d. 923). (2011). Tarikh al-Umam wa al-Muluk, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.
• Tarhanlı, İştar B. (1993). Müslüman toplum "laik" devlet: Türkiye'de Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, İstanbul: AFA yayınları.
• Uğur, Mücteba. (1997). “Hasen”, İstanbul: DİA.
• Velidedeoğlu, Hıfzı Veldet. (1904-1992). (1989). “Kanunlaştırma Hareketleri ve Tanzimat”, Tanzimat I, İstanbul: Numune matbaacılık.
• Weber, Max. (1864-1920). (1978). Economy and Society, University of California Press.
• Williamson, Ben. (1987). Educational and Social Change in Egypt and Turkey, A Study in Historical Sociology, London: Macmillan Press.
• Yıldırım, Yılmaz. (2012). “Neo-Patrimonyalizm Yaklaşımına Karşı Yapılaşma Olarak Türk Modernleşmesi”, Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Cilt: 14, Sayı: 1, ss. 1-21.
• Yılmaz, Fehmi. (2012). “Tütün”, İstanbul: DİA.
• Zamakhshari, Abu al-Qasim. (d. 1144). (2015). Tafsir al-Kashshaf, Beyrut: Dâru'l-Kütübi'l-İlmiyye.