Kenan Camurcu

The age of the world is estimated to be 4 billion years. In the sky visible to our eyes, there are reportedly 4 billion galaxies, each containing 400 billion stars. It is a distance that would take tens of thousands of years to traverse to the nearest galaxy, even if a faster-than-light vehicle were invented. When asked why the Creator needed this colossal panorama, the answer given is that these figures apply to the human universe, and none of them hold any sway in the presence of God. Alternatively, it is claimed that in the Malakut (God's Kingdom), these numbers can shrink to mere seconds, or even milliseconds. They must think this makes the picture reasonable and explainable.

However, neither Allah nor the angels live in this world and universe, so why should we base the calculation on them? Humans and other living beings inhabit it, and when they are considered, the billion-scale of time and space remains mind-boggling. If this is a necessity, what is the meaning and value of necessity for the Creator? If space exists to prevent objects from crushing each other, and time exists to prevent events from piling up, why did He have to create life this way? Why weren't humans created in a timeless and spaceless universe like the angels? What is the direct relationship between creation with time and space and the concept of testing (or trial)? On this plateau of distinction, are God's justice and mercy separate stories and experiences for every individual? If the order of time and space is a simulated alternative reality, what is the point of the experiences lived being a test? It’s complex, chaotic, meaningless, and exceedingly strange. If it were up to Albert Camus, we should view existence as fundamentally absurd and rebel against it by creating meaning (The Myth of Sisyphus, 1997). That is the extent of the peculiarity in the complications of creation.

Is the Universe a Waste of Space?

Returning to the infinite universe, the question of why the Creator needed this enormous perspective remains unanswered. Why did God create distances that can never be reached? Moreover, radio frequency research suggests no similar living life exists up to a distance of 100 million light-years from Earth. It seems that life exists only on Earth, in the midst of this desolation. This is comparable to only one out of 250 million sperm resulting in life. But why? Dr. Ellie Arroway (Jodie Foster) in the exquisite 1997 film Contact said, "If there is no life out there, it would be an awful waste of space." Why was there a need for such a waste of space, even as far as we have observed?

The kind of religiosity that loves to have scientific theories validate religious propositions tries to use the infinite universe to prove that Allah is all-powerful rather than seeing it as a waste of space. But they lack the social science background to realize their etymological mistake. Because although translations render the phrase "He is Kâdir (all-powerful)" in the Quran (e.g., Al-Fath 21) as "He has power over everything," the word does not mean this. They assume the root is kudret (power) and that the word is derived from it. However, kadîr (a substantive adjective or exaggerated form) and kâdir (the subject/agent) mean "the Measurer." Even if the intention is to signify the ability to carry out something in a measured way and to measure, that is a secondary meaning.

What kind of God is this, who creates things whose limits we cannot grasp, yet manifests for Moses at a certain point in the southern Mediterranean, and Moses, influenced by this, speaks words to organize life, addressing his own ethnicity? According to the historical information in Al-Ma'idah 21 ("Enter the holy land which Allah has written for you"), in the north, the Canaan of that time and the Urušalim/Jerusalem of later times, which Moses and his accompanying Jews were trying to reach, the path was opened for Jesus, who was of Moses's ethnic origin, to witness extraordinary things. Although his life ended tragically, words of wisdom echoed across every race and geography were poured from his tongue. Later, to the southeast, Muhammad, from a cousin ethnicity, encountered a different dimension of existence and conveyed it to his surroundings in the language of his own cultural reality. In the words of the famous philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush, he was interpreting the dreams he saw while awake.

A quick note on this: Muhammad of Mecca, and later Medina, interpreted the realm of existence he saw during meditative trance (istiğrak/wajd) in the early 7th century using the culture, language, stories, and traditions of that time. This is similar to how physicists now express the universe of existence they observe experimentally—not in a dream, but in a hadron collider and other experiments—using today's language. Protons, particles, neutrons, etc. Yes, the two observations are similar; there is no error in the comparison. Thanks to Husserl's valuable efforts, thought activity has long been accredited as scientific activity. In examples such as creating matter from energy at CERN, twin protons behaving identically no matter how far apart they are in the universe, or protons beginning to behave differently when the quantum universe is observed, scientists are performing a type of dream interpretation. Freud, who devoted his life to dreams, could have developed interesting hypotheses had he attempted to look at this aspect of the matter.

End of note. Let's continue the main topic.

There were, of course, other special individuals whom we call prophets, and all of them were the subjects of narrow, small, and limited spheres of activity. While all this was happening, different human communities scattered across other parts of the world were unaware of each other and of the events unfolding in these regions.

A God who creates a universe on a billion scale acted as God for certain small human communities in tiny locations on Earth—a minuscule dot within that universe. Why? No one knows the reason. Why didn't He ensure that knowledge about His existence and nature reached all tribes, clans, communities, and peoples? The assertion that this happened—that a prophet was sent to every nation—is merely a claim. The verses that speak of messengers conveying the revelation in the language of their own communities do not state that a prophet emerged within every community. That is a mistranslation and misinterpretation. They only state that the messenger who emerged within a nation expressed himself using their own culture, history, language, customs, and traditions. Or that every prophet repeated the same message (An-Nahl 36). Furthermore, the sending of a prophet is also an assertion, a theory, a hypothesis. Commentators only give the word ba'th the meaning of "sending" in verses related to the sending of prophets, but only where prophets are mentioned. This, however, is not the word's genuine or inherent meaning; it has been applied to it. It is a meaning established to suit the theory of prophethood. In all the remaining verses of the Quran, they use the word's true meaning, which is "resurrection."

Again, why did the messengers who mediated the flow of information cease with Muhammad? There is no answer to this question in the Quran. On such an important matter, there is only a single verse among more than 6,000 verses. In fact, Al-Ahzab 40 relates to the crisis that erupted when Zaynab, who was married to the Prophet’s adopted son, said she was in love with the Prophet and wanted to divorce her husband and marry the Prophet. The verse begins by saying, "Muhammad is not the father of any of your men," continues by stating he is a messenger, and ends by introducing him with the attribute of the "Seal of the Prophets (who bring the news)." Thus, the main issue is the first sentence of the verse, and the continuation of the verse refers to this issue. Indeed, the matter is repeated up to Al-Ahzab 54, with successive warnings for believers to be meticulous about the Prophet's reputation. These are the block of verses that prompted Aisha, the daughter of Abu Bakr, to lose her temper out of jealousy and say, "I see that your Lord is very quick to cater to your desires" (An-Nasai 3199, Al-Bukhari 4788, Muslim 1464, Ibn Majah 2000, Ahmad 25251).

Is such a crucial announcement that prophethood has ceased conveyed by minimizing its importance in this way? Moreover, with the symbolic expression "Seal of the Prophets," the meaning of which is not fully understood. There has even been a dispute over the reading of the construct (khātamun-nabiyyīn), with some reading it with a kasra (khātim) to mean "seal." (Al-Tabari, Jami' al-Bayan, 2013: 10/305). The only person who read it as "khātam," as it is written in Turkish Quranic manuscripts, was 'Asim of Kufa (d. 745). Khātim means seal, while khātam means ring. Although Ali Akbar Qureshi, the author of Qamus-i Qur'an, states that it can also be called khātam because letters were sealed with rings.

The single justification put forward by commentators, from the most learned to the most ignorant, is that humanity is now developed enough and no longer needs a reminding messenger. Is this an explanation? Messengers did not emerge due to insufficient access to information or underdevelopment, so why should they no longer be necessary? When I was touring the Cairo museum and saw 4,000- and 5,000-year-old fabrics, clothing, hand tools, and symbols containing theological information, I couldn't help but murmur to myself, "How dazzling, how powerful, how dissuasive was the technology, knowledge, culture, and civilization of the domain that Moses challenged, even by today's standards."

Messengers emerged during times when the human crisis in giving meaning to existence deepened, and this crisis is now deeper and more comprehensive than at any other time in history. Why do we think the personal development industry is so popular? Why are cults, self-help gurus, and people who speak words of wisdom gathering followers with such excitement, whether they are from Islamic, other religious, or even secular backgrounds? It is because there is a great human, cultural, and civilizational crisis in almost every society, especially in developed countries and societies.

Some mystics (tasawwuf erbabı), while remaining within the official theology that legislates the end of prophethood, argue that God has not abandoned humanity, reminding us that He is living (Hayy) and everlasting (Qayyūm). Therefore, humans can continue to make contact with the realm of revelation. The doors are not closed. Impassable barriers and walls have not been placed between the world and the beyond. The reason this experience is not called "revelation" but "inspiration" is that others, and even the person themselves, are not under an obligation to follow it. It is merely a technical and conceptual issue. The nature of what is witnessed is the same. The sentence in the Quran, "Your Lord has not forsaken you, nor has He become displeased" (Ad-Duha 3), describes the state that the Prophet Muhammad saw, heard, and witnessed, but perhaps it is also to soothe and compensate for the present human feeling of abandonment. All of these are claims and hypotheses, of course.

The political, military, financial, and sociological body of Ash'ari theology, Sunnism, is naturally reactive to the approach of Sufism. For this reason, Sufism is commonly described as the "Shia of Sunnism." Ibn Taymiyyah was already angry at Sufism because the purged Shia elements from Sunni jurisprudence were living within it. He even excommunicated it. His followers and the Salafist path he founded view this as purifying and purging religion of sediments. However, there is no such thing as a pure religion of Allah. Islam is the product of the language, culture, history, and society of the Hijaz in the 7th century. Salafism's claim to purify religion is the ideological camouflage of Umayyad Arab nationalism. It is a reaction to the science, culture, art, philosophy, contemplation, and civilization that emerged from the Hijaz and was established by various peoples on the Iranian plateau, reaching its peak in Iraq during the Abbasid period.

Although Islam asserts that prophethood has ended, it cannot say that humanity has been left to its own devices. For this reason, intermediary solutions have been developed. Sunnis speak of "Mujaddids" who will appear every hundred years. These are high-level scholars who will renew, reform, and revitalize religious thought and life. This chain will continue until the end of time, and finally, the Mahdi will appear. This means humanity will never be left in a void or on its own.

The problem can be solved if the classical "Mahdi" concept—the purported savior who will appear at the end of history and time—is reformed and interpreted to mean that admonishing, reminding, and reviving figures who will take on the function of the prophet will exist throughout time. Philosophers, thinkers, scientists, poets, wise people, and prophet-like leaders who call to truth, etc., can be Mahdis who intervene and bring people back to life when their reason, fairness, conscience, morality, and intellect falter.

The concept of Mahdi can be likened to Plato's philosopher-king model, but that is only related to political sovereignty. The state of impasse that humanity is plunging into is not solely about administration. Crises can arise in all aspects of relationships with nature and people, and not every situation can be regulated by law. In matters of volunteerism, humanity, and spirituality, behaviors without sanction can only be stirred by fueling emotion. This is what the Mahdis will do.

The specific and mythological Mahdi (Imam-i Zaman) theory in Twelver Shi'ism is, of course, different. The Twelfth Imam is a theory based on the premise of the famous Shi'ite theologian Sharif al-Murtaza (d. 1044) in his work al-Shafi fi'l-Imama, where he argues that God could not have left humanity to its own devices after the completion of prophethood, finds this contrary to absolute justice and divine grace, and proves the necessity of the Imams' existence through reason and logic. According to him, prophets undertook their duty with prophethood (nubuwwah), and Imams with guardianship (wilayah).

However, Sharif al-Murtaza does not address the question and problem of humanity being left to its own devices again after the process of the Imamate, which he claimed should start after the completion of prophethood, also ended with the Twelfth Imam. The solution offered by Shaykh al-Saduq (d. 991) to this problem is the tradition that twelve Mahdis from the Imam-i Zaman's lineage will come until his return (Zuhur). (Kamalu'd-Din wa Tamamu'n-Ni'me, 1975: 1/250-252). However, this tradition did not gain popularity within Twelver Shi'ism.

In the face of the problem of Muslims being left on their own with the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, the assumption that the Mahdi (Imam-i Zaman) has been alive for over a thousand years and has not cut off his connection with the world is deemed sufficient for explanation. Moreover, since jurists carry out duties on his behalf during his physical absence (Wilayat al-Faqih), no vacuum occurs. These are, of course, the necessities of the theory. Imami Shi'ism is not troubled by the fact that they have compelled God into such a model to sustain and defend the theory.

Given this, the importance of disputes, lack of information, and uncertainties in the sources—such as the historical fact that Imam Hasan al-Askari, considered the Eleventh Imam, did not have a son; that the child no one saw entered a cave and never reappeared; that the information is weak, fragile from the perspective of hadith technique, and does not constitute evidence; that the identity of Narjis, who is claimed to be Hasan al-Askari's wife, is unknown; and that there is even disagreement over what her real name was—have all lost their significance. The scholars of Imami Shi'ism, who do not even accept ahad (single-chain) reports as a source in jurisprudence, were compelled to make historical material that does not even rise to the level of ahad reports the fundamental basis of the sect and its creed. The literature, hagiographies, stories, and tales of witnessing the Mahdi produced by Imami scholars after Sharif al-Murtaza, and especially by narrators of tragic epics (rawzahkhans), have taken the place of reality.

Islam, neither with the Sunnis' Mahdi at the end of time nor with Imami Shi'ism's Mahdi, who disappeared in 874 and is claimed to be still alive, has been able to, is able to, or can be a remedy for the human crisis of the prophet-less ages. It also lacks answers that would satisfy humanity's philosophical distress. It cannot contribute to scientific developments. As seen in Europe, it has not solved problems through a chronological series of philosophers and thinkers. All it has is conquest, capture, invasion, violence, imposing religion, or collecting tribute (tax). This is why it has slowly withdrawn from the stage of history since the 18th century, when it lost the power to do these things. It was through this that its lack of capacity to contemplate humanity's search for truth and the problem of existence was revealed. Its making the brilliant scientific and philosophical activity that lasted until the 12th century a subject of a nostalgic narrative, instead of seeing it as a legacy, stems from both its lack of enthusiasm for these matters and the impossibility of scientific activity coexisting with conquest. However, it does not neglect to use that historical accumulation as an ideological, political, and military tool to gain moral superiority over its Western rival.

All attempts to ideologize Islam are malign. They have also produced bad results. The glorious 1979 Iranian revolution is a clear example of this. The effort and performance shown by the late Ali Shariati in extracting an ideology from religion to mobilize society up to the revolution stage can be excused. Because, in his time, it seemed like the way and method to motivate a religiousness that was indifferent to political problems. However, one should not overlook the alienating characteristic of ideology, given Marx's critique of ideology. The comparison is certainly not identical in all its elements, but it fits the alienation of the devout from Islam and their moving away from religion. Had Shariati lived, he would have seen this problem in Iran, which flowed into a completely different stream a few years after the revolution. It is like the state of Muslim identity as an ideological identity in the autocratic rule of conservatives in Turkey. There is no exception to the rule: Ideology alienates religion from its essence.

Christianity has been a matter of mysticism and spirituality since its inception. Judaism is a subject of ethnology and anthropology. Islam, which claims to be neither of these two, is the headline for the ideology debate. From the second Caliph onward, Muslim identity ceased to be about religion, spirituality, and mysticism, and evolved into a political identity. The first two Caliphs constructed Muslim identity as an ideological and political identity. Muawiyah is the link in the chain that institutionalized this identity and structuralized it as a dynasty, a court, and a sultanate. In terms of theology, he could not put himself forward against Ali to emphasize his role in the architecture of Muslim identity; he lacked that prestige. Therefore, he put Abu Bakr and Omar, whose personal histories he had rewritten, against the memory and legacy of Ali.

The World of Religiosity Where Gods Fight

While the fundamental questions have not yet been answered, some people are trying to impose their God on others and on those who believe differently. We witness examples of conversion that every faith embellishes and narrates. Scores are kept. This is a body-count competition between faiths.

Okay, others dictate their God using reason and logic, but what about Muslims? Islam is the strangest of all forms of religiosity. Throughout history, it has started wars to impose its conception of God, which is based on its own assumption. It has invaded countries. It accuses some Christian states of launching "salvation campaigns" a few times, but when compared to its own, the Christians' campaigns are statistically insignificant in both number and nature. Muslims have more than 400 jihad and conquest wars compared to 8 Crusades. The Crusaders have no land, country, or society that they conquered and held dominion over for years. After every campaign of conquest, Muslims seized countries and subjected societies to tribute (tax/kharaj) for many years.

It is believed that Allah, the Creator of the universe, who is merciful, Compassionate (Rahman), and Merciful (Rahim) to everything and everyone in it, wanted Muslims to invade countries, plunder their wealth, and exercise domination over the people living there under the name of conquest. They openly state that they would launch campaigns of conquest right now if they had the power. They are absolutely certain that they are acting in the name of Allah and that they are His chosen religious community.

During periods when Islam had military power, it mandated the acceptance of its God in the places it conquered. Those who were offered the choice had three options: either they would believe as Muslims did, reject Islam and be killed, or pay tribute (jizya) for the rest of their lives. And they had to perform the behavior and ritual that symbolized their humiliation every time (Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-Musannaf, 2004: 11/263, 33172). They base the ruling that jizya (tribute) should be given by showing humiliation on the last sentence of Surah At-Tawbah 29. However, that verse was actually a pre-announcement of the tariff (punishment and compensation) that would be applied to the Meccan pagans and their allies—who broke the perpetual non-aggression agreement secured by the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah in less than two years and were preparing for a major war with a large coalition—if they were defeated in battle. Its purpose was, of course, deterrence. It was not a prescriptive ruling valid for all times. But Muslims abandoned this context and applied it to the wars they themselves started. They also made jizya a poll tax on non-Muslims.

However, there are also those who cannot escape even with jizya. The famous Hanafi jurist al-Sarakhsi (d. 1090) defines them as "apostates and idolaters." Their right is either the sword or Islam (Shaybani’s [d. 805] Commentary on Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir by Sarakhsi, "bab al-dua inda al-qital", 1997: 1/57).

To please and make Allah happy, Muslims enslaved the men in the countries they invaded, turning them into commodities to be bought and sold, along with their children. They deemed the women fit for the status of concubine (jariyah). The reason we distinguish a jariyah from a slave is that women whose ownership is possessed can be made into sex slaves without a marriage contract. Even if they are married and their husbands are present. This is because they view ownership as a stronger bond than marriage and argue that it invalidates the marriage (Badr al-Din al-Ayni [d. 1451], al-Binayah fi Sharh al-Hidayah, 1990: 5/585). There is even a narration in the Kafi of the Shi'ite Kulayni (d. 941) that there is no need to wait for the purchased concubine's pregnancy status to be revealed (iddah/istibra) (Al-Furu min al-Kafi, 1988: 5/474, "bab istibrai'l-amat", narration: 9). This is because the jariyah is the subject of ownership, not marriage.

We consider these incidents historical, but let us recall the terrifying and disgusting performance of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The materials and regulations that will be immediately resurrected when an opportunity is found are present in the books. In the capitals of liberal democracies, mullahs are shouting from the pulpits every day that this curriculum is the very essence of Islam. Muslims believe that God commanded all these things. No other religion has such a theoretical regulation and legislation. No one else's God encourages such things.

The Universal God of the Holy Texts

The authors of the Gospel (Injīl) universalized the God of the Torah, removing Him from being merely the God of the Jews. The God of the Qur’an seems to prioritize the God of the Gospel while referencing the God of the Torah without comment or objection. He acknowledges all the paths (shir’a) that preceded the Qur’an as legitimate, warning that He did not make the existing human groups, with all their differences, into one single community (Al-Ma'idah 48). Therefore, in a sense, He is universal as the God of all paths.

But the fundamental question remains: Is God a thing, or a person?

This God is relatively anthropomorphic and definitely a "person." For this reason, it is believed that He created humankind to represent Him (Genesis 1:26-28). The holy texts are interpreted to confirm this assumption. For instance, they use the term "khalīfah" in Al-Baqarah 30—which means a new generation succeeding a previous one—in the sense of "Allah's deputy or representative," completely contrary to the word's meaning, culture, and etymology. How could they use the concept in its true sense of "one who comes after God"? They were forced to slightly distort and retouch it.

In popular Muslim theology, which holds an anthropomorphic conception of God, God is a person among persons. As long as people exist, there is no need for Him; He doesn't take part in the ordinary flow of life and doesn't interfere unless trouble arises.

Based on the Torah's dialogues between God and Moses, God should not be viewed as a "person." When asked His name, He replied that He was the "Existing (Thing)" (Exodus 3:13-14, "I Am that I Am"). This resembles the line in the Qur’an—which is the commentary (reading) of the Torah—in Taha 14: "Verily, I am Allah (al-ilāh/God)." However, when God is described with attributes and descriptions, He approaches the image of a "person." The emphasis on "99 Names" stems from the low level of comprehension that can only perceive Him by making Him a "person." The ritual of transforming those names into dhikr (remembrance/invocation) and repeating them is the training exercise for a type of faith lacking the ability to abstract, convincing itself that God exists and interferes in its life.

On the other hand, the principle that might allow faith to ferment is the maxim, "Whoever knows himself, knows his Lord." Bertrand Russell distinguishes between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" (Bedia Akarsu, Contemporary Philosophy, 1979: 259). There is naturally a difference between the knowledge of the concept of God in the proposition "Whoever knows himself, knows his Lord" and the knowledge of the concept of God obtained through attributes. This is why Ibn Taymiyyah, the ideological father of the anthropomorphic conception of God, reacted so strongly against the description "Whoever knows himself, knows his Lord." He angrily listed that the Prophet never spoke such a word, that this sentence does not appear in hadith books, and that it is a forgery (Majmū' al-Fatāwā, 1978: 16/349, 9111). This is because he believed that the Prophet Muhammad saw Allah in the form of a young man with feet amid greenery. He enthusiastically listed every narration he could find to support this (Bayān Talbīs al-Jahmiyyah, 2005: 7/290). He probably thought that faith could not be sustained with an abstract God. He must have believed that a concrete, visible, and mentally imaginable God would be more functional. Such a God would be very useful for the collective, disciplined, socio-political Muslim identity.

"Self-knowledge" is an invitation to witness God's existence by looking at the existence of the human microcosm. The God of the Torah, the "Existing (Thing)," can be known in this way. Perhaps this is why Ibn al-Qayyim accepts the principle "Whoever knows himself, knows his Lord" as Israelite knowledge (Madārij al-Sālikīn, 2003: 1/734, 9859).

How is the belief scheme established that self-knowledge will lead to the knowledge of God? It is through the conception of living life integrated with nature, which either encompasses God or is encompassed by God. The human being, as a cosmomorphic entity, is a part of the pan-theistic conception without hierarchy. As expressed in the translation of Ernst Haeckel by Baha Tevfik and Ahmed Nebil, "All sciences, all knowledge, reveal the need to believe in this way: that it is not right to assume God is a separate being, and that He is, on the contrary, dissolved in and inherent within matter" (Wahdat-i Mawjūd, The Religion of a Natural Scientist, 2014: 31). It does not matter whether one says "Everything is God" (pantheism) or "Everything is in God" (panentheism); the issue concerns defining the whole. The core problem and subject is how that whole emerged or was produced.

When the problem is gathered and brought to this point, there is only one creation theory that explains how the universe came into existence. There are no alternatives. Atheists also believe in creation, of course, because the emergence of the universe cannot be explained otherwise. They are certain that the universe did not form through a natural process, like the evolution of humans. Otherwise, why would they bother with the "Big Bang," which is simply a theory of creation? What distinguishes the atheist theory of creation from the religious theory of creation is that the creator and the creation in atheism lack will and purpose. In other words, a purposeless creation. If there is no will, aim, or purpose, there is no need to be reincarnated in another life. Even if there is a resurrection, it will not involve an accounting of the current life, like the reincarnation in the afterlife that the devout believe in. For this reason, atheism is, in reality, the radicalism of techno-scientism. It must believe, a priori, that the dogma of God's non-existence is indisputable. It must disregard observation, experiment, logic, philosophy, and all scientific methodologies. Therefore, it would not be wrong to see it as ideology instead of knowledge and science.

An atheist can easily find the explanation of Democritus—that "the universe has always existed" (Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, 1999: 33)—to be illogical and absurd. Those who put forward this idea in Ancient Greece were surely aware of the absurdity, but they deemed it their right to be absurd in the political tension revolving around the existence and non-existence of God. The present-day atheists continue to defend the assumption of God's non-existence, despite all its illogicality, inconsistency, and absurdity, due to the same tension.

However, the exaggerations made to answer those who do not believe in the afterlife are also unsubstantiated, baseless, and without proof. This is the reason that religion, which is a very simple, plain, and minimal thing, is maximized, made colossal, complicated, and turned into a metaphysical bureaucracy.

Remembered, Not Learned

For those who believe that God created the universe, the knowledge of existence must be ready-made. It should not emerge by maturing later. The human being is, in fact, remembering what exists. Plato's innate Ideas mean recollection. This is what is called "dhikr" in the Qur’an (Az-Zukhruf 44).

The famous neo-Platonist priest Marsilio Ficino (d. 1499) understood Christianity as a form of God's self-disclosure and tried to reconcile religion with philosophy (Macit Gökberk, History of Philosophy, 2010: 194). What Ficino said for Christianity is also valid for Islam: Islam is merely a form of God's self-disclosure. The disclosure occurs through remembrance: "So remind, for you are only a reminder" (Al-Ghashiyah 21). The warning in the following verse (Al-Ghashiyah 22), "You are not a tyrant over them," is of little concern to Islam. Throughout history, both the regimes it established and its practices in the places it invaded have been characterized by tyranny, domination, and imposition. Thus, with this record, it proves its disinterest in the principle of God's self-disclosure and remembrance. It is more concerned with human details and worldly matters like victory, supremacy, capture, and governance.

Could the claim that Descartes limited remembrance to remembering what he learned in the church as a child (Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, 1999: 76) be true? We cannot confirm that this simplification and secularization are appropriate and justified. This is because Descartes, like Plato, accepts innate propositions. So, from his perspective, the theory is also deeply metaphysical.

Gilson argues that Descartes neither set theology aside nor separated philosophy from theology. Thomas Aquinas had already done this centuries earlier. But he had separated the two to unite them. Descartes, on the other hand, saw a difference between philosophy and theology in order to separate them with clear lines (Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, 1999: 72). This is why it is thought that Cartesianism tore apart the God who is the object of religious worship and the God who is accepted as the principle of philosophical thought. The God of popular Islam, however, is merely the object of religious worship. Because Islam failed to unite Him with the philosophical principle, it is always immune to the sanctions of morality. For example, this is why it can easily be irresponsible toward nature, living life, and the other among human beings.

Descartes' contemporary Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1641) rationalized metaphysics by arguing that what is intuitive can be proven by reason. This is quite different from what Thomas Aquinas did in trying to save/immortalize religious knowledge through a method of uniting philosophical and religious wisdom. Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy is a synthesis of Aristotelian rationalism and Ibn Arabi's intuitionism.

Rational Submission in the Face of Despair

The essence of Aristotle's rationalism is that since God is in the heavens, it falls to man to deal with the world. The Qur’an objected to the Aristotelian belief among the Meccans, saying, "He is God in the heavens and on earth" (Az-Zukhruf 84). But the notes on causality regarding the emergence of living life (e.g., Al-Baqarah 164, "His sending down water from the sky and reviving the earth after its death") show that rational thought has a place in the periodic table of faith. This is like the religiosity of the Stoic Marcus Aurelius: rational submission in the face of despair (Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, 1999: 45).

It is true that the Greeks achieved a rational theology thanks to Aristotle. But this also led to them losing their religion (Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, 1999: 43). Would the rationalization of theology yield the same result as in the Greeks in all faiths and cultures? The reason Islam insists on remaining mythological and metaphysical is the assumption that rationalization will lead to the loss of religion.

When, out of such concern, reason is pushed aside and uncommented transmission (nakl) is put in focus, this also produced a sharp political consequence: Jahiliyyah Mecca was socio-political, based on consultation and deliberation, like Ancient Greek paganism. This model was sustained in the Prophet's Medina with the monotheistic principle. After the Prophet's death, Caliph Umar, the Paul of Islam, transformed the monotheism that supported multiple public spheres in Medina into a homogenizing ideology that destroyed diversity. The abolition of the Prophet's model also paved the way for the unitary regime that would evolve into a Sultanate. But the new era of conquest and empire already needed such a radical structural transformation of the public sphere, and they did what was necessary without hesitation.

The elders of Mecca, who were the masters of the class inequality and slavery system, considered themselves traditional (conservative) and the Prophet a deviant innovator. The God they believed in was not the Allah who commanded justice, morality, equality, and freedom. They argued that the Prophet had invented such an Allah. A very quick return to the same belief and its social manifestation occurred after the Prophet’s death. For those who can read, classical sources are full of examples. Now, what is the difference between the reaction received by those who defend the Just God and His manifestation on earth against the inequality and injustice created by the Muslims who took the place of Abu Sufyan, and the reaction in Mecca?

Herbert of Cherbury, in his work De Veritate, speaks of "historical religions that have damaged the essence of religion," saying that they are full of concepts contrary to natural and reasonable propositions (Macit Gökberk, History of Philosophy, 2010: 184). Islam is one of these religions.

The Muslim caste, whose lives are not marked by poverty, deprivation, or destitution, tells the Muslim caste, whose lives are nothing but poverty, deprivation, and destitution, that this is a divine test. Wealth and poverty are a test for those who experience them, and the poor must be patient. They must be patient to earn the afterlife. But what about the rich? All they have to do is occasionally donate to the poor they choose or to an accredited NGO within a congregation, group, or society, thereby sanitizing their unlimited spending and living as they please. Why is this test not experienced in atheist-majority countries like prosperous Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, where societies are not divided into rich and poor but have the rich and the richer, but is experienced in Muslim countries where corruption and extravagance are at its peak? Why are the most egregious cruelties found in Muslim lands? Why doesn't Allah prevent the tyranny carried out in His name in these countries?

If it is a crime for the servant to tolerate oppression, what is it for God to tolerate it?

In the verse, "And do not incline toward those who do wrong, lest the Fire touch you" (Hud 113), God holds His other servants indirectly responsible for oppression. Yet, despite remaining silent about the oppressions on earth, why does He say, "Allah is not unjust to His servants" (Fussilat 46) and not hold Himself responsible for those oppressions? Doesn't He become complicit in that oppression by allowing His oppressing servants to act or by not intervening? Where is His mercy? What is the meaning of His being the Compassionate (Rahmān) and Merciful (Rahīm) in life?

If we do not know, see, or experience how Allah’s attributes of Rahmān and Rahīm manifest, what good is it to man that He is Rahmān and Rahīm and that we have this knowledge? We must see the manifestation of these attributes so that we can know through experience that He is merciful, mustn't we?

If people are not grateful when Allah shows that He is Rahmān and Rahīm through examples in their lives, they become ungrateful. But if He does not show that He is Rahmān and Rahīm, does merely believing in these attributes retain any meaning? Because Allah's being Rahmān and Rahīm is not like believing in His existence. There is no benefit in our lived life in settling for just believing in His mercy. Mercy (Rahmān and Rahīm) is directly related to life. God must be Rahmān and Rahīm for every servant He created and burdened with certain duties, individually. He must show His justice to everyone, individually. It is absurd to expect people whose lives do not see the manifestation of divine mercy, Rahmān and Rahīm, to strengthen their faith by looking at others who benefit from the manifestation of these attributes.

According to the Ash'arites, Allah is not to be questioned. He does what He wills; He can also create oppression, and this cannot be seen as contrary to His justice. Since Allah is the owner of everything, it is permissible for people to suffer without deserving it or receiving compensation. Even for children who cannot defend themselves (Hasan Hanafi, Min al-'Aqīdah ilā al-Thawrah 3, al-'Adl, 2021: 492). Ash'arism is the creed of Sunnism. Those who did not feel they belonged there but wanted to show they were neither Mu'tazilah nor Shi'a called themselves Maturidis. In other words, embarrassed Mu'tazilism. They are those who favor human free will, though not as emphatically as the Mu'tazilah.

The Mu'tazilah opposed the Ash'arites' God, who acted without rules, was self-willed, and acted according to His whim. They recorded that man was left free at a high level, saying that whoever does good does it for himself, and whoever does evil does it against himself (Fussilat 46); that one reaps what one sows (Galatians 6:7); that man will gain nothing but the fruit of his effort (An-Najm 39); and that the righteousness of the righteous and the evil of the wicked shall be on him (Nevī'īm 18:20). They also argued that Allah did not create the act of evil. They maintained that the absolutely just Allah would not create evil and that the evils experienced have nothing to do with Him.

The famous Mu'tazilite scholar Qadi Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1025) is famous for finding the tormenting of animals (and children and the mentally ill)—that is, those who cannot defend themselves—contrary to Allah's justice. He states that animals deserve to receive compensation from Allah for the pain they endure. He argues that the compensation for the lives of animals permitted to be sacrificed or slaughtered solely for food is an obligation upon Allah. Killing an animal whose meat is not eaten is oppression. He reminds us that the Prophet forbade the killing of these animals (al-Muhīt, 2009: 166). Alusi also recounts that the Zoroastrians saw slaughtering and eating an animal that cannot defend itself as torment and believed that torment was ugly/evil (qubh), which is why the Rahīm and Hakīm (Merciful and Wise) God would not approve of it (Rūh al-Ma'ānī, 2014: 3/224).

However, the Mu'tazilah also have no explanation for the absolute just Allah's non-intervention in the evils that occur. He does not create evil, is not responsible for evil, but also does not prevent evil. He waits for this life to end to pay the compensation for the evil for which He is not responsible (but for which He is actually responsible because He does not intervene). The Mu'tazilah are also a faith that postpones the reckoning to the next life. This is despite the fact that the wickedness, injustices, and inequalities experienced in this world prevent the individual from using his will and freedom.

If the individual cannot use the will and freedom Allah gave him for any reason, he will not be held accountable. In that case, not all people are taking the test. Those who cannot use their will and freedom are exempt from the test. Since poverty is the greatest barrier to using will and freedom, a significant portion of the current world population is outside the divine test. The envy of the rich toward the poor is not in vain, then. Sufi leaders and preachers who do not experience destitution and deprivation are, because of this fundamental contradiction, focusing their lens on the most detailed topics in the definition of mukallafāt (obligations/duties) (beard, miswak, aligning feet in prayer, picking up crumbs at a meal, silver rings, etc.) and leaving the most important issues out of the frame. If you don't grow a beard or if a tiny drop of urine falls on your underwear, you go to Hell. If you use miswak and pick up breadcrumbs from the table, your Heaven is guaranteed.

What is the Use of Prayer in the Order of Causality?

Muslims have two assumptions: 1) Life works by a rule-bound order of causality, like Kant's a priori form of causality. God also accepted Himself as part of this order and made the rule He set binding for Himself. 2) Life works by rule-bound and rule-less divine will. Even in rule-bound situations, God is not obligated to follow the rule. He can desire something with a will that violates the rule. This is what a miracle means.

The rule-bound causality theory views prayer as symbolic. For those who believe in divine will, prayer is the sole source. Without it, causality would not work. Which one is correct?

If everything in nature works according to a rule and causality is the principle, where is God in this causality? If He is also subject to the rule and does nothing outside the rule, then what is the meaning of His being the absolutely powerful God? If He is not subject to and bound by the rule, then why doesn't He prevent the oppression and deprivation caused by the rule, by causality? What is the place of prayer here? If the rule will not be broken and the necessity of the mechanism will be fulfilled, why do people pray?

Ali Shariati, by considering prayer an action, speaks for the philosophy that accepts speech as action. If prayer is action, not speech, then a judgment is given that is in line with nature, that is, with innate disposition (fitrah) and creation. Since nature works by causality and God has bound Himself by this rule, prayer is an action and means fulfilling the necessity of the rule. Thus, we include prayer in the chain of causality.

On the other hand, there are theologians who say that prayer can change destiny (taqdīr) and *cancel fate (qada') In other words, Allah can change His mind with a prayer. When the Ash'arites, who objected to the theory that God knows possibilities but only learns the actual when it occurs, claim that He also creates the action, they destroy free will, which is the foundation of the test. Therefore, life is a scene designed by Allah.

But at the same time, if God knows which of the possibilities will be chosen, why is there a need for free will and a test? What is the reason for waiting for the action to occur? To whom is the action, which would serve as proof for the test, proven? The need for proof for the judgment in the afterlife invalidates the belief of the classical theory.

God knows all possibilities and the choice that will be used, but He does not interfere with the choice to be made with free will, and holds man responsible when the choice turns into action. Why then does He change His mind? Although He cursed Satan, He changed His mind when Satan said, "Grant me respite till the Day they are resurrected" (Sad 78-79). Does God's change of mind indicate that He learned something? Isn't a learning God contrary to the belief in an all-knowing God? Why would an all-knowing God change His mind? Does the God who is asked to intervene with prayer wait passively in the face of what normally happens?

Prayer, that is, calling out and summoning, is actually a wish. It is an expectation, a desire, a request. It is the mental and heartfelt thought and vocalization of "If only it could be." There are also words intended for motivation that serve as prayer. Had the Energetism school represented in the Yeni Fikir magazine in Konya in 1925 survived, it could have offered interesting explanations for prayer as one of the ways to activate energy that can turn into a material result. Likewise, the connection between the fact that mystics from different religious and belief circles can achieve the results they hope for by repeatedly chanting certain words and rituals and quantum entanglement.

The Words of Revelation Require God to be a "Person"

No matter what different faiths and religions call Him, the answer to the question of whether the Creator is a thing or a person will solve all philosophical and theological problems. If God is a "thing," existence is within Him or He is within existence, and communication with man cannot be through speech or words. In this model, revelation is a human performance. It is the effort of people called messengers or prophets to express the extraordinary situations they encounter after a process of mental, spiritual, and heartfelt purification, with words in a special state. But if God is a "person," He is outside of existence and must communicate with man through speech or words. To do this, He must express Himself through revelation, and the revelation must be divine, holy, from a higher hierarchy, and speak to earthly, base, vulgar minds.

The fact that the faith which imagines God as a "person" and makes Him speak with letters and words, yet shows no sensitivity to protecting those letters and words, is a separate discussion. The Muslim ummah, which boasts of preserving supposed "holy relics" like the Prophet's footprint or a hair from his beard for over a thousand years, has failed to preserve the Qur'an that is currently available in its present form. Even manuscripts dating back to the 10th century are incomplete. Most of them are missing. There is nothing in the world that can be dated to the Prophet's time other than the pages in Birmingham. Muslims owe the preservation of this page to the Christian Cadbury family. They conclude from the matching of this writing with today's manuscript that the entire current manuscript dates back to the Prophet's time. This is reasoning, assumption, and guesswork. However, Aisha, the daughter of Abu Bakr, said: "Sūrat al-Ahzāb was 200 verses long during the time of the Prophet. While the Qur'an was being written, verses other than the current number were lost." Kurtubi, who transmits the narration, speaks of the "issue of naskh (abrogation)" (Kurtubi, al-Jami' li-Ahkām al-Qur'an, 2019: 7/85). That is, 127 verses were abrogated, but there is no information, proof, or basis for this. What else can he say but, "It must be abrogation"? Muslims are dumbfounded by Aisha's statement. They don't say a single word. Neither refutation nor confirmation, zero reaction.

A similar statement is transmitted from Caliph Umar, the founding father of this Islam. Umar ibn al-Khattab asked Hudhayfah: "How many verses are in Sūrat al-Ahzāb?" Hudhayfah replied, "Seventy-two or seventy-three verses." Thereupon, Umar said: "It was actually close to Sūrat al-Baqarah, or longer. It also contained the verse of stoning (rajm)." (Suyūṭī, al-Durr al-Manthūr, 2003: 11/714. Ahmad-Musnad 21207, Abdurrazzāq-Musannaf 5990, Ibn Hibbān-Sahih 4428, Hākim-Mustadrak 8068, Beyhaqi-Sunan 16911, Ibn Hazm-Muhallā, 12/175).

There are many such examples in the oldest sources of Sunnism and Shi'ism regarding deficiencies or additions in the Qur'an. The Muslim community, which could not protect the Qur'an—the carrying column, the basic pillar, the essence, the all of its religion—claims to impose order on the world. It failed to preserve and transmit to later generations even the Qur'an written during the reign of Caliph Uthman, despite establishing countless states, dynasties, and sultanates, all the way up to the Ottomans, without interruption after the Prophet's death. It is not clear when the current Qur'an manuscript was written. Even in Umar's time, they debated the chapters, the number of verses, and verses that were not included in the Qur'an, and no one knows what is correct and what is wrong. This ummah, instead of debating these issues within itself and seeking a way out, is bullying others.

The fundamental reason Islam could not remain a religion is this civilization issue. Historical writing themed around the establishment of civilization was forced to produce an institutional and established religion. Political Sunnism (and Twelver Shi'ism copied from it) is the product of this conception, and Islam's crisis is precisely this.

People give the same reaction when experiencing the feeling of falling into a void in a dream, and during the panic that erupts when the parachute does not open: the reflex to grab onto something around them in the void. It is the same in life. In the moment of free fall, a person clutches at anything that comes to mind. Even the most absurd thing.

Transleted by Gemini