Kenan Çamurcu

One evening in 2003, as I gazed at the Damascus cityscape from Mount Qasioun, enveloped in boundless silence, these words flowed from my pen:

"Damascus from Mount Qasioun, like Istanbul from Çamlıca Hill and Tehran from Mount Damavand, reveals a silhouette where familiar elements of memory undulate in a spiral, starting from the vicinity of the Umayyad (Banu Umayya) Mosque and extending to Tehran and Istanbul. To gain insight into the city's social and cultural fabric, the sparkle of night can offer opportunities for enlightening experiences. Thus, when one revolves in the heart of Damascus, it is essential to courageously touch the symbols that stir the soul: the tomb of John the Baptist, the niche where the severed head of the Prophet's grandson Hussein was displayed, the corner where Hussein's son Ali Zayn al-Abidin prayed, the tomb of Saladin Ayyubi, the spiritual presence of Ali Shariati, and others are nothing but memories from a rapidly flowing history, akin to 'Bayram Morning in Süleymaniye,' rushing into the mind. Anyone stepping into the city through Thomas Gate or another Damascus gate, passing under a Roman arch and entering the basin of Islamic culture, can find ample reason to settle into a corner of the city's soul. The invaders of Kabul and Baghdad now seek to poison this millenniums-old sphere of delight, tranquility, and contentment." ("Küllü halin yezul," Thoughts in a Life-and-Death Struggle).

I am not sure if Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and MIT Director İbrahim Kalın share the same sentiment after the Salafi-political takeover of Damascus following 12 years of horrifying terror, massacres, and destruction. Undoubtedly, the childlike joy of their victory is evident in their eyes, as depicted in AI-generated photos showing them sipping coffee while looking at Damascus from Qasioun. But how different can this happiness be from what Sultan Selim felt when he appropriated the remnants of Sunni/Alevi, Arab/Turk/Kurdish Syria, which he had put to the sword in 1516?

The troll army, which compares the current powers-that-be's political monopolism to Abdülhamid's imperial will, would be more accurate to compare it to Sultan Selim due to the fresh 'reconquista' in Syria. That is, the Sultan who confidently turned his back on Europe and embarked on bloody conquest campaigns in Muslim lands.

In the Damascus I observed in 2003, a rigid, closed, and strict political regime, qualitatively more refined than the current governing style in Turkey, held sway. Yet, despite this, there was a vibrant social life, vastly different from ours. It was a social life where people of all faiths and lifestyles lived side-by-side in tranquility, where no one interfered with another's way of life, where lifestyle and belief or disbelief were not criteria for public acceptance, and where the tension between veiled and unveiled women was absent. The peaceful coexistence of those visiting the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine or praying in the Banu Umayya Mosque with those gathering in taverns in the back alleys simultaneously balanced the primitive political regime, which was incredibly reactive to political participation.

Now, in the Damascus that Fidan and Kalın behold as they savor their victory, the armed, intimidating, and menacing rule of Salafism, deeply implicated in the gravest crimes of violence and terror, has commenced its chapter of domination. The "freedom" they so carefully reiterate into every microphone sounds so incongruous in their mouths. One might almost expect them to burst into laughter after each mention of "freedom," a word whose meaning they don't even seem to grasp, as if in a parody. While militants of groups operating under the HTS banner gather and celebrate, perhaps in the illusion of being at the beginning of their fairy tale, three million Damascenes wait anxiously in their homes, shops, and government offices for their uncertain fate to become clear.

Speaking from the perspective of a former resident of that neighborhood, it is with great misfortune that I must say: I did not know Hakan Fidan personally, but through mutual acquaintances, I know him to be a person of rational and reformist religiosity. I know İbrahim (Kalın) from his student years; he is also such a person. He worked on Mulla Sadra for his doctorate; what more can be said? For this duo to adopt an anachronistic historicism and sectarianism as politics or strategy, a heavy dose of pragmatism must have been necessary. A few years ago, Kalın, representing Beştepe, complained on television about takfiri radicalism. Now, he is on display in the front seat on the streets of Damascus as a guest of al-Julani, one of the leaders of that very movement.

Do those who speak of the oppressive regime during Assad's era believe that Nusra will establish a pluralistic, secular, libertarian democracy? Of course, they don't. What they call "oppression" is the denial of their own lifestyle and religious identity to dominate. What they call freedom is the empowerment of that domination. That is, the state of the conservative oligarchy in Turkey. Of course, there is also an objective definition of despotism and freedom, and that relates to the existence or non-existence of a secular, pluralistic, libertarian democracy with all its rules and institutions. Such a situation did not exist in the Assad era in terms of political participation, but it is impossible under the administration of the Nusra fighters, who have radicalized and unleashed Salafi marginality. Jolani still says, "The moral police is to implement Sharia. (...) We call on people to obey Sharia, not force, but if you resist our invitation, you will face the force of violence!" This is al-Qaeda's doctrine. What is different in Afghanistan under the dominance of this doctrine? The Khamenei regime, which admits to being deeply involved with al-Qaeda , is ostensibly against Salafi takfiris, but in reality, it is merely the Shi'ite version of the worldview of ISIS and Nusra.

The expectation that the Salafi organizations under the HTS umbrella, which failed to adhere to the principles of law, justice, and equality throughout the 12-year civil war, will fully comply with them now that they have seized Syria can only be a joke; but it's the kind that doesn't make you laugh. The mitigating, even excusing, reason they used for their past crimes was "a state of war." But they do not apply the same justification for the violations committed by the Syrian army.

Whether read backward or forward, he's still Jolani

Ahmed al-Shara, no matter how much he wants to erase his past and claim to have transformed into someone else, he is still "Jolani." Capturing Damascus is not a magic spell that can make the crimes committed during the civil war disappear with a single click. Real life isn't like exercising the right to be forgotten on Google. Nusra, which has either forcibly liquidated or persuaded dozens of large and small terrorist organizations operating in Syria to rally around it, is composed of professional fighters who have switched sides. The militants of ISIS, whose existence was said to have ended, did not evaporate; they joined Nusra, meaning HTS.

Those who want to be deceived can be, or they can turn a deaf ear to the facts. But the truth is this: those who speak angrily of Assad's massacres benignly overlook the war crimes of Nusra leader Jolani. They also have a justification tool in their pocket: "but they suffered so much oppression." They pull it out whenever they are cornered.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan states that HTS has distanced itself from al-Qaeda and ISIS, and therefore should be removed from the list of terrorist organizations. Fidan's is an attempt to reconstruct reality to prevent the government he represents from appearing to be collaborating with a terrorist organization. Or it is a precaution against a situation that would cause trouble for Turkey in terms of international law. Because Nusra, operating under the HTS banner, has never severed its ties with al-Qaeda. There is no shortage of evidence. The most visible of these pieces of evidence is the "Red Bandanas" force, composed of foreign fighters, but which has supposedly 'Syrianized' itself by retracting its oath of allegiance from Ayman al-Zawahiri. They openly state their ties with Syrian al-Qaeda and their ideological alignment with the same world. Jolani also keeps warm relations with them by wearing a red bandana, posing for photos with them, and rewarding them for their operations.

The Guardianship of the "Red Bandanas"

According to experts, had it not been for Nusra's "Red Bandanas" (Asa'ib al-Hamra), HTS would not have succeeded in its latest offensive. The "Red Bandanas" are the 'red-heads' of the Salafis. They are "die-hard loyalist" fighters who gave the Syrian Army and Armed Resistance Forces a hard time. They are known for recognizing no rules or moral boundaries. They killed hundreds of innocent people in suicide attacks in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.

The epithet "die-hard loyalist" refers to the steadfast behavior of sworn loyalists who formed a human shield around the Prophet during the Battle of Uhud in 625, when Muslims were scattered and attacked by a large crowd of Meccans. This was the battle where, when the Prophet's army was understood to be defeated, Omar fled to the mountain (Tabari, d. 923, Tafsir, 7/172), Abu Bakr said, "I also fled, but then returned" (Nishapuri, d. 1014, Mustadrak, 3/31), and Uthman fled a distance of three days' travel (Bukhari, d. 870, 4066). The scene is described in the Quranic verse, "You were fleeing, not looking back at anyone, while the Messenger was calling out to you from behind" (Al Imran 153). When Uthman returned to Medina three days later, the Prophet sarcastically remarked, "You've gone quite far" (Tabari, Tafsir, 7/329). At that most desperate moment, eight people did not abandon the Prophet. Besides Ali – that is, remaining steadfast – there were seven other individuals whose names vary in different narrations (Waqidi, d. 823, Maghazi, p. 238).

The fact that the "Red Bandanas," disciples of Ibn Taymiyyah who hated Ali, are forced to refer to Ali's "die-hard loyalty" to bestow a heroism badge upon themselves is out of desperation, due to their lack of heroic history. Yet, their sheikh, Ibn Taymiyyah, disliked Ali so much that he wrote of Ibn Muljam, who stabbed Ali in the back in the mihrab, as "the most devout of people"; to him, Ibn Muljam was a pious individual who performed his prayers, fasted, read the Quran, and did this out of love for Allah and His Messenger. (Minhaj al-Sunnah, 7/47).

We are not deviating from the topic. Nor is our intention to press all buttons and exploit this opportunity to address other matters. These are all directly interconnected. The moment we speak of "theo-politics," our subject cannot be anything else. If those who celebrated when Ba'athist Assad was overthrown mourned when Ba'athist Saddam was overthrown, the only known reason for this is that Assad was an Alawite and Saddam was a Sunni. That is, the issue is not Ba'athism or dictatorship, but entirely related to theo-politics.

Nusra announced the existence of its "Red Bandanas" special force, composed of al-Qaeda members from Iraq, in a video in 2018. Indeed, what is called Iraqi al-Qaeda is an organization trained and led by Ba'athist officers after Saddam's overthrow. It is a terrorist organization that mostly attacked Shiite religious ceremonies and mosques, killing hundreds of easily targeted people.

Analysts writing about the "Red Bandanas" state that the group consists of Chechen, Uzbek, and Azerbaijani militants who received military training in their home countries. The group comprises die-hard fighters whom Nusra, i.e., Jolani, calls upon when he gets bogged down in achieving his objectives. It was founded in 2016 by Abu Rafiq Uzbeki and is led by Abu Yaqzan al-Misri. This group also eliminated Junud al-Sham, led by Abu Muslim Checheni, who dominated the Turkmen Mountain region north of Latakia, and brought the area under HTS control.

Although the AK Party spokesperson tries to extricate himself with a strange sentence like "HTS is no longer effectively a terrorist," the interview with the "Red Bandanas" clearly states the group's ties to the global terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Beştepe's cautious statements, which do not fully trust the sympathetic declarations in Western capitals advocating for HTS's removal from the terror list, can be understood. However, if, as alleged, the perpetrators of the ISIS massacre at Atatürk Airport in 2016, which killed 45 innocent people, were released at Jolani's request, such an example would be impossible to find in diplomatic history. No international political interest would legitimize such a swap.

Let's quote the relevant parts from the interview with the "Red Bandanas" that show HTS formally and practically adopting al-Qaeda's methods of terror:

Q: What is your opinion about Tanzim Hurras al-Din (Syrian al-Qaeda)?

A: They are a jihadi group with the same goals as Hay'at (Tahrir al-Sham).

(He states that the only difference between them is regarding the breaking of allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri. But he notes that both organizations adopt the same ideology and method. Hay'at even supplies ammunition to Tanzim.)

Q: Can we still say that Hay'at is a Salafi jihadi group, or do you think this designation is no longer appropriate?

A: Hay'at is a Salafi jihadi group that tries to apply the rulings of Sharia, and this is one of the fundamental principles that brought Hay'at into existence.

Q: Why did you choose to join Jabhat al-Nusra?

A: To apply the rulings of Sharia and due to sympathy for the al-Qaeda organization.

Q: Do you still like al-Qaeda?

A: I still like al-Qaeda, but the benefit here was in separating from al-Qaeda. Sheikh Abu al-Khayr al-Masri was in Syria and supported this step because it was in the interest of the field.

Q: Can we say that most Hay'at members sympathize with al-Qaeda?

A: As far as I know, no one in Hay'at thinks al-Qaeda is mistaken. The disagreement with Tanzim Hurras is not because of al-Qaeda; rather, it is a matter of leadership and ijtihad regarding allegiance and weapons.

Q: Had you adopted the Salafi method before the revolution?

A: No, I was an average Muslim. I became Salafi through my friend.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, mentioned above, was the ideologue of al-Qaeda and eliminated Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor. Abdullah Anas, Azzam's son-in-law, held the Egyptian Islamic Jihad responsible for his father-in-law's murder (Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, p. 37). Zawahiri's student, the Shiite-hating Musab al-Zarqawi, also eliminated Osama Bin Laden, whose mother was Shiite. ISIS, the new face of Saddam's Ba'ath in Iraq, was forged in this crucible. Jolani, who came to Syria at the instruction of ISIS leader Baghdadi to establish Nusra, was formed in this school and is now preparing to make the "Red Bandanas," who wrote the book on ruthlessness, a significant part of Syria's sovereignty.

Translated from Western media, the "Red Bandana" explicitly stated that the story of Jolani severing ties with al-Qaeda was merely a tactic. A Foreign Policy analyst heard the same sentence from a high-ranking FSA fighter he spoke to in Turkey: "Despite publicly appearing to break ties, Jolani and his men are full-fledged members of al-Qaeda." "These terrorists," said the FSA member, "tortured many people, including my son." The FP writer saw his tall, robust son walk with a hunch. He had been tortured for two years on Jolani's orders. In its September report, the UN detailed the extensive record of executions, torture, and human rights violations in the prisons of the Syrian Salvation Government, which governs Idlib, and thus HTS.

How will it be possible to integrate Salafi "Red Bandanas," who believe in global jihad and fighting until the entire earth belongs to Islam, into Jolani's "new Syria" for democracy? If it is remembered that even Jolani has to appear wearing a red bandana, how will the military guardianship of the "Red Bandanas" over the Damascus administration be prevented?

These are impossible tasks.

Can a Citizen Emerge from a Jihadi Salafi?

There is currently a media campaign suggesting that Jolani is trying to persuade jihadi Salafis—who are utterly unaware of concepts like democracy, human rights, and freedoms, let alone the functioning of modern institutions—to lay down arms, take government positions, and participate in social life. However, the reasons provided by those who consider this a futile effort are more convincing. Because, as the analysis states, the management vision of these men (yes, "men," because they do not allow women into the public sphere) is limited to "the implementation of Sharia." And what they call "Sharia" is merely the Salafi fiqh books they possess. After all, these are the people who urinated on Hafiz al-Assad's grave and burned it when they entered Damascus. The Prophet failed to turn good people out of the same kind of men who urinated in his mosque in front of him (Nesaî, d. 915, Sunan al-Kubra, 1/92, hadith 51-52-53). Is Jolani more effective and charismatic that he can perfectly solve this problem?

Nusra leader Jolani's statements about freedom of belief, equality in society, and so on are sufficiently decorative. Salafis do not even have the gene to think about, let alone implement, such a project. Salafism, inherited from Ibn Taymiyyah, is the religious form of Umayyad asabiyah (racism of the era).

The only explanation for Ibn Taymiyyah and his ideological heirs' profound hatred of Alawites is their animosity towards Ali and his descendants. Since Alawism, by its very existence, falsifies official Islamic history, the survival of widespread Islam, which suffers from an uninterrupted crisis of legitimacy, passes through the annihilation of Alawites. Salafism is focused on this.

Ibn Taymiyyah is not anti-superstition. He is the one who attributed the title of Lord to the Sultan (Majmu' al-Fatawa, 35/30). He is also the one who said in the Umayyad Mosque that Allah descends to earth just as he descended from the steps of his pulpit (Ibn Battuta, d. 1368, Rihla, 1/77), and who claimed that he sits on a known throne (Muhammad Abu Zahra, Ibn Taymiyyah, p. 268). While he dismisses the most authentic narrations as fabricated without any basis, he himself fabricates narrations. He falsely claims that Shiites advocate claims not found in books and then answers those claims. However, he himself fabricated the claim. (Many examples of these are in my notes).

This is the standard of Salafism; therefore, everything is permissible for them. They can lie, assault honor and chastity, steal property, and murder innocents. They have done these things in Syria since 2012, proven by hundreds of cases. They do them wherever they find an opportunity. This diseased mindset has seized, invaded, and occupied Syria. The only reason legitimizing this disaster is the Ba'athist closed regime. Instead of trying to reform the regime and make it liberal, transparent, participatory, and democratic, and supporting efforts in this direction, they handed the country over to the most brutal mob history has ever seen, with the hope of making Syria a satellite of Turkey.

If the matter were merely a difference in intellectual perspective on history, there would be nothing to worry about. However, historical problems bleed into the present and form the background, ground, and basis for the ideological terror of contemporary Salafism.

Jolani, the Nasrallah of the Sunnis

Malik al-Abda, a Syrian analyst and writer for the London-based Al-Majalla magazine, wrote that Jolani wants to be the Nasrallah of the Sunnis. Abda argues that for Jolani, religious belief is less important than the motivation to seize power. He was focused on capturing Damascus and considered everything permissible for that goal.

Having learned lessons from the Hezbollah experience, Jolani announced at the very beginning that the organizations involved in the civil war would lay down their arms. This would both eliminate those organizations as a threat to himself and prevent the questioning that constantly makes Hezbollah a subject of debate in Lebanon: what business does an alternative armed force have in a sovereign country?

Nasrallah, whose fate he learned from, was also aware of this problem but was in a quandary. The fighters could join the Lebanese army, and Hezbollah could transform into a political party, but the unqualified officials of Khamenei's "axis of resistance" were highly involved in Hezbollah and gave it no other role than that of a legion. If he tried to seek a different path, his annual budget of $100 million would be cut. Hezbollah's wise people, both inside and outside, knew this trajectory would eventually hit a wall and voiced it. For example, Imad Mughniyeh's brother-in-law, Mustafa Badreddine, the commander-in-chief of Hezbollah's military wing, wanted to withdraw from Syria, citing Hezbollah's losses when they were forced to participate in the Syrian civil war at Tehran's instruction. Qassem Soleimani, however, was against Badreddine's withdrawal plan. It is said that a fierce argument ensued between them. Badreddine was mysteriously killed in 2016 at the Quds Force headquarters at the military airport in Damascus. Tehran claimed he died in an Israeli airstrike. But Hezbollah said "an attack by Takfiri groups." Yet, the closest point of those groups to Damascus was 15 km away. Israel stated, "His own men killed him." (https://www.bbc.com/persian/world-39341340) If Mossad had done it, they would have already announced it as a success. Hezbollah's current leader, Naim Qassem, had said at the time that they would explain the incident in full detail, but no explanation was ever given. The mystery remained unsolved and became a 'cold case.'

Every time criticisms of Hezbollah's subservience to Tehran reached the "axis of resistance" office, Nasrallah put the critics in their place with a reprimand of "Iran pays your salaries" and pacified Tehran. However, the result of this policy was the destruction of Hezbollah. There is no longer a Hezbollah for the "axis of resistance" office to transfer money to. Hamas in Gaza and Ansar Allah in Yemen are also gone. It would not be surprising if Khamenei closes the now-unemployed office. Those in Tehran who were pilfering money from the budget under the guise of the "axis of resistance" must be heartbroken.

The cost of Khamenei's "axis of resistance" narrative to Twelver Shi'ism has been very heavy. Even distant Shi'ites in Iraq who do not believe as he does, or those in Lebanon who follow the intellectual legacy of Fadlullah, have suffered. The Shi'ite population in Southern Lebanon, the historical center of Shi'ism, is gone. Shi'ites in Syria are fleeing their homes and lands, escaping the terror of Salafism. Alawites are confined to Latakia and constantly face harassment and threats from HTS groups. Social life in Latakia has shut down.

Jolani will not want this experience to be repeated for Salafism or Sunnism. For this reason, he constantly sends reassuring messages to the West and reiterates to every microphone that he is not eager for cross-border adventures. He pledges that the new Syria will not be used as a base for anti-Israel and anti-Western activities.

The Hezbollah-Iran relationship is now applicable to Jolani and HTS in their relations with Turkey. That is why Jolani's very early announcement that armed militants will join the Syrian Army and security forces is probably to prevent a fate similar to Hezbollah's.

Just as Nasrallah has his Iran, Jolani has his Turkey. But it must be remembered that this type of relationship, while based on the stronger party's guardianship, is not one-sided. It is interactive. Just as Nasrallah and Hezbollah radicalized Islamists in Iran, Jolani's HTS will radicalize Islamists in Turkey, detaching them from classical Sunnism and turning them into Salafis. Remember when, in 2013, before America declared it a terrorist organization, Islamists said "ISIS is the locomotive of the Sunni movement" (https://www.islamtimes.com/az/news/422823/r%C4%B1dvan-kaya-i%C5%9Fid-s%C3%BCnni-hareketin-lokomotifidir#google_vignette)? Well, it was like that. But when the US, and then obligatorily Turkey, listed ISIS as a terrorist organization, they immediately retreated and blended into the crowd.

The Unabating State of Shock in Tehran

Khamenei's prediction that Israel would last for a quarter-century, followed by the rapid elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah in less than a year, and then the overthrow of Assad, has had a shocking effect in Tehran. The "absolute guardianship of the jurist" regime is experiencing a severe crisis of self-confidence. Commentators struggle to describe the heavy defeat suffered by the strategy of spreading influence through cross-border activities, becoming the reliable center of Shi'ism, and neutralizing global and regional powers. Since they cannot blame Khamenei's strategic error, they naturally resort to an external enemy narrative for help.

Ali Akbar Raefipour, a social media phenomenon and IRGC member, claimed that while Iran was focusing the world's attention on Israel, Turkey targeted Shiites and Alawites, emphasizing sectarian conflict, and thereby saved Israel. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPFQXforGm0) However, he attributed Iran's forced withdrawal from Syria and the region to a strategic weakness after Qassem Soleimani. According to him, while Soleimani could even establish contact with opposition groups in Syria, this ability was lost, leading to the overthrow of Assad. Raefipour claims that when Hakan Fidan became head of MIT, he asked his counterparts in the IRGC how they were in contact with all opposition groups in Syria and asked them to explain their method. Raefipour laments, "How did we get to this state when we were in that position?"

According to Hossein Mara'shi, leader of the Kargozaran Party, from the right wing of reformism, Qassem Soleimani told him that the opposition and Assad had reached an agreement, but Erdoğan did not allow it to happen. Rafsanjani reportedly said, "The Ba'ath should stay, but Assad needs to change." Mara'shi also draws a lesson from the Syrian experience for military guardianship in Iran: "Our armed forces and army, like the IRGC, are our strength and honor. But we must learn never to hand over politics to the military structure."

Mahmoud Va'ezi, leader of the Moderation and Development Party, also criticizes the foreign minister's oversight in visiting Assad two days before his fall, being unaware of what was happening.

Within Twelver Shi'ism, the Khamenei faction's opposition to Israel is obsessive, fixated, and compulsive. Even after all these events, they can still talk about the Israeli threat instead of changing their perspective. Instead of accepting being wrong and mistaken, they persist and insist. However, Israel is not a threat to either Iran or Turkey, nor to Islam. Anti-Semitic delusions as justification and basis are worthless. Getting needlessly agitated with hypothetical expansionist conspiracy theories and inventing dangers only leads to misallocation of resources and energy. If the money spent on this delusion were mobilized for human capital, it would lead to fruitful results for the entire region.

What about Khamenei's "axis of resistance" after the structure, which Caliph Omar established on the ruins of the Jewish Temple of Solomon, their Qibla, and which the Umayyad Caliph Marwan positioned as an alternative and rival Qibla to the Kaaba, naming it Al-Aqsa Mosque, became symbolized by the Nazi/fascist-admiring Amin al-Husseini? While there is a Saddam Square and statue in Qalqilya in the West Bank, mockingly inscribed with "Sayyid al-Shuhada (Master of Martyrs)," a title of Imam Hussein, Israelis named streets in several cities after Cyrus the Great (Coresh, Cyrus), the king of Persia, in commemoration of his saving the Jews from Babylonian exile?

Khamenei's exaggerated focus on Palestine, starting with Ahmadinejad's presidency in 2005, was primarily aimed at conquering Shi'ite communities. For this, he received support by standing shoulder-to-shoulder with Sunnis. Displays such as declaring Ayatollah Sadegh Shirazi, who criticized Islamic history and Sunnism, as "British Shi'ism" (https://farsi.khamenei.ir/newspart-index?tid=13176) are two-birds-with-one-stone actions: building trust among Sunnis and, at the same time, criminalizing his harsh opponent.

In Shi'ite history, Twelver Shi'ism was the smallest group, and Isma'ilism came to mind when Shi'ism was mentioned. However, from the 12th century onwards, Twelver Shi'ism (isna ashariyyah) rapidly achieved dominance by abandoning gnosis and transforming into a jurisprudential school, thereby resembling the majority, Sunnism, and marginalizing other Shi'ite currents.

Some may think I am reaching hasty and superficial conclusions. I will prove this thesis in an independent article. Here, let's suffice with what is relevant to this article.

The "Palestinian cause" was not Iran's primary agenda during and after the revolution. Over time, Khomeini began to emphasize Palestine more to gain acceptance for the new Iran and the revolution, based on a common strategy with Sunnis. Just like his fatwa on Salman Rushdie, whose book he hadn't even read. His declaration that "The Satanic Verses" made Rushdie an apostate whose blood was forfeit, etc., is typical Sunni jurisprudence, and the narrations about "Satan's intervention in revelation" in Rushdie's novel are found in Sunni hadith sources. Khomeini's strategy of aligning himself with Sunnism through this fatwa is clearly evident. Moreover, Rushdie, whose blood he wanted forfeited, was a close friend of Edward Said and a much more active figure in the Palestinian issue than Said himself.

The Era of the Rule of the Powerful

Hakan Fidan confidently asserts that his "brothers" in "new Syria" will enable a unitary Syria, representing sovereignty, and that the YPG has no place in this project. However, this appears more aspirational than realistic, as a unitary, centralized, sovereign Syria exceeds the capabilities of Nusra affiliates and they lack the conceptual framework to achieve it. Consequently, it would be no surprise if, once the current fervor subsides—in the not-too-distant future—groups within Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) or factions opposing the Salafi rulers initiate moves to dismantle this fragile new structure. If Ankara's scenarios include intervention in this conflictual environment, astute strategic minds will have already analyzed that Turkey would very rapidly reach a point of no return.

External powers hold secondary significance in the Syrian equation. Their involvement appears to be limited to a show of force aimed at deterring HTS's intent to wage war against the Kurds, extending no further. If the predictions of journalists reporting from the field prove accurate, and HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA)/Syrian Opposition Coalition (SMO) launch an extermination campaign against Kurdish and Christian militias, the response of the Americans and their allies remains unknown. What is certain is that Israel, as a regional power, is now the preeminent actor in the Syrian issue, and the party that cultivates a proper relationship with Israel will become the effective actor in Syria.

Given that all actors behave realistically and rationally, adopting policies and strategies aligned with their interests, it is entirely normal, natural, and rational for Kurds and Alawites to collaborate with Israel for their own security and assurances against the exterminationist intentions of Al-Qaeda affiliates and Salafists. They possess this right. This parallels the desire of the Druze in the Golan region to seek Israel's protection from Salafists. Over time, this protection model could evolve into another power shift in Syria, this time supported by Israel.

Syria did not experience a popular revolution. Armed Salafists seized Damascus and took control of the administration. This thus ushered in the era of the rule of the powerful. The timeline is uncertain, but when a new powerful entity emerges, it will easily be able to liquidate the current administration.

If Nusra's seizure of power, with substantial support, by compelling Assad to leave the country, indicates the revitalization of the Sunni theory of "legitimacy of those who seize power," then any other force that meets similar conditions could also forcibly remove the current government when similar alignments occur. With the financial, political, and military support extended to Salafist jihadists in Syria, the country has irrevocably been plunged into a tunnel of instability, making a reversal seem impossible.

Translated by Gemini