29 May 2025
Kenan Çamurcu
Like Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria, Turkey's last 150 years of political history have been consistently shaped by reform and change, mirroring the early experiences of Western-style modernization (Voll, 1994: 149). This phenomenon has manifested as modernization and social renewal, structural changes in political institutions and regime shifts, and sometimes, as a quest for differentiation in the realms of belief, philosophy, and thought.
In the Middle East, reform and change movements in the Islamic world were a civil constitutional movement in Tunisia, which enacted the first constitution (1857, Ahdu'l-Aman) (Abun-Nasr, 1987: 277; Çetin, 1999: 26-28), and in Iran, which experienced a major political constitutional movement for the establishment of a constitutional political regime. In Turkey and Egypt, however, the modernization process flowed from the state to society.
It's widely known that Turkish modernization aimed to rapidly transfer Western technological and social development. The Republican administration deemed this necessary for a contemporary society and economic progress. Therefore, convincing society of the benefits of modernization was, in their view, a waste of time. The state could know and implement what was best for society. Republican cadres openly articulated this at various times.
There's no doubt that the secular modernization driven by the state appeared to be an imposition on traditional society. It was also unpopular due to its authoritarian methods, and the Republic's Western-style modernization project inevitably met with resistance. The Republican elites categorized these objections and protests as "counter-revolution" and "reactionary movements," treating them as criminal cases. Protesters were dealt with quite harshly.
Turkish modernization was essentially a tool for building a modern nation. Since the goal was nation-building, important aspects of modernization such as freedoms, pluralism, civilian rule, and political participation were consistently neglected.
Feroz Ahmad describes the Kemalists, who aimed to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary Western civilization, as the founders of a transitional regime (Köker, 1993: 215). Zürcher also states that the sole purpose of Kemalist reforms was to secularize and modernize society (Zürcher, 2000: 252).
During the constitutional monarchy (Meşrutiyet) period, the modernization advocated by the Westernist, Turkist, and Islamist currents aimed to adopt Western technological development while preserving the traditional social fabric, and consequently, to achieve original political and social renewal suitable for the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, Ottoman modernization was distinctly dualistic. With the Republic, the pragmatic and dualistic aspects of Ottoman modernization, which would have coexisted with the traditional, were abandoned.
The Republic's governing elites focused on adopting the thought and philosophy of Western modernization. The difference in this approach was the desire to achieve accelerated transformation by the state, instead of the long, slow historical process that resulted in a strong civil society in the West. As in the constitutional period, the main actors of modernization during the Republican era were the state elites, and the emphasis was on making their project accepted by society (Söğütlü, 2010: 54).
The point where the modernization project was exaggerated was in the 1930s, when metaphysical attributes were attached to M. Kemal's name and modernization was almost religious identity, pushing it to an extreme. For instance, Ankara deputy Şeref Aykut systematically spoke of the religion of Kamalism in his book Kamalizm (1936) (Bora, 2017: 121). Aykut even summarized the principles of Kemalism in six articles, mimicking the "six tenets of faith" in the Sunni creed (Aykut, 1936: 5).
The Aim and Instrument of Modernization: The Metaphysical State
The German philosopher Carl Schmitt argued that societies' political culture and concepts are mostly influenced by religious theology – their beliefs about God, man, and nature. According to him, all concepts of modern state theory were secularized concepts of theology (Schmitt, 2002: 41). Foucault's conceptualization of pastoral power can be considered in this context.
Foucault placed pastorship (pastor/preacher) in Christianity at the core of the genealogy of governance. According to him, until the 16th century, the state in the sense of territorial administration was not a political structure. What needed to be governed were people or individuals or groups (Foucault, 2008: 167). The shepherd's power was exercised not over a territory, but over the flock (Foucault, 2014: 29).
This new form of power is a religiously justified new version of absolute state authority (Ağaoğulları, 2015: 406) in Bodin's depiction of the "head of the family" (pater familias), derived from the Roman order. In classical sociological approaches, the modern state is also an organization with the legitimate right to use physical force within a country's sovereign domain (Weber, 2018: 270).
Jean Bodin was the heir to the Roman jurists' principle of "the prince is not bound by law" (princeps legibus solutus) (Domingo, 2010: 17). This principle, put forward by the Syrian-born Roman jurist Ulpian (d. 228), continued unchanged until the 13th century. Even when the idea of binding the prince by law emerged, regulations were made without violating this principle (Benoist, 1999: 102-103).
Although Bodin defined sovereignty as "absolute and permanent power" (Bodin, 1962: I, 8), it gained its modern meaning in European historical experience when it evolved to be linked with territory and society.
The concept of orthodoxy in the Muslim tradition is similar to Foucault's concept of pastoral power. In the Foucauldian sense, pastoral power, even though he implied a different kind of pastoral environment, points to a specific kind of knowledge between the preacher and each member of the community, no different from the shepherd knowing about every sheep in his flock. Whether it's the action of a cleric or a shepherd, every act of moral responsibility contains individualizing knowledge (Musa, 2018: 82).
The Republic's Party-State's Secular Sacred Core
The Republic's party-state can be described as a Hegelian state endowed with the obligation and corresponding authority to protect the country's interests. It was the "earthly state" as a secular version of Augustine's "Divine State," and in this respect, it was as absolutist as the first (Cassirer, 1946: 263).
The Republic's "neo-patrimonialism" was established as a presidential system where all powers were concentrated in the hands of a single person, with only minor decisions delegated within the same riverbed (Bratton - Walle, 1997: 63). For this reason, Turkey's democratic efforts over the last sixty years have always been conducted through a campaign to divide and disperse power as much as possible. Let's read this definition with the parenthetical note that this goal was never achieved, including during the period of conservatives who most strongly objected to the absolutist order.
The goal of strengthening the state in Ottoman modernization was also the political principle of the Republic's founding cadres. In political history studies, this unchanging characteristic is emphasized, as it passed from Abdülhamid II's autocratic regime to the opposing Committee of Union and Progress, and from there to the opposing CHP. Studies accurately showed the new form this legacy took in the AK Party experience. Evaluations prove that domestic and national despotism in the last twenty years consists merely of a conservative shift and a change of political personnel.
Populism, a principle in the Turkist and Westernist programs during the constitutional monarchy, was the most meaningful principle of Kemalist reforms. However, in the 1930s, this principle was expressed with the formula "for the people despite the people," and the existence of the Grand National Assembly was deemed sufficient for the people's participation in political life (Köker, 1993: 138). In the newly established Republic, the sovereignty belonging unconditionally to the nation stemmed from the need for a state defined as "the people's state," separate from the person of the sultan, rather than a new and democratic design where power and authority would be shared (Heper, 2006: 95). Otherwise, matters related to the state and politics were monopolized by a limited elite during the Republic's single-party era, just as in the Ottoman Empire, and lacked a social base (Durdu, 2013: 76).
In Turkey, statism is more than an economic formula. In reaction to this, Nuri Demirağ, the president of the National Development Party founded in 1945, justified establishing his party by stating, "To put an end to the thousand kinds of misery, disaster, and injustice suffered by the nation under statist administration" (Ahmad, 1996: 158).
The understanding of statism, adopted as an economic principle, as a social-economic and political organizational system by the Kadro movement, an influential intellectual and political center in the 1930s, demonstrates the individual-negating nature of the secular revolution. Levent Köker describes Kadro's understanding of statism as the denial of individualism not only in the economic sphere but in all aspects of social life (Köker, 1993: 195).
Top-Down Social and Cultural Modernization
Atatürk emerged after a great catastrophe and possessed charismatic leadership qualities among the people, at least as much as Sultan Hamid. Under his leadership, a radical reform project was implemented with the power of single-man rule. It seems reasonable to associate this situation with the despotic spirit of modernization (Aksakal, 2010: 250).
Years before the Republic was founded, Mustafa Kemal expressed his reaction to the idea of spreading modernization over time and allowing for social transformation. On July 6, 1918, in Karlsbad (now Karlovy Vary in the Czech Republic), a tourist city in the Austro-Hungarian Empire famous for its thermal baths, when the difficulty of Western lifestyle's impact on traditional society was discussed, he reacted: "If I were to gain great authority and power, I believe I would implement the desired revolution in our social life with a single stroke. Because unlike others, I do not accept that this work can be done by gradually accustoming the general public and the scholarly circles to think like me. My soul rebels against such behavior" (Söğütlü, 2010: 52, quoted from Afet İnan's Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün Karlsbad Hatıraları).
Comparing the Turkish revolution with the French and Soviet revolutions was a constant preoccupation of Kemalist discourse in the early Republican period. M. Kemal stated very early, already in 1923, "Revolutions made with blood are stronger, a bloodless revolution cannot be eternalized." The Independence Courts, representing the power to declare a state of emergency, were "the living embodiment of the pathos of the Kemalist revolution" (Bora, 2017: 131).
Kemalism is essentially a tutelage-oriented ideology and positivist. The political consequence of positivism in Kemalism manifests itself, on the one hand, in ensuring opposition to the religious tendencies of political rivals and opposing forces, and on the other hand, in its contribution to maintaining a strong centralized state necessary for progress within order, which is a requirement of positivism (Köker, 1993: 224).
In the 1920s and 30s, the cadres guiding Turkish politics adopted a positivist approach, believing that the best solutions to every problem—political, economic, and social—could only be found by science. According to positivism, every problem, including social ones, had a single solution. This could only be determined by "science, the only valid source of knowledge on all matters." Moreover, according to this positivist utopia, in the near future, science would become the religion of all humanity, and a world would be reached where no guide other than the data of empirical science would be respected.
In this scenario, the modernization of Turkey was also a scientific and technical matter. Throughout the history of the Republic, bureaucratic elites who rose to the top of the state bureaucracy within the Atatürk-İnönü tradition always approached political issues within this positivist framework (Heper, 2006: 142-143).
The representation of ideology by engineers in politics wasn't limited to left-wing technocrats. Starting from the 1960s, all of the right-wing and conservative politicians in the developmentalist tradition were also engineers. It's clear that this background inevitably made their methods positivist, even those of Erbakan, the architect of the religious political alternative. Nilüfer Göle extensively discussed this topic in her book, Engineers and Ideology (Göle, 1986).
The Republic's Individual-Less Collectivism
The Republic was essentially a political revolution. Although Kemalism proudly declared the transition from umma (community) to citizen with the Republic, it disregarded the individual due to its Comtian nature. The reason for not seeing an issue with implementing Western-style modernization with radical methods and from top to bottom was the assumption that Western values were already ingrained in the culture.
In Kemalism's national construction strategy, Turks were presented as a naturally Western nation. The cultural transformation program was directed towards this. The main idea here is the claim of having discovered Western values long before the West itself. Therefore, modernization was defined not as Westernization, but as a return to the essence (Bora, Cereyanlar, 2017: 66-67).
In the area of secularism, one of the dominant parameters of Republican modernization, the state was always authoritarian. The designed official interpretation of religion found its counterpart within the created classes. However, the majority of society did not participate in the desired representation and harmony. While the modernizing state strove for the decline of the old religious culture, the vast majority of the people reproduced their ties with a centuries-old tradition under the given new conditions. Initially expressing their reaction through harsh means like "rebellion," they later turned to methods such as "withdrawal" and "civil disobedience," or emphasized their desire to "survive" by "adapting" (Demir et al., 2008: 77-90, quoted from Ferhat Kentel).
Liberal Modernization Versus Authoritarian Modernization
The Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), founded on November 17, 1924, by commanders like Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, and Refet Bele, who were prominent figures in the War of Independence and voices of this reaction, opposed the authoritarian tendency of Mustafa Kemal's Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) (Zürcher, 2000: 246). Otherwise, the TCF, like the CHF, also wanted Turkey to be transformed into a contemporary Western society. But it sought to do so using liberal methods.
While the CHF understood modernization as a move towards cultural change, the TCF prioritized the adoption of Western science and technology and changes in the economic structure, arguing that cultural change should be left to individuals and the will of society. As for method, the former believed that modernization could be built from top to bottom by the state and elites, while the latter was of the opinion that it should be achieved gradually, over time, and together with society.
The Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu), enacted in February 1925 under the pretext of the suspicious event called the "Sheikh Said rebellion," offered the government an opportunity to silence all opponents. The TCF was closed in June 1925. Strict control was established over the press, and an atmosphere of complete silence prevailed in the country (Söğütlü, 2010: 51-52).
These cadres, who established a full one-party rule by liquidating the opposition, believed that Western superiority stemmed from rationality, a universal principle. Therefore, according to them, to Westernize and modernize, a secular and rational culture first needed to be created. According to this reductionist conception of modernity, inspired by Comtean positivism, the first condition for modernization was the enlightenment of society. In other words, these cadres, in Kemal Karpat's words, viewed the phenomena of "modernization" and "progress" not as economic, social, and political advancement, but essentially as a cultural change movement (Karpat, 2007: 43).
Traditional Society's Reaction and Resistance to Secular Modernization
It is said that the 1921 Constitution, enacted before the proclamation of the Republic, was organized from bottom to top in terms of administrative structure. This Constitution was the constitutionalized form of the reaction of the provinces, villages, and Anatolia against the center. However, with the 1924 Constitution, enacted during the period of radical modernization that began after the proclamation of the Republic, there was a return to the strictly centralist classical administrative model (Tanör, 2006: 265). The new secular and strictly centralist regime rapidly alienated itself from the general public, except for a small minority. With the inclusion of the principle of secularism in the Constitution in 1928, the state-society polarization sharpened.
When secularism was introduced into the Constitution in 1928, it wasn't enough to simply embrace the idea that religion shouldn't be the basis of state governance and that belief should be left to freedom of conscience. The Republic deemed it necessary for the state to control religion in order to create a modern and contemporary society. They called this the "intellectual revolution" (Köker, 1993: 166). All symbols and institutions belonging to popular Islam, which was much more influential than official Islam, were banned (Ahmad, 2012: 99-100).
In the face of successive radical modernization reforms, which the new regime called a "revolution," the rising undercurrents of reaction began to emerge one by one. In Erzurum, Kars, Bursa, İzmir, Kütahya, Isparta, Kayseri, Kastamonu, Çorum, Antalya, and other cities, numerous objections, protests, and outbreaks of reaction were recorded from prominent figures in society such as muftis, city elders, dervish lodge sheikhs, and some local officials. Protesters propagated that the "infidel" regime would soon collapse, the caliphate and the sultanate would return, and that there would be a return to religion and traditions, and they secretly organized in this direction.
When Westernization of Social Life Became a Matter of Honor for the People
Adalet Ağaoğlu, in her novel Ölmeye Yatmak (Lying Down to Die), caricatures rapid and imposed modernization as follows: "The order from the center requested a window to be opened to the West. Well, then; the prosecutor's daughter will play the violin. Girl students will play Flowers and Insects with boy students. Was polka absolutely necessary? In polka, boys will hug girls. They'll hold hands. Yes, perhaps a wider window will be opened to the West, but the entire townspeople rose up." (Ağaoğlu, 2015: 12-13). "The dignitaries and merchant fathers among the audience, to cover up their honor defiled by polka and rondo, coughed constantly, laughing unnecessarily to drive away all boring thoughts in their heads. They had been commanded to be civilized. Well, what could they do, they had become civilized. It wasn't their fault." (Ağaoğlu, 2015: 21).
The people, who had not broken away from their traditions, began to feel that their "honor was being defiled" in the face of impositions attempting to Westernize social life. The commanded civilization was met with reaction from the public. A sharp division and chasm emerged in society, caught between tradition and modernization. While Westernization and modernization processes were rapid in big cities like Istanbul and Ankara, these movements could not easily progress in places like villages and towns (Çavuş, 2015: 345). Indeed, a cartoon published in Akşam in 1926 in reaction to the adoption of the Civil Code depicted a liberated Turkish woman riding a hot-air balloon and throwing off "virtue, honor, and shame" as excess weight (Göle, 2011: 109).
Sketches of Westernization on the Front of the War of Independence
From the memoirs of Mazhar Müfit Kansu, who was close to Mustafa Kemal during the National Struggle, it is understood that Mustafa Kemal planned the Westernization "revolutions" during the War of Independence. To transform the New Turkey into a civilized state, head coverings would be abolished, the fez would be removed, hats would be worn like civilized nations, and Latin characters would be adopted (Kansu, 1997: 130).
Among the reforms, the hat, which had a very high symbolic value, was, in Falih Rıfkı Atay's words, "not a matter of headgear, but a matter of the head." The real issue was to change the superstitions inside the head (Atay, 1969: 432).
The public's abandonment of traditional head coverings for modern hats was deemed necessary for the completion of the transition from empire to nation-state. The campaign launched under the name of modernizing clothing aimed to free society and the state from symbolic garments and achieve a modern appearance. On September 2, 1925, the Council of Ministers, chaired by President Gazi Mustafa Kemal, issued three decrees closing dervish lodges and hospices, and regulating the clothing of religious officials and state employees to dress in the same manner as the public (Özdemir, 2007: 49).
There was a great public reaction to the hat imposition. Falih Rıfkı Atay recounts: "By late October, the people of the inner streets, accustomed to fedora and bowler shapes, followed us when they first saw us in cylinder hats, and we even heard the compliment 'Infidels' from behind some windows" (Atay, 1969: 435).
Among the Republican elites, there was a reaction to women's veiling, and they wanted a radical decision on this issue as well. However, Mustafa Kemal moved more slowly on women's attire than on other reforms. He declared that women's veiling was not the primary issue of the Republic. According to him, the primary importance for Turkish women was the development of their intellectual and spiritual state. In his speeches, he explained that veiling should not isolate women from social life. He emphasized that the country's current level was insufficient to meet basic needs, that men of other competencies were needed, and that future mothers would be the ones to raise them. This was necessary for the New Turkish state to maintain its independence, honor, life, and existence (Karal, 1991: 82).
When Authoritarian Modernization Wears Boots
As Şerif Mardin noted, the burden placed on ideology to make Republican modernization, which did not flow from bottom to top, a reality was too heavy, and no ideology could carry this burden. Secular elites believed that the people owed their lives and rights to them. The discomfort felt by the lack of appreciation for what had been done wore out the patience of the Republic's founding elite in the early 1930s. The extraordinary public favor shown to the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası), established in 1930 to provide dignified opposition to the government and rectify the dictatorial appearance, was perceived as treason. After this, when a rebellion in the Menemen district of İzmir resulted in tragedy in December of the same year, Necip Fazıl, a young secular poet who would later become the harshest pen of the conservative segment, wrote in Hakimiyet-i Milliye: "You will dry up the green blood of the pious and reactionaries in Turkey's population registries, that's all" (Bora, 2017: 134).
The attempted rebellion in the Menemen district of Izmir in December 1930, which resulted in the death of Second Lieutenant Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, was met with astonishment and disappointment among the Republican cadres dedicated to modernizing the country. Mustafa Kemal explicitly wrote of his great disappointment in a message sent to the Chief of General Staff: "This event is shameful for all republicans and patriots. Because some of the people of Menemen applauded and encouraged this savagery of the reactionaries" (Ahmad, 2012: 78).
Kemalist writer and diplomat Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was also deeply saddened by the reaction shown in Menemen to the Republic's reforms: "It means that the atmosphere, the environment there (...) was the atmosphere and environment of Derviş Mehmed. If it weren't, this human butcher would never have found 20 minutes to complete his work. If the environment and atmosphere were imbued with republican and revolutionary principles, Sheikh Mehmed would have choked and fallen at the first stir" (Kadri, 1930: 1).
The extent of societal reaction to Republican modernization is also demonstrated by the unexpected electoral success of the Democrat Party, which promised to bring the demands of the people to power after the transition to a multi-party system. The harsh practices aimed at totally reshaping social life and religion during the single-party period, especially the pressure on religious life, transformed the Democrat Party into a living space for segments of the public who reacted to this style of modernization. In addition to promising to liberalize people's social lives, the Democrat Party also offered an alternative modernization opportunity for the traditional segments of society (Özçelik, 2019: 322).
Did the Traditional Segment Embrace Modern Institutions?
There's a thesis that while state-led modernization found responsive adaptation in urban centers, the periphery's reaction was not to modernization itself but to the center's impositions. This conclusion is derived from the assumption that the traditional segment adopted modern institutions after migrating from rural areas to cities (Karaca, 2020: 124). However, the last twenty years of political experience, approved by conservative sociology, refutes this thesis.
As Nilüfer Göle states, Turkish modernization did not rise on the entrepreneurial and creative power of a civil society based on differentiation and pluralism. On the contrary, it is a civilization project that excluded local patterns and traditional values. Local Islam, alien to rationalist and positivist values, was pushed out of history within the framework of this civilization project. The elites' "civilization" project penetrated the realm that Pierre Bourdieu called "habitus" – operating below the level of consciousness and language, beyond personal control, involuntary, defining one's eating, drinking, speaking, and movements, far beyond political or economic classifications (Göle, 2011: 171-172). All true. But the conservative-political forces, reacting to this modernization, imposed their own modernization ideology on society using the same methods.
When the modernization project, which aimed to leave no autonomous social sphere outside the river of politics, is stripped of its secular character, the existing conservative authoritarianism can be explained. Conservative radicalism, as the final link in the historical evolution of indigenous and national despotism, or the shift taking over from secular radicalism, is a relocation story. Conservatives and secularists are two sides of the same coin. Those who have managed to remain outside these two poles barely fill a handful.
Translated by Gemini
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