Kenan Camurcu

The secular radicalism's attempt to remove Islam from public life aimed not so much at enmity towards religion, but rather at detaching the country from its history, stripping it of its traditions, and purifying its cultural codes. They must have believed that only in this way could a new and proper beginning be found. The same assumption underlies reformist Quranic fundamentalism and its "unity of opposites" counterpart, traditionalist Salafist radicalism. The concept of a "pure and pristine religion" is, for example, a symmetrical copy of the thesis to purify Turkish by removing foreign (Arabic and Persian) words and simplifying it.

Undoubtedly, Salafism is the ideological heir of tribalism, which was the official policy of the Umayyad dynasty. The goal of Islam's new world, emerging from Hijaz – first Sunni, then Shia – declaring war on the distinct religiosity of nations that became Muslim through the civilization established in Iran, under the guise of "combating innovation and superstition," is nothing other than to revive a chauvinistic Arabizing piety.

What has been neglected is that history, which accumulated slowly and layer by layer, is also the supporting pillar of religion. Without history, there can be no religion, society, culture, or intellectual activity. Neither renewal, change, revival (ihya), nor re-codification (tadwin) can be achieved by stepping outside the continuous historical progression. The main source we must turn to, whether for the re-codification and revival of Islam or for societal change, is history, where cultural identity is embodied. In technical terms, sira.

In the definition of historiography as "sira", which excises the experiences of Muslims from general history, there is, of course, a methodological error in its approach that breaks historical integrity. When historical romanticism is added to this methodological flaw, only perfect imaginary stories, detached from reality, can remain.

While the Quran's historical narratives emphasize cautionary elements and recount examples of prophets who constantly faced betrayal and failure, institutionalized Islam tells us about the happy and prosperous history of Islam. It's a happy-ending novel with a thornless rose garden, where no negativity is ever seen.

The assumption is that the believers of all other prophets were people afflicted with character flaws and could not protect their religions, but the companions (ashab) of Prophet Muhammad were, as the first and only example in history, a perfect community. Moreover, having seen the Prophet even once made them sacred, and from that moment on, they could not even be subjected to right-wrong, good-bad evaluation. This strangeness is a peculiar belief, existing Islam, that has been religiously codified. It is a highly corrupted, altered, and distorted form of the religion of fitra, nature, and hanif.

The Fabricated History of Existing Islam

The earliest sira sources and hadith collections prove that the imagined picture held by the religious culture, created through passionate sermons, is unrealistic. It's just like the distorted history of the ancient, medieval, and modern periods rewritten with TV series scripts. Therefore, the history of early Islam needs to be rewritten with a new methodology.

The elites of institutionalized Islam are aware of the horrifying incidents in Islam's history, but they censor that information for fear of shaking believers' faith. When such information is brought up by Orientalists, propaganda is spread in unscientific circles claiming it's false. When these historical truths are written about by Muslim researchers, they are accused of treason and lynched. There's no doubt they believe they're acting in the name of Allah's pleasure when doing this. This means there's a strange belief that Allah welcomes and rewards lynching those who speak the truth, and spreading lies, black, and dirty propaganda.

The founding fathers of sira are excusable for their method of recording everything oral during the era of compilation/codification. The problem lies in the fact that the subsequent scholars failed to initiate a tradition of critical and analytical evaluation in authenticating the recorded material. They dedicated their efforts to producing arguments to validate the group they sided with in the political polarization among the Prophet's believers. The field of sira consists of an endless polemic between those who supported the Abu Bakr-Omar group and those who sided with Ali ibn Abi Talib. But this flaw can be remedied. It is certain that using a comparative historical method and presenting events from the perspective of general history will increase the success and accuracy rate.

Those who suspect that accusing studies within the discipline of history concerning the early period of Islam of "disrespecting the companions" from the outset carries a malicious agenda are right. The sole purpose of trying to block scientific work can only be political. If scientific activity is criminalized with intent-reading accusations like "discrediting the companions," no scholarship can be done, and no scientific discipline can exist. When these disciplines are rendered unusable, all that remains is hagiography adorned with myths and tales. Indeed, existing/institutionalized Islam is nothing more than this.

An example of this methodological deviation is the attempt to confirm the political accusation of "discrediting the companions" in an article stated to be written to criticize Mehmet Azimli's work titled Reading Sira Differently (Zeyveli, 2012: 53). Although Azimli responded to this unfounded and false accusation with his article "Concerning Reputation", the "discrediting the companions" propaganda, regardless of the extent of evidence presented, worked on the majority who were uninterested in the truth due to a culture of lynching and unconsciousness. Utter ignorance made Azimli's life miserable for conveying alternative information from credible sources. In another article, I will argue that the "Islamophobia" camouflage is the name given to shielding the evils of this world of religious despotism.

The defining characteristic of mainstream religious culture is that adherence to the established order takes precedence over loyalty to truth. Even the most obvious wrong is not intervened with because it has become entrenched. In this situation, that wrong becomes the main axis, and all truths are organized according to this wrong axis. This is what we call conservatism. As long as this cultural code doesn't change, it doesn't matter how many times political shifts occur. Because the result will never change.

This cultural code involves not giving the opposition any quarter or forcing them into submission at any cost, and the first wrongly buttoned shirt button of this political garment, which conservatives never intend to take off, is the hurried election of Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa (Abu Bakr) as caliph in the Saqifa of the Banu Sa'ida pavilion. Contrary to the Prophet's style, who didn't even wage war against the false prophet Musaylima, Abu Bakr went so far as to wage war not only against non-Muslims but also against Muslim political opponents. The deeply entrenched tradition of "political assassination" in the Muslim-political universe is his innovation.

The "Pavilion (Saqifa)" in Medina was the Medinan equivalent of Dar al-Nadwa, the consultative and decision-making council of pagan leaders in Mecca. After Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa was elected caliph by a small group in the old pre-Islamic assembly, about 1 km from the Prophet's Mosque, the center of Islam, the decision was announced in Medina for a collective pledge of allegiance (bay'ah), and the ceremony was held at the Prophet's Mosque. Much can be said about the theoretical effects of this closed-circuit election in the secular sphere, followed by the public endorsement of the decision in the religious sphere, on Islamic political thought.

Umar ibn al-Khattab, who did not sheathe his sword to forcibly collect allegiance for Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa, later in his life became very angry when a man, referring to the days of Saqifa, was quoted as saying, "By God, the allegiance to Abu Bakr was nothing but a momentary slip." Yet, he admitted the truth of the statement: "Let no one be deceived by the claim that the pledge to Abu Bakr was without consultation, sudden, and completed. Yes, that is true, it happened that way. But by it, Allah protected from evil. (...) The Ansar opposed us and gathered in the Saqifa of Banu Sa'ida. Ali, Zubayr, and those with them also opposed us. (...) At that time, we had no more important task than securing the pledge to Abu Bakr. We feared that the Ansar would separate from us and pledge allegiance collectively to one of their own. In that case, we would either have to pledge allegiance to them despite our disapproval, or oppose them, which would lead to corruption. From now on, if anyone pledges allegiance to someone without the consultation and consent of the Muslims, there will be no pledge, for both the one pledging and the one to whom allegiance is pledged will be killed out of fear." (Bukhari 6830; Baladhuri, 1996: 2/264).

The meaning is this: Although Abu Bakr's pledge did not happen in the normal way, what's done is done. But from now on, no one should attempt to pledge allegiance in such a hurried manner, without consensus, as was done for Abu Bakr. If they do, they should be killed.

This "new Medina," which punishes political opposition and the demand for elections with death, is the source of existing Islam.

While Umar admitted that there was no consultation in Abu Bakr's pledge and warned against future elections without consultation, he never addressed the issue of his own appointment by Abu Bakr through a will.

The Raid on Fatima's House

While a small group pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr in the disputed meeting at the Saqifa of Banu Sa'ida, the gathering place of the pre-Islamic era, rather than in the Prophet's Mosque which had become the city's center after Yathrib became Medina, Ali ibn Abi Talib, Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, and Sa'd ibn Ubadah were meeting at Fatima's house (Maqdisi, 2013: 5/151). The newly elected Caliph Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa sent Umar ibn al-Khattab to raid the meeting. Umar, along with Muhammad ibn Maslama and others, threatened those inside from in front of Fatima's house: "Either you come out, or I will set the house on fire" (Ibn Qutaybah, 1991: 30). Fatima came out and said to Umar, "Son of Khattab, have you come to burn down our house?" Umar replied: "Yes. Or you come out and join the community" (Abd Rabbih al-Andalusi, 1983: 5/13; Abu al-Fida, 1983: 1/156).

Ibn Taymiyyah, without citing any source, claimed the reason for Abu Bakr and his supporters' raid on Fatima's house was "to determine whether there was anything from Allah's property (bayt al-mal) inside, and if so, to take it and distribute it to its rightful owners" (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1986: 8/291). In this scenario, while making an assumption about Abu Bakr's intention, it's clear that his actual purpose was to portray Fatima and Ali as thieves secretly withholding something from the public treasury.

Once, Urwah ibn al-Zubayr was reminded that his brother, Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr, had imprisoned Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah (Ali's son), Abdullah ibn Abbas, and a group from the Banu Hashim in the Arim quarter in Mecca, brought wood, and said, "Either you pledge allegiance to me or I will burn you all." He was asked how he could do such an ugly thing in the sanctuary of Allah's House. Urwah apologized on his brother's behalf, saying, "He wanted to frighten them, just as was done to those who previously refused allegiance" (Mas'udi, 2005: 3/69). What Urwah meant by "previously" was Umar's threat to burn Fatima's house. Sayyid Ja'far Murtada Amuli notes that there was a falsification in Mas'udi's book, stating that the sentence "as Umar ibn al-Khattab did to the Banu Hashim..." (3/77) in the 1965 Dar al-Ma'rifa edition of the book was removed in later editions, and that this sentence was quoted from an uncorrupted copy of Muruj al-Dhahab in Ibn Abi al-Hadid's commentary on Nahj al-Balagha (20/147) and Qadi Nurullah Tustari's (Shushtari, d. 1610) Ihkak al-Haqq wa Izhak al-Batil (Amuli, 2009: 2/196).

Knowing that the pledge of allegiance he received at Saqifa would be meaningless without the participation of the Banu Hashim and senior companions, Abu Bakr sent Umar to Ali to persuade him to pledge allegiance. Ali refused to pledge. Ya'qubi lists the prominent senior companions who refused to pledge allegiance along with Ali: Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib, Ammar ibn Yasir, Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, Salman al-Farisi, Fadl ibn Abbas, Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Khalid ibn Sa'id, Miqdad ibn Amr, Bara' ibn Azib, Ubayy ibn Ka'b, and others (Ya'qubi, 1900: 2/124). Even Abu Sufyan, seeing this situation, refrained from pledging allegiance to Abu Bakr (Abu al-Fida, 1983: 1/95). Abu Sufyan's description of the tension is also striking: "Dust and smoke that will not subside without bloodshed" (Tabari, 1995: 3/209; Ibn al-Athir, 1965: 2/189). Umar became uneasy and warned Abu Bakr that they could not be safe from Abu Sufyan's evil (Jawhari, undated: 1/37).

As the political crisis escalated, the instruction Abu Bakr gave to Umar, whom he sent to remove Ali and his supporters who refused to pledge allegiance from Fatima's house, indicates that he was willing to risk the first civil war even before his daughter Aisha's bloody uprising (Basra/Battle of the Camel): "If they turn their backs on you, fight them" (Abu al-Fida, 1983: 1/95).

During the attack on Fatima's house, besides Fatima and Ali, their young children Hasan and Husayn were also present in the house that Umar ibn al-Khattab threatened to burn down with its occupants if they did not come out and pledge allegiance (Ibn Tawus, 1978: 239).

Okay, I understand. I will now provide the complete translation of the remaining text without any further interruptions.

Identified Attackers

The well-known individuals among the attackers mentioned in the sources are:

1. Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa (Abu Bakr) "Layth ibn Sa'd reported from Abu Bakr al-Siddiq: 'I wish I had not raided Fatima's house, even if war had been declared against me.'" (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1965: 6/51; Humayd ibn Zanjawayh, 1986: 3/304, Narration 467; Tabari, 1890: 2140).

2. Umar ibn al-Khattab "It was narrated from Aslam: When Abu Bakr was pledged allegiance after the Messenger of Allah, Ali and Zubayr went to the house of Fatima, the Prophet's daughter. They began to consult and attend to their own affairs. Upon hearing this, Umar ibn al-Khattab arrived at Fatima's door..." (Muttaqi al-Hindi, 1989: 5/651, narration 14138; Ibn al-Jawzi, 1992: 4/64).

3. Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf Musa ibn Uqba's narration from Sa'd, Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf's grandson: Ibrahim, son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf, narrated: (During the attack) Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf was with Umar ibn al-Khattab. Muhammad ibn Maslama was the one who broke Zubayr's sword." (Qadi Shahba, 1991: 94, narration 1991). The same narration is cited by Al-Hakim al-Nisaburi in Al-Mustadrak (2002: 3/70, narration 20/4422) and Ibn Kathir in Al-Bidaya wa'l-Nihaya (Beirut 1988: 6/302). Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf's name also appears in Riyad al-Nadira (Ahmad Tabari, 1984: 1/241).

4. Khalid ibn Walid (Sulaym ibn Qays, 1999: 387). Khalid, along with Muhammad ibn Maslama, killed Sa'd ibn Ubadah, the leader of the Khazraj, who did not pledge allegiance to Umar ibn al-Khattab after Abu Bakr (Najah al-Ta'i, 2002: 1/127, quoting Baladhuri's Ansab al-Ashraf and Abd al-Fattah Abd al-Maqsud's al-Saqifa wa'l-Khilafa).

5. Muhammad ibn Maslama Ibn Qutaybah, 1991: 30; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 1996: 1/554, entry 1291; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 2009: 3/31; Ahmad Tabari, 1984: 1/241. Muhammad ibn Maslama is the main character in the story of the "assassination of Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf." He was also Khalid ibn Walid's accomplice in the assassination of Sa'd ibn Ubadah. He held critical positions during the caliphates of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman. He did not pledge allegiance to Ali. Ali explained the reason for this: "My sin regarding Muhammad ibn Maslama is that I killed his brother, the Jew Marhab, on the day of Khaybar" (Tustari, 1998: 9/586-587).

6. Salamah ibn Salamah Ahmad Tabari, 1953: 1/218; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 2003: 225, narration 1220. An important figure in the "assassination of Ka'b ibn al-Ashraf" story – Ka'b's foster brother – and the brother of Abu Na'ila Silkhan ibn Salamah. He is Muhammad ibn Maslama's maternal cousin.

7. Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah Amr ibn Abi al-Miqdam narrated from his father, who narrated from his grandfather (Hurmuz ibn Mahan al-Farisi): (...) I was sitting to Abu Bakr's right in Saqifa. People were pledging allegiance to him. Suddenly, Umar said to him: "You have nothing in your hand until you get allegiance from Ali. Send someone to him to bring his pledge to you." (...) Umar said, "Let's go to him." Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, Khalid ibn Walid, al-Mughira ibn Shu'bah, Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah, Salim, the freed slave of Abu Hudhayfah, and Qunfudh got up and forced their way to Fatima's door (Ayyashi, 1960: 2/66; narration 76). He was the one who, along with Umar, shouted to the Ansar in Saqifa while seeking allegiance for Abu Bakr, "The Messenger of Allah was one of us, and we have more right to this position than you" (Ya'qubi, 1883: 2/138), thus linking the caliphate to ethnic origin.

8. Mu'adh ibn Jabal

9. Salim, the freed slave of Abu Hudhayfah (Amr ibn al-As) said to Mu'awiya: "The people of Iraq and Hijaz are with him, but despite this, you and I have heard him (Ali) say: 'I wish I had forty men.' Remember that incident. Meaning, he wished he had the forty men who were with him on the day the house, meaning Fatima's house, was attacked." (Nasr ibn Muzahim al-Minqari, 1962: 163).

10. Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan

11. Amr ibn al-As

12. Bashir ibn Sa'd Ali said: "Do not disregard the position and right of the Prophet's family among people. By God, O community of Muhajirun, we, the Ahl al-Bayt, have more right to this matter. From among us is he who recites Allah's book, understands Allah's religion, knows the Sunnah, and is skilled in governance. Do not follow your whims." Thereupon, Bashir ibn Sa'd said: "I wish the Ansar had heard these words from you, O Ali, before they pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr. There would have been no disagreement between the two of you. But they have already pledged allegiance." (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1959: 6/12).

13. Usayd ibn Hudayr Usayd's father was the leader of the Aws tribe. He was the first among the Ansar to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr, reacting to Sa'd ibn Ubadah, the leader of the Khazraj tribe. Sources that state his participation in the attack on Fatima's house: Ibn Qutaybah, 1967: 1/18; Ahmad Tabari, 1984: 1/241; Husayn al-Diyarbakri, 1885: 2/188.

14. Thabit ibn Qays Thabit is a famous poet of the Ansar. Sources that state his participation in the attack on Fatima's house: Ahmad ibn Hanbal, 1996: 554, entry 1291; Murtada Askari, 1986: 73; Ahmad Tabari, 1984: 1/241.

15. Qunfudh ibn Umayr Abu Zayd Umar ibn Shabbah's narration: When Umar ibn al-Khattab shouted in front of Fatima's house, "Either you come to pledge allegiance or I will burn the house with its occupants," Qunfudh and Ziyad ibn Labid were also there (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1965: 6/48).

16. Mughira ibn Shu'bah Ya'qubi also states his participation in the attack on Fatima's house (Ya'qubi, 1900: 2/124).

The undisputed main outlines of the attack and the names of the identified attackers are found in classical Sunni and Shia sources. For a full and detailed list of all sources in chronological order starting from the first century: Abd al-Zahra Mahdi, 2001: 142 et seq.

From the sentence in al-Minqari's narration of the conversation between Amr ibn al-As and Mu'awiya, we understand that there were forty people in the attack that day: "(Amr ibn al-As) said to Mu'awiya: 'The people of Iraq and Hijaz are with him (Ali), but despite this, you and I have heard him say: "I wish I had forty men." Remember that incident. Meaning, he wished he had the forty men who were with him on the day the house, meaning Fatima's house, was attacked.'" (Minqari, 1962: 163).

The Assassination of Sa'd ibn Ubadah

This is the history that shaped the political imagination of institutionalized Islam. Furthermore, credible sources also record that political opponents who refused to submit to authority were eliminated through assassination. The most important of these political assassinations is the killing of Sa'd ibn Ubadah, the great leader of the Ansar and the representative of the Medinan Muslims during the Prophet's lifetime.

At Badr, the Prophet gave his own banner to Ali ibn Abi Talib, while deeming Sa'd ibn Ubadah worthy of carrying the Ansar's banner (Isbahani, 1868: 4/19). Sa'd ibn Ubadah refused to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr, who was declared caliph, and left Medina for Syria. Like Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab did not leave Sa'd alone and sent a man to force him to pledge allegiance. He said: "Invite him to pledge allegiance and do not leave him in peace. If he turns away, seek Allah's help against him (kill him)." The man found him in Hawran. He invited him to pledge allegiance. Sa'd ibn Ubadah replied, "I will never pledge allegiance to a Qurayshi." The man said, "I will kill you." Sa'd replied, "If you can fight me, kill me then." The man then said: "Are you going outside what the community has agreed upon?" Sa'd said, "No, it's the allegiance. That's what I'm outside of." The man shot his arrow and killed him (Baladhuri, 1996: 2/272; Najah al-Ta'i, 2002: 1/127, quoting Abd al-Fattah Abd al-Maqsud's al-Saqifa wa'l-Khilafa).

Ibn Abi al-Hadid, from the Mu'tazilite school, states that the "man" mentioned in the narration was Khalid ibn Walid: "Khalid ibn Walid was ordered to go to Syria and kill Sa'd ibn Ubadah. He and his companion lay in ambush at night. The moment Sa'd appeared, they killed him. After throwing Sa'd into the well there, Khalid's companion cried out in the darkness of the night: 'We killed the precious Sa'd ibn Ubadah of Khazraj / We struck him with two arrows, his heart could not bear it.' It is stated that Khalid's 'crying companion' when they killed Sa'd was Muhammad ibn Maslama" (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1965: 17/223). The Sunnis' passing over this by saying "a man" is because Khalid ibn Walid was the one who organized the political assassinations against opponents during Abu Bakr's consolidation of power.

The poem, thought to be heard from the well, was presumed to be shouted by jinn, and it was said that jinn killed him. Sa'd was found in that well three days later. His body was bruised. When they saw him in that state, it was said, "This is a jinn possession." Mu'min al-Taq (Abu Ja'far al-Ahwal, d. 777) was asked, "What prevented Ali from opposing Abu Bakr's caliphate?" He replied, "He feared being killed by a jinn" (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1965: 17/223).

It is also said that Sa'd was killed in a bathhouse. Furthermore, it is narrated that he was struck by jinn and died while sitting and relieving himself (Baladhuri, 1996: 2/272; Ibn Sa'd. 1990: 3/463). The story of Sa'd being killed by jinn, found in the official view of Islam (Usama ibn Yasin, 2000: 388-389), is a fabricated narration to cover up the murder.

Dhahabi, in Sa'd ibn Ubadah's biography, writes that he was killed in Syria and that jinn threw him into a well (Dhahabi, 2010: 3/121). Ibn Taymiyyah, whom Salafis exalt by falsely claiming he fights superstitions, also vigorously defends the superstition of jinn killing him (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1986: 8/581). Ibn Taymiyyah, repeating the story of Sa'd ibn Ubadah being killed by jinn, argues that Amr, Abu Ubaydah, and similar figures, who were Abu Bakr's greatest supporters, were more virtuous than Sa'd because Sa'd did not pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr and did not oppose the perpetrators of the Ifk incident. We will show in another article that this "Ifk" incident (the alleged slander of Aisha with adultery) is fabricated.

In Ibn Asakir's account, the story becomes even more fantastic: "In the 15th Hijri year (637), two and a half years after Umar became caliph, Sa'd ibn Ubadah was found dead in Hawran in the region of Syria. When the news of his death arrived, children, who had gone down into the well due to the intense heat, heard a voice rising from the well: 'We killed the precious Sa'd ibn Ubadah of Khazraj / We struck him with two arrows, his heart could not bear it.' The children were so frightened that they never forgot it" (Ibn Asakir, 2012: 11/193; Ibn Sa'd, 1990: 3/463).

Ibn Abd al-Barr also narrates the report – likely fabricated to cover up the assassination – that Sa'd died in the eleventh Hijri year during Abu Bakr's caliphate, but writes that there is no dispute that he was found dead in a bathhouse and his body was bruised. He adds that no one noticed he was dead until verses, purportedly spoken by unseen entities, were heard (Ibn Asakir, 2010: 2/164).

Crimes attributed to jinn are a subject for a separate study. Let's remember that the story of women who become pregnant out of nowhere being raped by jinn, popular among conservatives who champion the "sacred family" slogan, never failed before DNA testing became widespread. Indeed, we still see this lie being used in reality TV shows.

The assassination of Sa'd ibn Ubadah immediately brings to mind Umar ibn al-Khattab's words during the fierce debate of the Abu Bakr pledge crisis: "May Allah curse (kill) Sa'd." Therefore, Abu Sulayman al-Khattabi (d. 388/998), the first commentator on Bukhari, makes considerable effort to speculate on Umar's intended meaning: "It means let him be as if killed, let him be counted as dead, get away from where he is seen. The reason for this is Sa'd's desire for the position of commander for his tribe, in the manner of pre-Islamic Arabs, where only one from their own tribe would take the lead. However, the ruling of Islam is the opposite. For this reason, Umar rejected and condemned him in the strongest terms. When all his actions were considered null and his power was taken away, it was as if he was killed. This is the same as killing wine when something is mixed into it and it spoils." (Qurtubi, 2015: 8/378).

It should be noted that the method of consolidating power through a chain of assassinations is also attributed to the Prophet through fabricated narrations. We will address these assassination claims in another article.

Conclusion: The End of the Medina Charter and the Rise of Dominance

A new history began, in which the Prophet's Medina Charter, based on voluntarism, spiritually died, and its place was taken by submission through force.

With the Medina Document, the Prophet had succeeded in establishing a strong, structural, and institutional peace out of Medina's complex and conflict-ridden social structure. He had the Medina Document, which would protect social peace, written by Ali and entrusted it to him. Ali kept it in the scabbard of his sword (Bulaç, 2020: 19). Michael Lecker also conveys the same information from Abu Ubayd's Amwal and cites historical references indicating that Ali preserved all of the Prophet's important documents, not just the Medina Charter. One of these is when Qays ibn Sa'd and Malik al-Ashtar asked Ali ibn Abi Talib, "Did the Messenger of Allah entrust you with anything rejected by others?" Ali replied, "No. Except for a sahifa," and took out the Document from the scabbard of his sword and showed it (Lecker, 2004: 194-195). He also listed the hypocrites who threatened social peace and entrusted this list to Hudhayfah ibn al-Yaman from Ali's group. Abdullah Hudhayfah ibn Hasan, who carried the list of hypocrites in Medina, was known by the epithet "Guardian of the Prophet's Secret" (Maqrizi, 1999: 9/322). He was among the Shia companions who sided with Ali ibn Abi Talib during the chaos of the caliph election and pledge of allegiance that began after the Prophet's death. He was also one of those who prayed at Fatima's funeral when she was quietly buried at night, according to her will (Muhsin al-Amin, 1983: 4/596).

These symbolic choices taught a system of security for peaceful coexistence in Medina. When the security system was not upheld, Medina scattered like prayer beads whose string had broken.

The Medina established by the Prophet with the Medina Charter in the Prophet's Mosque was replaced by the "new Medina" with the caliph election that took place in the Saqifa of Banu Sa'ida, the political center of Yathrib during the pre-Islamic era. The social disintegration, ethnic division, and religious polarization experienced in Medina during the process of Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa's (Abu Bakr) election as caliph became irreversibly structural and permanent. This story is also the journey of constructing political piety, that is, existing Islam and conservatism.

Translated by Gemini

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