Challenging the conventions of the established order, preventing the plundering of the public treasury, and holding those responsible accountable are extremely high-stakes endeavors. For instance, Ömer b. Abdulaziz (d. 720), despite being an Umayyad caliph, radically attempted to change the nepotistic, discriminatory, and tyrannical politico-religious-economic regime established by his ancestors. He was poisoned and killed by his own kin in the second year of his caliphate. Imam Baqir (grandson of Husayn), a prominent Shi'a figure who suffered greatly under the Umayyads, referred to him as "the noble of the Umayyads" due to his just treatment of Ali's supporters and his initiation of a period of reconciliation by rectifying injustices. (Ibn al-Athir, d. 1233, Al-Kamil fi't-Tarikh, 5/62).

From 2016 onwards, "the state's" political economy, driven by the sociological imperative of the "survival paradigm," shifted towards a re-distribution of capital. Consequently, actions that would ordinarily be considered criminal under the definition of corruption began to be excused. Kılıçdaroğlu's slogan "Where is the 128 billion dollars?" was, in essence, a struggle to define this axial shift as illegitimate. It is precisely this struggle that the new administration, which analyzed the necessity of changing methods to achieve power after Kılıçdaroğlu's eventual removal from the CHP leadership, immediately and definitively abandoned.

The "state" we have been referring to is, in the theoretical "state-government" model, not the permanent structure that the temporary government should not touch. With the massive autocracy unveiled by the 22-year-long government in 2016, there is no longer a "state" — that is, no law, tradition, customs, democratic rules, or institutions — to rein in the government and dictate its limits. Thus, "the state" has become the powerful political will itself. The "political will" here should be understood not as a concept within the legitimate sphere of producing and exercising sovereignty, but as the specter of the irade-i seniye (imperial will) regime from the pre-republican era. The established order, comprised of the seyfiye (military), ilmiye (religious scholars), and kalemiye (bureaucracy) trinity, is also that same entity. This is akin to Numan Kurtulmuş's frequent "Harun-Qarun" comparison, which he often used when he was opposed to the power-hungry political establishment. Kurtulmuş alluded to the "Pharaoh-Haman-Qarun" trinity, an example drawn from Egyptian history when describing the Prophet's contextual environment in the 7th century (e.g., see Ankabut 39). This represents the absolute leader, the subservient bureaucracy, and the capital group financing the regime: a capitocracy. This is the ideological root of the highly influential neoliberal current of the 90s, the authoritarian liberal program implemented in Chile after Pinochet's rather bloody 1973 coup, the same Pinochet whom Hayek, a darling of liberals, traveled to meet to express his respect, admiration, and congratulations. When this model is translated into conservatism, it corresponds to our "indigenous-national" experience. The current "constitutional monarchy" delusion emerging from liberal circles is not as fantastical as it might seem.

The blatant nature of the Chilean case is, of course, an exception. In fact, there is extensive literature suggesting that the low-intensity and phantom-fascist neoliberal program is therefore heavily involved in covert operations and has specialized in illicit financing for this purpose. Sedat Peker had just begun to expose the Turkish version of this phenomenon when the established order intervened and prevented the "fire" from spreading further.

Disregarding tactical errors and the inherent fluctuations of electoral politics, we clearly observed from a strategic perspective that when Kılıçdaroğlu began to challenge this powerful and intimidating system, aiming to change it, the established order's alarm level escalated. The signal flare was Meral Akşener's enthusiastic announcement of the İyi Party's "Path of Omar" strategy. There are compelling reasons to believe that Akşener's campaign, presented with the words "We promise not to stray from Atatürk's path while following Omar's path to offer our nation a just and free life", was the theo-political crypto of the mobilization to prevent Kılıçdaroğlu's election as president.

The oxymoron in Akşener's promise "not to stray from Atatürk's path while following Omar's path" can serve as our starting point: to mention Atatürk, who granted women the right to vote and be elected, empowering them as subjects in public life, in the same sentence as Omar, who scourged, beat, and pulled off the headscarf of enslaved women for covering their heads like free women (Ibn Abi Shaybah, d. 849, Musannaf 2/28)—that is, who expelled them from the public sphere—is, as the ancients would say, acaibu'l-gharaib: surprising, contradictory, strange, peculiar. Unless this strangeness was intentionally chosen to subliminally invite voters to follow the path of the autocratic Omar, not the symbol of justice, Ali. Or, unless it was an attempt to generate approval, support, and consent for the conservatives' sacred despotism by invoking the path of Caliph Omar, famous for his terrifying whip, a symbol of unquestionable power (Ibn Khallikan, d. 1282, Wafayat al-A'yan, 3/14).

I am not sure if anyone among the collective spearheading Akşener's campaign truly understands "the Path of Omar." We know, at the very least, that the only source of knowledge for both popular Islam and its elites is an oral religious understanding at the level of sermons, filled with exaggerations and fabrications. It is certain that they possess no knowledge whatsoever about historical written sources and their significance and value for Sunnism. Therefore, we can begin by explaining a little about this "path."

All the information you are about to read below is taken from Omarist/Sunni sources. This means that even the most peculiar-seeming information is not presented in these sources out of enmity towards Omar; rather, it is recounted as a virtue of his. The Omarists' reaction to the 'Alawites (Shi'ism, Alevism) who criticize Omar, based on the same sources and information, is not due to the unreliability of the reported news and information but rather because it is used critically instead of being a source of pride.

The Path of the Whipping Caliph, Omar

Caliph Omar (b. Khattab), whom the "Path of Omar" campaign, which began in November 2021, references, can be considered the Paul of Islam. In this respect: just as Paul (d. 64) transformed the message of the Jewish king (messiah) Jesus, who was at odds with Rome, into "Christianity" in accordance with Rome's objective reality, making it the empire's religious identity, Omar transformed Muhammad's message into "Islam" in accordance with the objective reality of the Hejaz, making it the theo-political identity of the conquering and imperial "new Medina."

Transitioning from the Prophet's participatory model, limited to the Hejaz and based on power-sharing, to a universal, conquering, dominating, and unitary phase would undoubtedly have inevitable consequences in belief and action. As the political template changed, religious thought and practice adapted accordingly. There are many examples of Omar, who institutionalized the Byzantine administrative model, intervening in religion as a political authority, but to avoid deviation from the topic, let's leave them for other articles for now.

Islam's departure from its character as a religion focused on spirituality and personal perfection, transitioning into a socio-political Islam—that is, a disciplined, orderly social identity—has various manifestations. The Tarawih prayer, performed during Ramadan, despite being an individual act of worship in the Prophet's practice, to be performed alone, in contemplation and solitude, for personal perfection, was transformed by Omar into a congregational prayer for the construction of a disciplined, closed, collective society. This should be noted as a powerful metaphor. This was done despite the Prophet's stern warning against changes in worship: "Every newly introduced matter is an innovation, every innovation is misguidance, and every misguidance leads to the Fire" (Muslim, 867). Yet, Omar challenged this by saying, "What a beautiful innovation" (Bukhari, 2010) regarding his action. His supporting scholars, in desperation, were forced to develop a theory dividing innovations into "good" and "bad."

Omar also altered the form of prayer, despite the Prophet's admonition, "Pray as you have seen me pray" (Bukhari, 893), by introducing the gesture of folding hands, a sign of submission before kings, shahs, and sultans, into prayer. Folding hands in patriarchal cultures signifies respectful standing before kings, sultans, elders, and so on. Omar, when adding hand-folding to prayer, was influenced by the Persian captives who, showing respect in their own culture, folded their hands before the caliph. There is no information about hand-folding in prayer during the Prophet's time. All narrations attributing hand-folding to the Prophet are baseless.

The famous narration of Abu Humayd al-Sa'idi (Abu Dawud, 729), which describes the prayer down to its smallest details, does not mention hand-folding. It is specifically stated by the narrators that Abu Humayd delivered his speech, beginning with "I am the one who knows the Prophet's prayer best," in the presence of 10 senior companions. In contrast, the Bukhari and Muslim narrations that suggest hands should be folded are single-narrator accounts.

The specialized aspect of the matter is as follows:

Hand-folding in prayer is based on Bukhari's narration from Sahl b. Sa'd: "The people were commanded to place the right hand over the left hand" (Bukhari, 707). However, the narration does not state that this was the Prophet's instruction, but it is perceived as such. Bukhari's commentator, Ayni, considers the hadith mursal (incomplete chain of narration) due to a missing narrator in its attribution to the Prophet (Umdat al-Qari, 5/278). Suyuti agrees (al-Tawshih, 1/463). Muslim's narration from Wail b. Hujr (401) is also mursal. Ibn Ma'in considers Wail's narrations from his father as mursal (Tahdhib, 7/247). Moreover, Wail's narration does not mention seeing the Prophet folding his hands; it states that he removed his hands from his cloak when going into bowing. Thus, the idea of him folding his hands is entirely an assumption. Here, it is clear that the Prophet was holding his cloak to prevent it from blowing away in the wind.

Before the emergence of the Sunni legal schools, it is recorded in books of legal history that famous and reputable figures from the second generation, such as Abdullah b. Zubayr, Sa'id b. Musayyab, Sa'id b. Jubayr, Ibn Jurayj, Nakha'i, Hasan Basri, and Ibn Sirin, prayed with their hands open (Jaziri, al-Fiqh 'ala al-Madhahib al-Arba'a, 1/217).

In the Qur'an, prayer is mentioned with the phrase "aqimu's-salat" (to establish, uphold prayer). When standing in prayer (qiyam), there is no hand-folding as before the Persian Shah or other kings and sultans. One stands upright before Allah. Much can be said about the self-confidence of individuality in standing upright, versus the subservient, passive, subordinate psycho-politics of standing with hands tied as if before a sultan.

While Habermas's theory of the public sphere or structure as a realm of deliberation and dialogue corresponded to the Prophet's mosque (Masjid al-Nabawi), with Abu Bakr, it transitioned to the "caliph's house." Omar institutionalized this alienation, and finally, by the time of Muawiya, this transformation reached its natural conclusion with the palace becoming the public structure.

It was also Omar who initiated the professionalization of the leader with the caliphate during Abu Bakr's era. After being elected caliph, when Abu Bakr went to sell baskets in the market, Omar arranged a salary for him so that he would not have to engage in trade for a living. However, Abu Bakr was not satisfied with the 2,000 dirhams salary, saying, "I have a family. You have prevented me from trading. Increase it a bit more" (Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Talkhis al-Khabir, 4/356, narration 2613-33). After negotiation with Abu Bakr, they added another 500 dirhams, making his salary 2,500 dirhams (Ibn Sa'd, Tabaqat, 3/169). At this point, the official historical narrative of "wealthy Abu Bakr," portraying him as financially supporting the Prophet and buying and freeing Muslim slaves, etc., lacks historical reality.

Omar is also the originator of the official historical writing of Islam, the use of a linear calendar based on the migration to Medina (the Hijri calendar), and other radical changes.

Omar initiated the Hijri calendar, which is debated annually in Turkey as the "Conquest of Mecca" celebrations coincide with the Gregorian New Year, a favored topic of secular-conservative lifestyle polarization. This is because a calendar is important for an imperial state, just as Rome produced a new calendar based on the birth of Jesus. A linear calendar was necessary for the caliphate, which adopted the Byzantine model of governance. When the politico-religious conception of state and society evolved into an empire during Omar's time, the indispensable element of universality (Catholicism) – the calendar – inevitably came to the fore.

Arabs did not follow a linear history; they referred to significant events to specify the year. While Jewish, Iranian, and Roman calendars started with their own events and progressed linearly, Arabs continually started with a different event. The frequent use of Abraha the Yemenite's attempt to destroy the Kaaba as a starting point in many events is an example of this. This tradition continued in Islam. The reference to the migration to Medina is for the same reason. Therefore, the claim of the established/real Islam that the Hijri calendar is a symbol of Islam is baseless. There was no Hijri calendar during the Prophet's time. The years were not counted during the Medina period either; there is no such record. Narrations claiming that the Prophet dated one or two events based on the migration to Medina are weak. His dating of the letter written to the Christians of Najran by referencing the migration does not fall under the definition of "the Hijri calendar as a symbol of Islam"; it is merely another example of Arabs using a significant event as a starting point. The term "Islamic calendar" is a definition of an unfounded political identity. The Hijri calendar is an important part of the identity construction that copies Christianity.

The linear calendar is an invention of Catholicism, and the Islamic linear (Hijri) calendar, initiated during the time of Caliph Omar, is the beginning of Islamic Catholicism. This is because there was no universal understanding of religion during the Prophet's lifetime. The transformation of "umma" in Qur'anic literature and other ordinary concepts, appropriate for the anthropology of the time, into extraordinary and super meanings occurred with Omar's Catholic Islam. The claim of Islam and the Qur'an's universality for all places and times was a requirement of an Islam that was given imperial character during the era of Caliph Omar.

Omar's focus on external conquests rather than just administering justly in Medina stemmed from his understanding that the legitimacy crisis, disagreement, dispersion, polarization, and conflict that emerged during the succession debate after the Prophet's death would not lead to integration. Habermas's fixation on integration as a principle of his theory of social evolution (Taner Timur, Habermas'ı Okumak, p. 140) explains the situation in Medina. It is evident that Omar invented an external enemy to freeze and suppress internal disunity. He also managed to control social dynamics through the military expenditures and tensions created by the conquests. With the spoils of war and plunder from the conquests, he financed the new regime and silenced dissent.

Omar himself admitted that his definition of Muslim theo-political identity was designed to exclude Ali, who, during the discussion of whether the caliph should be Uthman or Ali, stated that he would not maintain the order established by the first two caliphs and would return to the Prophet's model (Dhahabi, d. 1374, Siyar A'lam, p. 165). The renowned hadith scholar Nur al-Din al-Haythami (d. 1405) narrates that after consulting with Ali, Uthman, Talha, Zubayr, Abd al-Rahman b. Awf, and Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas about the next leader, Omar said: "If they appoint the sparse-haired one (Ali), he will guide them to the straight path." His son Abdullah (b. Omar) asked his father: "What prevents you from doing this?" Omar replied: "I hate that he should take on this matter both in my life and in my death." (Baghiyyat al-Bahith 'an Zawa'id Musnad al-Harith, pp. 622-623, hadith 594).

The specialized information regarding this narration, as transmitted by the Omarists, is as follows: The narrators are trustworthy (sika) and the hadith is authentic (sahih). It is noted that Abu Nu'aym included it in Hilyat al-Awliya, Ibn Sa'd in Tabaqat, al-Hafiz (Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani) in al-Matālib, al-Hakim (Nisaburi) in al-Mustadrak, and Bukhari narrated a similar one. Furthermore, Majma' al-Zawa'id and Bayhaqi are also cited as references.

Indeed, after the Prophet's death, when Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah was elected caliph, Fatimah addressed those who plunged Medina into turbulence due to the hasty election, saying: "By Allah, if everyone had followed the one to whom the Prophet gave the reins of leadership [Ali], he would have led them to happiness, and this mount would have been managed without anyone suffering the slightest harm" (Ibn Tayfur, d. 893, Balaghat al-Nisa, 24).

The Shi'a relate the caliphate issue to Omar’s raising his voice to prevent the Prophet’s will, when the Prophet on his deathbed said, “Let me write something so you will not go astray,” and Omar retorted, “He is talking out of pain, the Qur’an is sufficient for us” (Bukhari, Kitab al-'Ilm, hadith 114). But more important than this is Omar’s audacious opinion and diagnosis regarding the Prophet’s mental health while the Prophet was still alive and revelation had not ceased, and his invention of a new doctrine that separated the Prophet from the Qur’an, envisioning a Qur’an, revelation, and Islam independent of the Prophet. This is precisely the issue that now concerns the conservative socio-political complaint about "young people becoming deists."

Yet, Omar was someone who believed the Qur'an, which he claimed would be sufficient, was incomplete. He argued that the punishment of stoning (rajm) for adultery had been removed from the Qur'an. He even contemplated adding the verse he recited as a Qur'anic verse, but refrained due to fear of backlash: "If I did not fear people saying that an addition has been made to the Qur'an, I would have written the verse of rajm" (Abu Dawud 4/144, Tirmidhi 4/38, Muslim, Sharh Nawawi 11/191, and others).

To formulate it for beginners: Alevism is partisanship for Ali-Fatimah, while Sunnism is partisanship for Abu Bakr-Omar-Uthman-Aisha. Sunnism is Omarism against Ali.

The Omarists, seeking to illegitimize the subsequent sectarian divisions, used a popular argument to prove that there was no disagreement between Ali and Omar: they claimed that Omar married Ali's daughter (Umm Kulthum). This is an entirely invalid basis, because Umm Kulthum was the daughter of Abu Bakr, not Ali. When Abu Bakr's wife, Asma, married Ali after Abu Bakr's death, she moved to Ali's house with her children. One of these children was Umm Kulthum. She was the half-sister of Abu Bakr's son Muhammad. Muhammad, whose mother was different from his sister Aisha, fought as a commander of the infantry in Ali's army when Aisha led the coup and rebellion against Ali (Basra/Battle of the Camel) (Ibn A'tham, d. 932, Kitab al-Futuh, p. 434). Muhammad was Ali's governor in Egypt. He was killed and his body burned a year after Aisha's rebellion in Muawiya's uprising (Siffin) (Ibn al-Jawzi, d. 1201, al-Muntazam, 3/1318; Baladhuri, d. 892, Ansab, 2/304). Sunnism never mentions Muhammad, nor does it even know or recognize his name, despite his being Abu Bakr's son, due to his partisanship for Ali.

The Omarists, that is, the elites of Sunnism, denying the early groupings around the Prophet in the early periods of Islam, holds no value in terms of truth. The Prophet's followers, let alone their internal quarrels, conflicts, and wars, were people who could go so far as to attempt to assassinate the Prophet. The history of Islam is no different from the history of other religions, and Muhammad's experiences are the same as those of other prophets.

Let's briefly summarize the issue of the Prophet's assassination attempt: Nine years after the Hijra (October 630), some merchants brought news that Byzantium was preparing to attack Medina. The Prophet set out towards Byzantium (Syria) as a deterrent. It was date harvesting season; there was famine, and water was scarce. No one wanted to participate in the preemptive operation. However, the news that Byzantium would attack Medina might also have been disinformation for an assassination plot against the Prophet. Because when they reached Tabuk, there was no Byzantine and Christian Arab tribal army. They stayed for twenty days and then set out on their return journey to Medina (Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Kubra, 9/57, 17868). We understand that the Prophet noticed an abnormality from Hudhayfah holding the camel's reins and Ammar guiding it (Zamakhshari, Kashshaf, 2/282). The two did not allow anyone to approach the Prophet. Sources describe a group lying in ambush to push the Prophet off a cliff (Halabi, Sirat al-Halabiyya, 3/201).

The assassins, while discussing their plan among themselves, were overheard by Hudhayfah saying, "Let's throw him from his camel into the valley" (Tafsir al-Dahhak, 1/414, Hadith 1009). The Prophet, upon learning of the plot, asked Ammar and Hudhayfah to walk close to him (Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya, 3/20).

The sensitivity in describing those who attempted to assassinate the Prophet as "hypocrites" is related to the "companions" theory. If "companions" were named, concrete individuals would have to be identified. Thus, the abstract category of unknown "hypocrites" seems to have been preferred. When Hudhayfah moved towards the assassins in ambush, they realized they were exposed and fled. When Hudhayfah returned, the Prophet asked, "Did you recognize them?" Hudhayfah replied that it was too dark and their faces were covered, but the camels belonged to certain individuals (Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Kubra, 9/56-57, Hadith 17867).

In the narration stating that Hudhayfah said the camels belonged to "certain individuals," it cannot have been said "certain individuals." Names must have been listed. It is evident that those who narrated the account coded the names as "certain individuals" to avoid mentioning them. From the narrators' behavior, one can infer that the assassins were shocking names. Everyone must have been suspicious of each other. For example, Omar's repeatedly approaching Hudhayfah and persistently asking if his name was on the secret list of hypocrites (Ibn Kathir, Bidaya 5/21) occurred after the assassination attempt. Ibn Hazm states that the assassination narration is fabricated because, according to him, it implicates Abu Bakr, Omar, Uthman, Talha, and Sa'd b. Abi Waqqas as assassins (al-Isal, 12/160). However, there is a problem: Hudhayfah's narration (Muslim, hadith 2779-11, 4/2144) does not mention the assassins' names. Ibn Hazm does not explain where he obtained the narration he calls fabricated, which mentions the assassins' names. In other words, he blames a narration unknown to anyone. There are different lists of names in the sources, but all are contradictory. The list even includes names of individuals who were not Muslim at that time. The assassination attempt on the Prophet occurred two years before his death. Allegedly, his leaving Ali as his deputy and likening him to Moses' Aaron (Bukhari, hadith 3706) caused panic among the anti-Ali group. Therefore, the plan was to kill the Prophet and return to Medina with a caliph they would choose there.

The assassins are referred to as "black-robed figures." This is the uniform of ISIS. There's also an interesting anecdote about the "black-robed figures": When Muawiya's coup attempt against Caliph Ali failed, a trick of arbitration (tahkim) was arranged in February 657. In this arbitration, Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, who ostensibly represented Ali but in reality betrayed him, approached Ammar b. Yasir and said, "Is there a problem between us? Am I not your brother?" Ammar replied, "I don't know. I heard the Messenger of Allah curse you on the night of the camel (Tabuk assassination attempt)." When Abu Musa said, "But he also prayed for my forgiveness," Ammar cut him off: "I witnessed him cursing you, not praying for your forgiveness" (Ibn Asakir, Tarikh Madinat Dimashq, 32/9).

Abu Musa's admission of his involvement in the assassination attempt by saying, "But he also prayed for my forgiveness," is not found in popular religious Turkish sources (e.g., M. Yaşar Kandemir, Ebû Mûsa el-Eş'arî, DİA, 10/190-192). However, when Ammar b. Yasir was asked about Abu Musa's character, he said he had heard a terrifying statement about him from Hudhayfah: "He said he was one of the black-robed figures. Then he frowned. I understood that he was among that group on that night in the narrow pass" (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, Sharh Nahj al-Balagha, 13/190). Ibn Abi Shaybah narrates that when Hudhayfah was asked how many assassins there were, Abu Musa al-Ash'ari replied, "They received news that there were fourteen people," to which Hudhayfah responded, "If you were among them, then there were fifteen" (Ibn Abi Shaybah, al-Musannaf, 20/615-616).

The fanaticism of Omarism, which seeks to propagate a dramatized historical narrative instead of historical facts, reaches such a level that it links Omar's shouting at the Prophet in front of the polytheists, "Are you not a prophet?" during the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, to his piety and the strength of his faith. This is despite the Prophet warning him, "I am the Messenger of Allah, and I will never disobey Him" (Sahih al-Bukhari, Bab al-Shurut fi'l-Jihad, hadith 2731-2732). Nevertheless, Omar, his anger and doubt undiminished, went to Abu Bakr and said, "Are we not in the right, and are they not in falsehood?" (Sahih al-Bukhari, Kitab al-Tafsir, hadith 4844).

Omar himself confessed, while he was caliph, to his psychological state and faith crisis on that day, even admitting that he had considered a rebellion (coup?) against the Prophet if he had found enough supporters: "On that day, I fell into doubt. So much so that I had never experienced such doubt since I embraced Islam. If I had found people whose hearts had left this agreement and would follow me on that day, I would have left the agreement too. By Allah, I doubted so much that I said to myself, 'If one hundred people shared my opinion, I would never have accepted this agreement'" (Waqidi, d. 823, Kitab al-Maghazi, 2/607).

Omar, who was so audacious towards the Prophet, a paragon of mercy, kindness, and tolerance, nonetheless fled to the mountain during the Battle of Uhud, leaving the Prophet to die, while Ali and eight others from the group who pledged to die were human shields for the Prophet. During his caliphate, when he recited Al 'Imran 155 in a sermon, he reminded those who knew the story: "On the day of Uhud, I fled to the top of the mountain. I looked like a goat" (Tabari, d. 923, Tafsir al-Tabari 7/172; Suyuti, d. 1505, Durr al-Mansur 7/81). A person who fled the Battle of Qadisiyyah (636) returned to Medina and stood before Caliph Omar. He said, "Commander of the Faithful, I am ruined, I fled (from the battle) crawling." Omar consoled him, "I am also from your group" (Abu Hayyan al-Andalusi, d. 1344, Tafsir al-Bahr al-Muhit, 4/470). Omar was referring to his flight from the Battle of Uhud.

At the extremes of Omarist fanaticism, we can encounter intriguing claims. For instance, the assertion that the Prophet was rebuked by Allah through verses (Anfal 67-69) for not heeding Omar's suggestion to collectively execute the prisoners of the Battle of Badr, and even to have the killings carried out by their own relatives. The Omarists even claimed, to support this peculiar assertion, that if punishment had descended upon the Prophet for not listening to Omar, no one but Omar (including the Prophet) would have been saved (Mawardi, Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, Adolphum Marcum, Bonnae 1853, p. 78). There is no indication that the verses in question are related to the Battle of Badr, and the interpretation put forward is an embellishment made to glorify Omar.

Commentators, keen to portray Omar as exceptional and distinguished, are unaware that in doing so, they repeatedly demean and denigrate the Prophet. Presenting the Prophet as someone constantly rebuked, contradicted, and warned by Allah seems to have almost acquired the status of an official view.

Many ways have been tried to discredit the Prophet throughout the history of Islam. For example, this is a community that attributed the "frowning face" or "sour-faced" person mentioned in Surah Abasa to the Prophet. It is a religious culture that perpetuates and defends the Umayyad debasement that portrayed the Prophet of "exalted moral character" (Qalam 4) as the "frowning person (abasa)" (verse 1) in Surah Abasa, even though Surah Mudassir (verse 11) states that the "frowning person (abasa)" was one of the polytheist elders.

Adding to this are the pessimistic tales of him falling into depression and attempting suicide multiple times when not receiving revelation (Bukhari, hadith 6982), being so bewildered upon encountering revelation that he lost himself, only to be convinced of his prophethood by the Christian Waraqa (Bayhaqi, Dala'il al-Nubuwwa, 2/136), becoming incoherent due to sorcery he suffered in Medina (Bukhari, hadith 1300), believing his wife Aisha had cheated on him and thus being contradicted and rebuked by Allah (Bukhari, hadith 4750), and so on. All these stories have only one source: Aisha. Aisha, who was a small child of roughly 6 years old when revelation began in Mecca and had no connection with the Prophet until her father Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah embraced Islam, narrated these stories to her nephew Urwa, who then narrated them to his student Zuhri. Let's also remember that Aisha narrated all this information as if she herself had personally witnessed it. This is how the strange history of Islam, as it stands, was written.

Existing Islam is a religion that has not transmitted a single narration from Khadijah, the Prophet's wife who witnessed every moment of his life for 15 years before the revelation began and 12 years after, and sees no problem with this advanced level of strangeness. No information about those days has been transmitted from Ali, who never left his side, or from his closest friend, Ammar, either.

Akşener's "Path of Omar" campaign relies on the ingrained belief that Omar is the symbol of justice. The cliché of Omar's justice is a utopian hagiography, expanded with additions and embellishments over time. The epithet "Farooq" added to his name, meaning one who clearly distinguishes between right and wrong, justice and falsehood, was a compliment from a Christian delegation visiting him, offered as flattery. The claim that the Prophet bestowed this epithet upon him is an Omarist fabrication. Ibn Shihab al-Zuhri (d. 742), one of the great figures of Sunnism (and one of the architects of the official history of Islam), explicitly states that the first to call Omar "Farooq" were Christians, that Muslims adopted it from them, that nothing to that effect came from the Prophet, and that even his son Abdullah simply called him Omar (Ibn Shabbah, d. 876, Tarikh al-Madina, 2/662).

The "justice of Omar," represented by the slogan "If a wolf catches a lamb by the bank of the Euphrates, Allah will hold Omar accountable for it," is a legend born of mythological historiography. First and foremost, the saying is a fabrication. The elements of the saying vary in each fabrication: some say Tigris instead of Euphrates, some replace wolf-lamb with a lost or dead camel, and so on. Even the staunch Omarist Dhahabi, in Kashif (6197), deems the narrator of this saying unreliable. Ibn Hajar, in Taqrib (7585), calls it "weak." In contrast, there are truths that even Muslim socio-politics cannot be proud of. For example, the true story of the "Well of Forty Girls" in Fahraj village, Yazd, the center of Zoroastrianism in Iran, is one of them. That well preserves the painful memory of the girls in the village jumping into it to avoid being enslaved by Arabs during the conquest of Iran. Reading this sentence naturally brings to mind the enslavement of Kurdish Yazidi women and young girls by ISIS. I had mentioned Yazidi girls bought by Gazan ISIS members in Syria and taken to Gaza. These are the Yazidi women rescued by Israel on the anniversary of October 7th attack. Islam did not neglect to write the story of the "Well of Forty Girls" from its own perspective. According to their claim, the Zoroastrians threw the Muslim girls into the well. This is, of course, a forced interpretation that does not align with the ordinary flow of history specific to that period.

In another example that falsifies the legend of justice, Omar revives the slave custom and beats a Muslim slave woman, forcibly removing her headscarf. In the incident, he tells the woman, "Uncover your head, you cannot resemble free women," and then whips her. In another narration, he himself removes the woman's headscarf (Nasiruddin Albani, Irwa' al-Ghalil, 6/203, hadith 1796). According to Omarist narrators, while beating the woman, he said: "Why did you cover the head of this [Muslim] slave woman and make her resemble free women? For this reason, when I met her, I treated her respectfully. You cannot make slaves resemble free women" (Ibn Abi Shaybah, Musannaf, 2/28; Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Kubra, 2/320, hadith 3221).

Even stranger: During a journey, a fasting companion, when it was time to break his fast, took a wineskin containing nabidh (a fermented drink) that Omar had hung on his camel, drank from it, and became intoxicated. Omar then administered a whipping punishment to him. The man said to Omar: "But I drank from your wineskin." Omar's answer was peculiar: "I applied the hadd (punishment) to you because you were intoxicated (not because you drank it)" (Ibn Abi Shaybah, Kitab al-Musannaf, narration 28392, 5/498-499). The famous Muhaddith Sha'bi (d. 722) wrote that the man drank Omar's "medicine" and became tipsy, and that Omar therefore applied the hadd to him. According to Sha'bi, the punishment given to the man was not because what he drank was an intoxicating beverage, but because he was intoxicated (Ibn Abd Rabbih, Iqd al-Farid, 8/80). It is clear that Sha'bi's dilemma was how to both exonerate Omar and justify the man's punishment. However, the solution he found is even stranger than the event itself. It hardly seems possible to consider it an exemplary act of justice.

Akşener's Omarist Path

Setting aside the fact that Akşener's "Path of Omar" campaign pivots on the "Omar" produced by deconstructive historiography (sira), rather than the historical and objective Omar, what could be the rationale for her overlooking the qualitative crisis potential of categorically excluding Alevi voters, which transcends mere quantitative calculation? The lack of an answer to this question proves the campaign's sabotaging intent.

Seven months after the launch of the "Path of Omar" campaign, this time İYİ Party's theologian Ankara deputy İbrahim Halil Oral clarified the roadmap by stating, "The more Muslim ('more Muslim'?) Sunni segment will not vote for an Alevi candidate". The "winnable candidate" label circulated on the same track was a coded, unmasked frontal assault contributing to the collaboration.

When Kılıçdaroğlu was nominated as a candidate at the Six-Party Table, Akşener's unhappiness, evident on her face, was undoubtedly a gestural and facial episode within the broader effort to undermine the momentum, but it also reflected her anxiety at having failed in her mission. As a former deputy chairman of the İYİ Party put it, she was "psychologically shattered." However, once the sabotage was confirmed to be successful, the smile never left her face.

In the mobilization to prevent Kılıçdaroğlu's election, history repeated itself. The incident was a replica of the "Let Uthman go, but let Ali not come" campaign from early Islamic history.

Ms. Meral was the contemporary manifestation of Aisha, who had ardently supported the overthrow of Caliph Uthman but broke the alliance with the slogan "Let Uthman go, but let Ali not come" when the populace wished to make Ali caliph.

The historical "Let Uthman go, but let Ali not come" campaign is as follows:

All sources indicate that during the caliphate of Uthman b. Affan, nepotism, corruption in the public treasury, and illegalities led to discontent and ultimately rebellion in the provinces. Those who protested the injustices demanded Uthman's resignation. People arriving in Medina from various cities sought to peacefully install Ali at the head of the state. The Umayyad caliph Uthman, however, rejected the demand, stating, "I will not remove the shirt that Allah has dressed me in" (Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi't-Tarikh, 3/60).

The greatest reaction to the Caliph came from Aisha, the daughter of Abdullah b. Abi Quhafah (Abu Bakr). Effectively using her title as "the Prophet's wife," Aisha waved the Prophet's shirt, which he wore at the time of his death, and shouted: "O Muslims, this is the garment of the Messenger of Allah. It has not worn out. But Uthman has worn out his sunna [practice]" (Ya'qubi, Tarikh al-Ya'qubi, 1/152).

Aisha, inciting the crowd against Uthman, cried out, "Kill that Jewish bearded man [Na'sal]! May Allah curse him!" (Tabari, Tarikh, 3/12). The famous Muhajir Jahjah also shouted, "Get down from that pulpit!" He even attacked Uthman, seized the staff, a symbol of authority, from his hand, and broke it (Ibn Kathir, al-Bidaya, 4/170).

Aisha, who encouraged the rebellion, left the city for Mecca when the unrest began. As she was returning to Medina after things had calmed down, she met Abd b. Umm Kilab on the way and received the news of Uthman's assassination. She asked, "What did they do?" When she was told, "They agreed upon Ali," she replied, "If the matter concluded in favor of your man, this is not appropriate at all." She gave up on returning to Medina and turned towards Mecca (Tabari, Tarikh, 3/12). Aisha was not pleased with Ali's election. While she had been cursing Uthman, she now said, "By Allah, Uthman was killed unjustly. I will demand his blood. One day of Uthman is better than all of Ali's time" (Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, al-Mahsul fi Usul al-Fiqh, 4/343).

In Mecca, she met with the individuals with whom she would plan an armed uprising against Ali (Basra/Battle of the Camel): Marwan, who had been the most ardent enemy of the Prophet and the instigator of the rebellion against Uthman; former governors of Basra and Yemen; Zubayr and Talha. (Marwan also killed Talha in the chaos of the Basra uprising. Zubayr, when he abandoned the fight and returned, was killed on the way at Aisha's instruction.) They decided that the pretext for their uprising would be Uthman's blood (Sahih Muslim bi-Sharh al-Ubayy wa'l-Sanusi, Ikmalu Ikmal al-Mu'lim wa Mukammilu Ikmal Ikmal, 8/246).

The reason for the "Let Uthman go, but let Ali not come" campaign in 656 was Ali's promise to restore the wealth plundered from the public treasury. It is the same panic caused by the swelling and foaming of the "Let Erdoğan go, but let Kılıçdaroğlu not come" campaign since he declared he would return 418 billion dollars to the public treasury. Apart from this, all the words spouted in the political marketplace are merely decorative. They pertain neither to procedure nor to substance.

Translated by Gemini