Kenan Camurcu

"Kullu Halin Yazul"

In 2003, as part of the Eastern Conference Intellectuals Initiative's solidarity trips to countries in the region targeted by the "New Middle East Project" or "Greater Middle East Project," we traveled to Syria. Iraq had been invaded, and it was widely rumored in official and unofficial circles that Syria was next. We were, of course, against the strict Ba'ath regime in Syria, which was a relic from the 1960s, and we advocated for change, but we argued that it could not happen through military occupation. We were very pleased with Prime Minister Erdoğan's rapprochement with Damascus. Those were good days when there were influential good people within the AK Party group in Parliament, who were at least affected by criticism and inclined to change policies, and when the epidemic of trollism, which destroys reasoning, had not yet emerged.

Sitting at Nawfara Cafe, adjacent to the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, the late Roni (Margulies) happily showed us an under-glass artwork he said he bought for a bargain, inscribed with "kullu halin yazul." I learned there that he was a collector who understood these things well. "Kullu halin yazul" is a phrase meaning "every situation vanishes, passes away, is temporary." It is, in essence, a warning against believing one's current state is eternal and permanent. I had used Roni's under-glass artwork as the title for my article evaluating the Syria trip and the regional problems of that period. I also included the article in my book, "Can Havliyle Düşünceler" (Thoughts in a Last Gasp).

In 1986, while interviewing Ufuk Güldemir for Girişim magazine at the old Cumhuriyet newspaper building in Cağaloğlu, he leaned in after the interview and whispered, "Contrary to what is claimed, no state is eternal." The a priori proposition is that Bashar al-Assad and others are not exempt from the "kullu halin yazul" dictum. This is especially true for a regime of surveillance and investigation, with a closed and autocratic political model.

Caesar-Sectioning the Domino that the "Arab Spring" Could Not Topple

Following the September 11 attacks, despite the regime change process initiated by the invasion of Afghanistan, we always advocated for the urgent change of the closed regime in Syria. Still, we were against both Bush's doctrine of exporting liberal democracy by force and Obama's policy of faithfully implementing this doctrine on the ground. Despite the high level of Türkiye-Syria relations, advocating for democratic change at that time faced objections from Erdoğanist and Gülenist supporter groups who wanted to avoid stirring up trouble. Those were the times when Erdoğanists (who later became Davutoğlu loyalists) toured Syria in vehicles provided by Ba'ath agents, enjoyed guesthouses, and were highly esteemed. However, when relations soured, they became the most ardent and hostile enemies of Assad. It's like how those who lead lynching mobs for harassment, rape, theft, etc., are often the criminals who have committed or are prone to committing these offenses.

In 2011, during the "Arab Spring" frenzy, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, short-lived peaceful demonstrations in Syria suddenly turned into armed violence. More accurately, Salafi armed groups, whose origins were unclear, hijacked peaceful demonstrations and quickly plunged Syria into civil war chaos. In the face of one of the Salafi violence leaders, Julani, another Julani (from Golan), the late Cevdet Said, stated that societal change cannot occur through arms, force, violence, and terror, and that this is also contrary to Islam. The great scholar Ramadan al-Buti, who was assassinated in a bombing by Julani's organization Nusra while giving a tafsir lesson in a small mosque in Damascus, also issued a fatwa that changing the government through armed violence and terror is not approved by any sect of Islam because innocents would suffer in such a chaotic environment. The late Buti's fear came true; besides the losses of the warring parties, thousands of innocents lost their lives during the attacks of Salafi organizations and the army's operations.

Salafi organizations like ISIS and Nusra, fully supported by Western capitals, argued that there was no other way than armed violence to overthrow the Syrian regime. Their supporters did not see their actions as terrorism and called them "opposition." Davutoğlu went a step further, addressing them as "angry youths" from the pinnacle of empathy and solidarity. The rest of the bitter story is known to everyone.

The curse of Hamas's October 7 attack, which received multi-faceted support from Khamenei, reached Assad, who made Syria a base for these activities, after Haniyeh, Sinwar, Nasrallah, and others. When Julani, the leader of the rebels, told his supporters gathered at the Umayyad Mosque, "Brothers, after this great victory, a new history is being written throughout the region," he might have been concerned about placing a new responsibility on his uneducated, unskilled, unprofessional followers who until then had done nothing but kill. But what he said is not true; the new history in the region is being written by Israel under Netanyahu's leadership. He did this by destroying Khamenei's "axis of resistance" myth in a few months.

There is nothing historical about allowing Nusra members, with light weapons, to march to Damascus almost with escorts. It is thought that they learned lessons from the Iran and Hezbollah experience. If they venture outside the fences that surround them, their fate will be sealed from sunrise to sunset.

Netanyahu was not revealing a secret when he said that Assad's departure from power and the country was a result of Israel's attacks on Iran and Hezbollah. He must have done it to savor his victory a little, but there is a much more important reason: he wants to make sure that Syria's new rulers have received their marching orders: keeping Khamenei or his successor out of Syria is not enough; the vacuum he leaves will also not be filled.

Since silence in Damascus implies consent to Netanyahu's depiction, it is time to bid farewell to the "Palestinian cause." Under the condition that Tehran has also thrown in the towel, it is unlikely that any alternative will emerge to raise a hand to become the successor of Hamas. Even if it did, it would not find a base area like Syria right under Israel's nose, nor would it receive high- مبلغ financial support. On this occasion, related humanitarian organizations will also be deprived of the immense profits they gained from the Palestinian industry.

As we know very well from repeated examples, Muslims are unsurpassed in receiving messages of power. Remember how Trump said that if he were elected president, anti-Semitic protests would be harshly suppressed, and as soon as he was elected, the highly audacious protests led by Hamas-affiliated Arabs in America suddenly ceased. The same happened in Europe after governments started intervening. At the TRT World Forum, they protested Erdoğan about commercial ships going to Israel, and Erdoğan scolded them, saying, "Don't be the mouth and tongue of Zionists." Those anti-Semitic protestors immediately received the message and disappeared. The subtext of the message was probably: "If you continue this, you will be accused of espionage serving the strategic interests of a foreign state and imprisoned indefinitely." The Hamas-affiliated and anti-Semitic struggle, of course, goes only so far. Protesters who attacked certain chain restaurants and cafes, threw rats inside, damaged property, and frightened children, as if they had never appeared, vanished.

"The Theatrical Fall of the Regime"

More than ten years later, one morning, Nusra, with other merged organizations under the HTS banner, launched an attack with a few thousand militants and light weapons and reached Damascus in a week without encountering any resistance. These short-film developments were met with suspicion in the Arab media, and it was written that behind the "theatrical fall of the regime," there might be an undisclosed secret agreement, compromise, or consensus.

If so, let's retouch the news language: it's not the regime that was overthrown in Syria; Assad merely left the presidency. The government, ministries, bureaucracy, army, and institutions remained in place. Officials at no level of these institutions felt the need to leave the country. Prime Minister Jalali, who is still in office, said, "What concerns us now is the continued service to Syrians." The visible number of protestors in the streets are largely HTS supporters. There are also civil servants and shopkeepers trying to get into photos on the streets as a precaution due to the uncertainty of the new situation. Otherwise, with internal migration from terror regions, the current population of Damascus is roughly 3 million. Compared to those who participated in pro-Assad rallies in Mezze Square in the center of Damascus, the crowd at the current celebrations is merely a handful.

Assad's departure by election would have been preferable, no doubt, but it did not happen. As a result of Israel crippling the "axis of resistance," full support from Western capitals, and a US-Russia agreement, and with the approval of the regime's supporting pillars and the army remaining in its barracks, Assad, the symbol of the old administration, left the country. The story of a few thousand militants with light weapons defeating the Syrian army, overthrowing the regime, and taking over the country would only excite those with zero critical thinking. Armed militants are fulfilling the visual need of a change in administration by destroying statues or sitting at Assad's desk and posing for many photos. Beyond that, they have no meaning or function. How could they? If state governance were handed over to uneducated, unskilled, socially inept armed individuals who have no experience in state and governance, what would they do?

What happened was a controlled crisis. A transition process, clearly planned in every respect, has been and is still ongoing. The Western world had learned from its experience in Iraq that dismantling the army, destroying institutions, and eliminating the state when overthrowing Saddam was a big mistake. They did not repeat the same mistake in Syria. For example, Assad's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the communiqué announcing the political change to the world.

While news channels were reporting "Assad regime overthrown," Assad's prime minister was giving interviews about the roadmap for the transfer of power and saying he was in his position for a peaceful transition process. At the same time, Julani, the leader of the rebel forces, was warning his men not to damage state buildings and had forbidden firing into the air to avoid creating tension.

Remember how Western media suddenly started reporting on "Assad's terrible dungeons," and political journalism here immediately translated it into Turkish without editing? Even the "White Helmets" (Syria Civil Defense Organization), the controversial showcase of Nusra, issued a statement announcing that the much-talked-about Sednaya prison did not contain unreachable floors, cells, or secret compartments deep underground.  Clearly, the rebel leadership is trying to de-escalate tensions among its supporters to prevent events that would cause them to lose control. They do not want even the slightest glitch that would violate the transition agreement.

The Salafi organizations under the HTS banner are undoubtedly eager to commit massacres in Alawite villages, drawing inspiration from their spiritual guide Ibn Taymiyyah, who, with a false claim that Nusayris (Alawites) were spying for Tatars in the Damascus mountains, attacked Alawite villages with his followers (Muhammad Abu Zahra, Ibn Taymiyyah Hayatuhu ve Asruhu, p. 40-41). Ten years ago, they hysterically shouted the slogan "Christians to Beirut, Alawites to the coffin."

For those interested in further reading: Ibn Taymiyyah, the ideological ancestor of Salafism's religious violence, consistently uses the phrase "He is compelled to repent, otherwise he is killed" for Shias and Alawites in his books. In his shameful fatwa, which is a document of hatred towards Alawites and does not permit any religious or ethnic differences to exist in Muslim society, he writes that Nusayris (Arab Alawites) are more infidel than Jews and Christians, and their harm to Islam is greater than that of warring infidels. To broaden his target spectrum, he adds to his fatwa that they appear to be Shia and lovers of Ahl al-Bayt. (Majmu' al-Fatawa, 35/149-160). Thus, Shias are also included in the massacre list.

However, the Nusra elements continuing under the HTS banner face countless insurmountable obstacles to reverting to these activities. The assumption that they will eventually get bored of routine state services due to knowing nothing but fighting, and will cause trouble, is certainly a possibility, and perhaps the powers that cleared their path are waiting for them to make such a mistake to wipe them off the face of the earth.

The Flashing Terror Dictionary

After deducting consolidation, propaganda, and public relations, Ahmed al-Shara, known by the code name "Julani," whose life has been spent in armed action in the ranks of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Nusra, and his supporters, know that there is no bright future they can promise Syria, starting with themselves, and all their solution partners. It is also impossible for a Talibanist regime, i.e., an emirate, to be established in Syria with Al-Qaeda ideology, both in terms of the country's internal dynamics and its political supporters. It would be absurd to think that the Gulf states and the West, who will provide the estimated $1 trillion budget needed for Syria to recover, would squander money to allow Al-Qaeda-trained militias to realize their Islamist aspirations. How will HTS, which Türkiye, the UN, and many other countries have listed as a terrorist organization, take over the country's administration with this qualification? Can Julani, on whose head Americans have placed a bounty for his capture dead or alive, replace Assad in this state? In this situation, either the current status will not change, and a handcuffed administration will be established, or the terrorist label will be removed from Julani's neck with conditional parole.

However, in the world of abundant standards and criteria for terrorism and terrorists, no one sees themselves in a contradiction that needs explanation. Julani might also think he can act freely in this amusing circus. But it should not be forgotten that Syria is not a country that is solely the concern of Iran and Pakistan, like Afghanistan. It is a critically important demo-geographic area on the Mediterranean-West Asia line, especially concerning Israel's security. For this reason, the qualitative strategic value that every country and society loves to attribute to itself truly exists for Syria. Therefore, even Trump, who promised to bring soldiers home from hot conflict zones during his election campaign, will certainly exclude Syria from the project.

It is true that the act of changing governments by force through arming internal opponents is Bush Jr.'s legacy, and there is no objective definition of terror in this conceptual world. Some armed struggles are acceptable, others are rejected. In Türkiye's case, HTS, which the state considered a terrorist organization, can turn into an "opposition" overnight. Having a weapon in hand becomes an insignificant detail that is not bothered with. On the contrary, it is now a crime to say that the organization's militants are terrorists. It is a reason for an ex officio investigation. For example, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office found Doğu Perinçek's statement that the Free Syrian Army (ÖSO) was a terrorist organization "contrary to the state's general national security policy" and launched an investigation against him. There are crimes like revealing prohibited information (TCK 336), political and military espionage (TCK 328), but "contrary to national security policy" is a very fresh crime. Its inception was the day HTS seized power in Syria. In the arena, there is an equation where politics, not law, plays a role, and there is no hesitation in deeming what suits one's interests legitimate and what does not, illegitimate. It's an equation where everyone on microphones accuses each other of supporting terrorism but does not act on it, while behind closed doors, bargaining takes place with the cards at hand.

Various Echoes of the New Syria

Davutoğlu, a key actor in the process that led Syria into civil war, would surely want to be on the stage now. He must be feeling the most anger now about being purged without being able to reap the fruits of his efforts for regime change. If the change in Syria had occurred during his time, he would have guaranteed his position as the star of the post-Erdoğan era. But this opportunity fell to Hakan Fidan. Fidan seems to have received the reward for faithfully not shying away from the great risks of critical functions and duties during the most difficult times. If no major mishap occurs, he will be the number one after Erdoğan.

But there is a small problem: Erdoğan, who promised ten years ago that the Damascus regime would be overthrown in a short time and that he would pray in the Umayyad Mosque, no longer shows any trace of that enthusiasm. He seems displeased. Is it because he did not get much out of the "theatrical fall" in Syria, which occurred under US-Russia tutelage and agreement? Or is his cheerlessness related to the maps of Syria flying around, divided into three: a Kurdish autonomous region extending to the Lebanese border, an Alawite region on the Mediterranean coast, and an encircled barren Sunni region inland?

Hakan Fidan is also in a hurry to squeeze in daily and practical issues instead of political rhetoric that would celebrate "victory" and compensate for years of delay. He merely announces to the expectations of domestic politics that millions of Syrians will now return to their country. The urgent predicament is clear in every respect. His uttering words without concrete meaning stems from this. In fact, he also knows that it is impossible for millions of Syrians to return to their country right now. With fertility and population growth rates far above the world average, what capacity does Syria have to absorb their mass return? Most of them don't even have homes there. If they go, there are no jobs, no factories, no functioning economy. Seventy percent, perhaps more, of the population lives below the poverty line. Official publications show per capita income as $780, but it could be even lower. Fidan skips the issue of time when talking about the return of Syrians. The return project could take years. For now, the crisis is being managed with public relations statements that try to save the situation. In other words, Ankara may not even have achieved the gain of accelerating the return of Syrians.

Since Netanyahu is the big winner of the process, it has become clear that Israel will get the lion's share of the change in Syria. After the war that began on October 8, 2023, and ended with the elimination of Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the change of government in Syria in December 2024, Israel has now succeeded in drawing a security circle that will no longer be disturbed from the north, after the south. With the condition of bringing order to Lebanon as well, Syria is now within Israel's sphere of influence. After his harsh and disproportionate response to Hamas's Iran-backed October 7 attack and the results he achieved, Netanyahu expects to be remembered alongside the figures who raised Israel by winning the '48 and '67 wars. He has a messianic, founding father aura. They compare him to King David and call him "King Bibi." This nickname also became the title of a documentary about his life. He is likened to Moshe Dayan, who won the 1967 war despite the all-out attack by Arab states. But even under these circumstances, Netanyahu's trial on corruption charges continues. He is forced to appear in court and defend himself. With this and other evidence, Israeli democracy is arguably the best in the region. And think of those who wish Israel to be wiped off the map; such a level of law, justice, and democracy probably never crosses their minds.

During the year-long state of emergency in Israel, the Israeli left has lost its voice. Because their opponent, the reckless right-wing conservative Netanyahu, whom they accused of "bringing war home," is the head of the astonishing pager operation that neutralized over 3,000 Hezbollah fighters with a single push of a button one afternoon. He managed to destroy Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and all top-level executives by leaving them buried deep under rubble for three days, too deep to be extracted. We don't know if their bodies were found. Even a funeral could not be held. He killed almost all of Hamas's leadership and militants. He destroyed all of Khamenei's cross-border operation centers in Syria. The list goes on. It seems difficult for an alternative political force capable of dealing with such an opponent to emerge anytime soon. Therefore, the "Palestinian issue" and "two-state solution" agendas that the Israeli left tried to keep on the agenda have also become history.

Furthermore, there is now a new situation in Syria that will erase the "Palestinian issue" from the records. Yasser Arafat's secular nationalism or Khamenei's religiously motivated "Palestine" now lack the energy and means to continue. The statement by Mosab Yousef, son of Hamas founder Hassan Yousef, who worked for Israel's internal intelligence agency Shin Bet to dismantle Hamas, that "There is no such thing as a Palestinian ethnic identity. We are the Arabs of Judea and Samaria" could form the strategic framework for the new era. On the Israeli side, and subtly among Gulf administrations, a plan to return to square one is circulating: Gaza could be transferred to Egypt, and the West Bank to Jordan. The people in these regions would become citizens of those countries. Israeli Arab citizens, like others, would remain Israelis.

The Tragic Finale in Khamenei's "Axis of Resistance" Saga

The Khamenei regime scored zero on the Syria file. According to a live confession and disclosure by a Sepah (Revolutionary Guard) commander, the financial, human, and diplomatic cost of the Syrian issue for Iran has been very heavy since Qasem Soleimani, who shot at protestors in Iran in 2009, commanded the forceful suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Syria in 2012, even before ISIS emerged. After this major failure, Iranians are now questioning the billions of dollars spent to suppress the armed rebellion in Syria, the soldiers sent to the country under the name of "Harem guards" who lost their lives, and the forced deployment of Afghan refugees in Iran to war under threat of deportation, leading to their deaths.

It is said that Khamenei spent over $5 billion between 2012 and 2018 to keep the Assad administration in power. Hasmatollah Falahatpisheh, former head of the Iranian Parliament's national security commission, announced that Syria owes Iran $30 billion. This figure might indicate the amount spent on the former Damascus administration, which is news that would infuriate millions of people in oil-rich Iran struggling with poverty and economic hardship.

Money far exceeding the wealth allegedly taken by Shah Pahlavi when fleeing Iran in the 1979 revolution has evaporated under the guise of the "axis of resistance" budget and the Syria support fund. Parliament cannot demand an accounting of the expenditures. Media outlets attempting to bring the issue to light could even be executed with cocktail accusations of espionage, enmity towards the regime, anti-Islamism, etc. In the great blackout, it is unknown who profited. Behzad Nabavi, Iran's first Oil Minister after the revolution, a reformist politician nicknamed "the old guerrilla," announced that 60% of the national wealth is used by organizations directly affiliated with Khamenei and outside parliamentary oversight.

In a 2022 news report, it was revealed that while the average annual meat consumption in Iran was 12 kg per person, it was 97 kg in Gaza, to which millions of dollars were sent from Khamenei's office, causing outrage. Similarly, when Iranians saw a photograph of Khamenei's "Imam of Africa," the Nigerian Sheikh Zakzaky, whose hardships are frequently reported in the regime's media, wearing a thousands-of-dollars watch on his wife's arm during a visit to Khamenei, they cursed profusely on social media, complaining about where their rightful money was being spent under the name of the "axis of resistance." The wife of Hamas's last leader, Sinwar, was also seen in a video carrying a $32,000 Hermes Birkin bag while trying to move away from the operational zone in a tunnel below while Gaza was being bombed.

After the killing of Qasem Soleimani, a foundation (Bonyad-i Maktab-e Hajj Qassem) with an annual budget of 200 million Euros was established for his family. The Soleimani family decides on unsupervised expenditures as they wish. Soleimani's young daughter buys an iPhone 13 Pro worth several civil servant salaries as soon as it is released in the US, and his son comes to his father's death anniversary commemoration wearing an Under Armour cap and branded clothing, etc. Opponents say that the Soleimani family shamelessly flaunts their luxury and American brand addiction under conditions of increasing and deepening poverty.

While the actors of the "axis of resistance," to whom resources are transferred by cutting from the quality of life of Iranians, spend the allocated money for their personal welfare, Iranians who demand better education, a higher standard of living, openness, democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights are rotting in prisons or being killed in protest demonstrations.

Qasem Soleimani, while defending financial support to the organizations in the "axis of resistance," used to say that if they didn't, bombs would explode in Tehran. This reflects the meaning and value of these organizations for Tehran. They were merely legions. Shortly after critics reacted to his statement that if fighters were not sent to Syria, terrorists would carry out attacks in Tehran, alleged ISIS militants brazenly attacked the Parliament. The attack lasted for hours, and 5 people lost their lives. Soleimani's trolls immediately published hundreds of "See?" messages on social media. It was openly stated that this was a blatant false flag operation because the event unfolded in a very showy manner.

Soleimani's Lockpick: The Quds Force

The "axis of resistance" was Khamenei's saga. It was about delaying tactics, like a Thousand and One Nights tale. The task of making the saga real on the ground was given to Qasem Soleimani.

Soleimani, who had no significant military career other than participating in a few operations in the Iraq-Iran war at a military unit (Sarallah headquarters) based in his hometown Kerman and fighting smugglers on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, was suddenly appointed by Khamenei as the commander of the Quds Force, established within Sepah, and put in charge of cross-border operations.

Soleimani was an insignificant low-level soldier in the Iraq-Iran war. While the war hero Sepah commander Davoud Karimi was fighting on the front lines and exposed to chemical weapons in operations like Walfajr 8, Karbala 2, and Beit-ul-Moqaddas, Soleimani was not in the dangerous area. Davoud Karimi was a reformist commander. He was imprisoned for his reaction to the attacks and insults against Ayatollah Montazeri, who resigned as Khomeini's representative in 1988 after the execution of political prisoners in prisons. Some Sepah commanders regarded this as a sneaky coup within Sepah. Khamenei's supporters were the ones who imprisoned Karimi while he was gravely ill with chemical poisoning and tortured him in prison. Khamenei remained silent during the arrest but told his own media after Karimi's death that he was disturbed by what had been done to him.

Last year, a leaked confidential parliamentary document revealed that 3 billion Euros were allocated to the Quds Force, whose budget is a state secret. This was during Qalibaf's tenure as Parliament Speaker, whose relationship with Soleimani was known to be strained despite Qalibaf often speaking of their friendship. Qalibaf is also a former Sepah commander and even ran for president. The subtle implications Qalibaf inserted into his praising words when speaking about Soleimani after his death are noteworthy. When he says, "After the war, I was in Tehran, he remained in Kerman", he portrays him as a local and insignificant soldier in the provinces until Khomeini's death, similar to the period Khamenei dislikes being reminded of. In 1979, when the revolution happened, and in 1980, when the leaders of the revolution established the republic, he was still a local preacher in Mashhad. But the regime's apparatus does not include anyone else in the television clips prepared for the anniversary of the revolution; only Khamenei and Khomeini are present.

Soleimani's appointment as head of the Quds Force was undoubtedly not only for cross-border operations. He was also tasked with engineering and establishing guardianship in domestic politics. Using Basij militias against opponents is also within this scope. It was Soleimani who ordered Basij militias to attack university students when they started protests in 1999 after the closure of the reformist Salam newspaper. He boasted that he prepared the declaration of the Sepah generals who issued a memorandum to President Khatami. The declaration stated, "Mr. Khatami, our patience is running out," and warned that the guardianship of the jurist (Khamenei) was a red line.

Soleimani's Sarallah headquarters also attacked protestors after the fraudulent presidential elections in 2009. General Hamedani, who was killed in Syria, boasted that they formed a brigade from common criminals to suppress the protests. Ahmadinejad, who was elected president in the fraudulent election, later revealed, after falling out of favor, that this method was used in the 2009 protests, and these lowlifes burned and destroyed everything to intervene against the protestors.

A tweet announcing that Aziz Jaafari, the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards—who was abruptly dismissed and reassigned to an ineffective position—played an effective role in suppressing the 2009 protests with the Sarallah brigade, which was loyal to Soleimani, caused panic in Tehran. Although Jaafari did not deny the revealing message, written as if in praise, others claimed the account was not his. Jaafari made no statement on the matter, and the tweet remains active.

Another intriguing confession came from Hussein Allahkarim, the head of Ansar-e Hezbollah, a militia group affiliated with the Quds Force and known for its attacks on dissidents in Iran. Allahkarim, describing how fighters trained and managed by the Quds Force carried out clandestine activities in the Bosnian War disguised as Red Crescent workers, confessed in a 2019 interview that they had been in close contact with al-Qaeda in Bosnia. This revelation contradicted Tehran's official denial of any ties with al-Qaeda. Allahkarim stated, "Al-Qaeda adopted our style. From headbands and flags to battalion names." Allahkarim's admission of the Quds Force's relationship with al-Qaeda was undoubtedly an act of sabotage against the Rouhani government, which had made significant progress in nuclear negotiations that would have also contributed to Iran's democratization at the time. It is known that Khamenei was behind this maneuver.

The "Axis of Resistance's" Fleeting Life

The communication office of the "axis of resistance" quickly realized that Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack was premature in declaring itself the beginning of Israel's ultimate eradication. Less than a year after the attack, Hamas's successive leaders were killed, all high-ranking Hezbollah officials, including Nasrallah's designated successors, were eliminated within hours, and an Israeli strike on Iran, described as a "military exercise," forced Tehran to retreat within its national borders.

Khamenei had claimed that Sinwar's death wouldn't halt the "axis of resistance," but his uneasy gaze scanning the sky just as he was about to lead Ismail Haniyeh's funeral prayer, forced to appear among the public, went viral on social media. Supporters' explanation that "the renovation at the university caught his attention, and he looked at it just as he was about to pray" failed to convince anyone.

Given Israel's swift and devastating response to the October 7 attack, Khamenei's unease is hardly surprising. Netanyahu killed Haniyeh in Tehran, Nasrallah in Beirut's Dahiya, and then Sinwar in Rafah, Gaza.

Sinwar had covered his face to avoid recognition, but an Israeli drone identified him. His act of throwing an object with his last ounce of strength was used on social media as proof that he was a hero who fought to his last breath. Some users wrote that the Israelis made a huge mistake by releasing these images. However, they failed to grasp that, in the Israelis' cost-benefit analysis, the epic narrative derived from these images did not outweigh the reality of Sinwar dying completely alone.

Hamas was the "weak link" of the "axis of resistance." An organization with no logistical capabilities beyond the Philadelphia Corridor, connected to Egypt by tunnels. When Netanyahu seized that area, the Qassam Brigades and similar groups ceased to exist.

Sinwar's solitary death and the alleged recovery of Nasrallah's body from the rubble three days later seem to have opened a deep chasm in the morale and emotional world of "axis of resistance" sympathizers. Furthermore, the discovery of Nasrallah's body is not definitively confirmed; it was Hezbollah members who made the announcement. There is no corroborating evidence. They stated the body was washed and temporarily buried in an unknown location, and no funeral ceremony was held. After his chosen successors were also killed by Israel, Naim Qassem first announced that Hezbollah would continue without a leader. He even declared their readiness to accept an unconditional ceasefire and announced that Hezbollah fighters had withdrawn north of the Litani River.

Presumably under pressure from Tehran, Naim Qassem reluctantly agreed to lead Hezbollah, but on the condition that he would not reside in Lebanon. He lives in secrecy in Tehran and issues his statements from there. After the Haniyeh experience, he knows Tehran is not safe either. Hezbollah is no longer a Lebanese entity; it's an organization without a body. Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati stated in mid-September (2024) that contact with Hezbollah had been cut.

While propaganda claimed Hezbollah had decimated Israel despite the killing of Nasrallah and its entire top command, the Israeli army's precise operation in Beirut, which collapsed Hezbollah's sensitive building on the spot without affecting the surroundings, was watched live. Subsequently, after Hezbollah was completely removed from southern Lebanon, hundreds of heavy weapons sent from Khamenei's "axis of resistance" office fell into Israeli hands.

When the missile supply chain from Iran was broken, the whole world witnessed Hezbollah's paralysis. Years ago, based on photos published by Hezbollah, I had written that the organization didn't need Iranian missiles and was producing them in underground workshops. I regret being fooled by that PR activity.

Internal Criticism and Public Opinion

Imam Musa Sadr, the legendary leader of Lebanese Shiites, opposed Yasser Arafat's use of Lebanon for actions against Israel, as he wanted to prevent the war from spreading into Lebanon. For this reason, their relations were never good. Sadr aimed to protect the Shiites on the Israeli border and sought to keep Lebanon united. Fadlullah was a prominent scholar of this strategic tradition. He was firmly against Khamenei transforming Hezbollah into a legion. Consequently, he was removed from protocol in Tehran and wasn't invited to meetings for years. Even after Nasrallah was appointed as Hezbollah's leader, Fadlullah continued to issue warnings despite being sidelined. But they didn't listen, and ultimately, Hezbollah became history under Israeli bombs.

Nasrallah alienated 12% of the Shiite community—which Imam Musa Sadr had given an identity—and transformed them into Khamenei's legion. Whenever internal criticism arose, he would retort, "Iran pays your salary." When Mahsa Amini died in custody, and millions believed she died from a brain hemorrhage due to beatings, protesting for three months at great personal risk, and over 300 people were killed by bullets from the Revolutionary Guards, Basij, and police, he accused the public of being "troublemakers incited by external forces." Hezbollah's television channel, Al-Manar, even called Mahsa a "suicidal terrorist to put Iran in a difficult situation." Iranians remember these things when Nasrallah's name is mentioned and do not speak favorably of Hezbollah. The number of Iranians who hold such views can be inferred from Khamenei's inability to hold free elections without any restrictions.

As for the Yemeni Houthis, it would be overly imaginative to consider them a force within the "axis of resistance." They are merely a missile launchpad for the Quds Force. After their last missile launch toward Tel Aviv, they fell silent when their headquarters and associated locations were hit.

Khamenei's Deterioration and Regime Weakness

Khamenei's "axis of resistance" fable, or his Arabian Nights tales, has ended. Yet, he still desperately tries to convey messages of "we are standing tall." He probably genuinely believes this too, as his mental health, in addition to his considerably deteriorating physical health, is currently a subject of debate. For instance, what he said while recounting a memory during his reception of Soleimani's family surprised even his supporters: "It was twenty-four years ago. We were sitting with the children from Sepah in this courtyard. There were about twenty commanders. We prayed. I sat on the step. I gave an impressive speech. It wasn't in my mind before. God was speaking, as it were. I was the speaker, but the words were God's. It was a very strange meeting, very effective." Psychiatrists would likely call this a "messianic complex," but of a type that is powerless to act. One must compare the power of Khamenei's regime, which caused the death of the president by bringing him from Azerbaijan to Iran in a dilapidated, poorly maintained helicopter from the Shah era, with Israel's power, which rendered 3,000 Hezbollah fighters useless with a single message by exploding their pagers.

A call to bureaucrats and the security sector by political activist Fatima Sipehri, whose husband died in the Iran-Iraq war, went viral again on social media following Assad's overthrow. Sipehri, held in prison despite serious health issues, said in the video, "The Islamic Republic is on its way out; Khamenei's fate will be just like Gaddafi and Saddam. Separate your path." Sipehri, along with her brother, is among the 14 signatories of the statement calling for Khamenei's resignation. All signatories were arrested. They were denied legal representation and sentenced to a total of 72 years in prison, 6 years in exile, and 6 years banned from all activities.

Translated by Gemini