Kenan Camurcu

In the Turkish context of public sphere debates, the official cult(ure) is a socialized historical inheritance, relevant for both the right-conservative/religious and the left-secular traditions. The objective reality of this inheritance is the absence of civil society. The public sphere, where negotiation, dialogue, and consensus should take place, is represented by the official society, namely the state. In the monarchical regime, the state occupied the space that could otherwise be considered civil society. The Republic, too, possesses the physiology of the same genetic inheritance.

In Europe, the public sphere's transformation from a civil character into an arena of state existence (Habermas, 2021: 135) has been a given situation from the very beginning in the historical experiences of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. It is a de facto truth by virtue of the bed it flourished in, and a de jure truth in terms of its formalization and institutionalization.

When today's conservative autocracy decided to define itself within this political bed and willingly continued the tradition, it was rewarded with eternal power and unquestionable privilege by the guardians of ideological dynamics.

There is no clear answer to the question of who these guardians of ideological dynamics are. Whoever Küçükömer's "them" are, that is who they are. At the "İdris Küçükömer: Civil Society Outpost" symposium, where I also gave a speech, Professor Asaf Savaş (Akat) reminded us that Küçükömer constantly spoke of "them" when confronting the established order, without ever specifying who "them" were. But a composite sketch exists. In my article "The Theopolitical Crypto in the Campaign to Prevent Kılıçdaroğlu's Election", I tried to describe the ghost.

What is Political Culture?

The Almond model, often referenced in political science departments, defines "political culture" as the template of tendencies that guide political actions absorbed within the political system (Almond, 1956: 396). However, it is doubtful whether this model can be explanatory for the historical experience of this land, where theopolitical characteristics are prominent. Perhaps the general-social culture, fermented by theo-cultural and ethno-cultural elements, produces the political culture that generates the political system's output as a template for tendencies guiding political actions. There is no definitive empirical result that can be considered certain knowledge.

Can the Almond model help interpret the socio-cultural phenomenology of the caliphate election crisis following the death of the Prophet of Islam, or the political culture of the Ottoman example, a hybrid model of Genghis Khan's law and Islamic Sharia? If so, we can use it to describe the ideological genealogy of conservative autocracy.

But Almond has a warning: Unlike the fragmentation in the political culture of other countries, the political culture of Turkey, along with Israel and the Philippines in the Asia-Africa region, is quite exceptional for definition due to its almost homogeneous nature (Almond and Coleman, 2015: 544).

This is a culture that has maintained its existence in continuity from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. It also repaired and reproduced itself through military interventions that recurred in ten-year periods, starting with the 1960 military coup. The main characteristic of this political culture is the socialized official cult. This is produced by utilizing the power, determinism, and coerciveness of the state apparatus, the possibilities and tools of formal education, mass communication devices, religious channels, and public spaces.

However, the suppression and manipulation of the free public sphere by the system, ideology, and state mechanism always result in the disappearance of the free public sphere (Akkol, 2019: 173). This explains why the same autocratic outcome is encountered in the secular political regime called "Old Turkey" and in the full-time religious political regime called "New Turkey."

Reform, but to Strengthen the Center

Beginning in the early period of Islam, in the political thought of the Sunni Islamic tradition, the state is equipped not merely as a functional and pragmatic organization for managing societal affairs, but with the "cause" of ideology, doctrine, and societal design. This is the state myth that guides the sociopolitical culture dominated by a public spirit. To open a parenthesis, the Khamenei faction of Twelver Shi'ism is also a student of this basin, which is why it is not respected in the Shi'i scholarly centers of Najaf and Qom.

As experts have pointed out, due to the state myth, the purpose of modernization and reforms during the Tanzimat period was solely the strengthening of the state (Köker, 2010: 126). The romanticism of those who assume multi-party regimes to be democratization and trace their source back to the Tanzimat process is misplaced.

The common ground among the very different political and intellectual currents—Westernism, Islamism, and Turkism—that emerged during the Second Constitutional Era was their offering of ideological prescriptions to save the state. Modernization and regulatory efforts did not aim to change the center's understanding of the state and its attitude towards the periphery; on the contrary, they involved attitudes aimed at strengthening the center (Heper, 2018: 76).

Halil İnalcık wrote that the political culture of the Ottoman state, born as a ghazi state on the common borders of two rival religions and civilizations, was shaped by a predisposition to war (İnalcık, 1955: 222). Since internal peace and external security were the state's priority, the Ottoman Empire was a state whose army was always ready for campaign (Duran and Çamlı, 2019: 143). With this fundamental characteristic, the state was almost the sole reality relative to the individual and society. Indeed, the state maintained its independence even against Islam, which was its source of legitimacy. For instance, while the Shaykh al-Islam had the right to express an opinion that the Sultan's practice was contrary to Sharia, he could not directly intervene in the government and legal administration (Heper, 2018: 53).

Sacred Authority Representing God

According to Ottoman-Turkish state philosophy, the Sultan was appointed by God to hold together the various strata of society (Heper, 2018: 52). The historian Tursun Bey (d. 1499) emphasized that one of the proofs that Allah made man His vicegerent on earth was the presence of a Sultan in every era (Keskintaş, 2017: 305). In other words, it was believed that the authority of wilaya (guardianship/sovereignty), which is accepted as belonging to Allah in the discipline of kalam, manifested in the Sultan. This belief views the state as an indispensable tool for nizam-ı alem (world order). What they call nizam-ı alem is Allah's sovereignty on earth, the representation on earth of the divine sovereignty called malakut in the cosmos. It is a theory that grounds the Christian doctrine of "the Kingdom of God."

Theologians consider the wilaya (authority) that is Allah's act as one of the most important issues in kalam. Some have addressed it within the discussion of imamah, while others have examined it as an independent topic (Mutlak, 2013: 177).

Although imamah (leadership) is not seen as divinely ordained in Sunnism as it is in Shi'ism, great importance is attached to the issue of sultanate and leadership, with the warning that it is not permissible to spend even one night without one. To the extent of saying: "Sixty years with a tyrannical sultan is better than a night without a sultan" (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2004: 20/54).

In ancient Turkish belief, the state was also divine. Rulers received their authority from God (Kafesoğlu, 1997: 250). In the Ottoman state, the heir of this tradition, the Sultan was the father, master, and patron (mawla, i.e., possessor of wilaya) of his subjects, just as he held the right of ownership over land. In İnalcık's words, "Absolute obedience is required for the Caliph-Sultan, who is entrusted with leading and managing Muslims on the path of Sharia" (İnalcık, 1958: 74). Just as the French cleric Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (d. 1704), attached to the court, emphasized to the heir apparent about the duties of subjects to their ruler: "The ruler's open impiety, even tyranny, does not exempt subjects from the duty of obedience. Subjects can only oppose the tyranny of rulers with respectful supplications, without complaint or resistance, and pray for their guidance" (Meriç, 1980: 318).

In Sunni political culture, obedience to rulers is paramount. In a narration allegedly transmitted from Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman from the Prophet, it is said: "Muslims should obey their leaders, even if he hits you on your back and takes your property (وإن ضرب ظهرَك ، وأخذ مالَك)" (Bukhari 7084, Muslim 1847, Abu Dawud 4244). Ibn Taymiyyah formulated this as: "Avoiding rebellion against tyrannical kings and enduring their injustices" (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1989: 4/444).

However, it is unthinkable that the Prophet, who gave a secret list of conspirators in Medina plotting to seize power after the assassination attempt against him in Tabuk two years before his death (630) (Ahmad 23321, Muslim 2779, Qurtubi, 2006: 10/304), to Hudhayfa, would recommend absolute obedience to tyrannical rulers.

No Political Despotism Without Religious Despotism

The theo-political culture created by historical practices expands the political sphere and narrows the civil sphere. For this reason, Ayatollah Nainî (d. 1936), an intellectual leader of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, said, "There is no political despotism without religious despotism" (Muqimi, 2001: 444).

The sacralization of the state in the religious culture of Islam is a result derived by analogy with the Prophet's place in religion. Therefore, starting from the innovative thinkers of the 19th century, Muslim scholars and intellectuals began to solve the problem from this theoretical crossroads.

According to innovative thinkers, politics can only be freed from being a subheading of theology by allowing its rational, relative, and profane character to carry out processes of discussion and consensus. According to Mehdi Bazargan (d. 1995), one of the 20th-century thinkers of the Islamic world (and the first prime minister after the Iranian revolution), Muslims engage in judging and issuing rulings because they live a social life. This does not mean that the Prophet came for this purpose (Muhammadi, 2001: 69).

Mehmet Seyyid Bey, the Deputy of Izmir, known for his long speech titled "The Sharia Nature of the Caliphate" delivered in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey during the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, also reminded that the issue of the caliphate was part of the people's rights and public interest, and had no theological aspect. According to him, the caliph's representation of the Prophet in legislating Sharia was not analogous to the Pope's representation of Jesus in Catholicism (Seyyid Bey, 1999: 175).

In a political culture where the state is sacralized, even considered divine, it is not easy to convince the majority of the country's population, who will determine political destiny, that the right to sovereignty/authority belongs to society. In such a socio-political climate, the primary reason why the plant of democracy cannot flourish is that democracy involves more than just participation in the political process. Democracy is essentially a way of forming power (Wildavsky, 1987: 17). This, in turn, reverts to the issue of sovereignty/authority.

The magnitude of the state's sphere in social life diminishes the meaning of society being the source that produces sovereignty. The night-watchman role (Nozick, 2000: 59) ascribed to the "minimal state" by ultra-liberalism (libertarianism, anarcho-liberalism), which is viewed as abhorrent because it brings the topic to the liberation of capital from all restrictions, can actually be interpreted and developed for the benefit of society and the individual. There is no doubt that the anarchist-communist Bakunin, who called for the destruction of the state, inspired capitalist libertarians.

Reciprocal Interaction of Political Culture and Political Structure

According to Michel Foucault's inference from the "shepherd God" metaphor, frequently found in the Eastern Mediterranean, "If God is the shepherd of humans, and the king is like Him, the shepherd of humans, then the king is in a sense the subordinate shepherd to whom God has entrusted the flock of humans" (Foucault, 2013: 111). The etymological root of the Arabic word "siyasa" (politics) also primarily means "to subdue, to educate, to reform" (Farahidi, 2003: 2/206). It was initially used for animals but came to be used for humans as a category of the animal species.

A parallel to Foucault's comparison between the pastoral tradition and the culture that gave birth to democracy in Greece (Foucault, 2013: 111-112) is found in the analysis of Turkish democracy by the intellectual politician Turan Güneş: "In Eastern political philosophy, the name for people relative to the Sultan is 'reaya'. 'Reaya' is the plural of 'rai' and its meaning is 'grazed flock'. The philosophy on which democracy is based, on the other hand, emerged as a rebellion against the medieval European concept of divine power and the individual's place in the established order" (Güneş, 2009: 148).

The historical situation confirms that the relationship between political culture and political structure can be defined on the basis of reciprocal interaction (Çalışkan, 2016: 25).

The Unquestionability of Power Since Early Islam

The historical and theoretical roots of the unquestionability of power in Sunni political theory can be traced back to the early period of Islamic history.

Caliph Uthman (d. 656), whose door was besieged by the populace as mounting reactions in Basra, Egypt, and Medina, almost everywhere, turned into rebellion due to his favoritism towards his own tribe, the Umayyads, and widespread corruption, unlawfulness, inequality, and injustice, responded to the demand of leading companions who sought to quell the unrest and calm the atmosphere to step down by saying, "I will not take off the shirt God has clothed me with" (Ibn al-Athir, 1987: 3/60). Here, "shirt" signifies power, authority, dominion. The "shirt" in "I took off the Milli Görüş shirt," however, is different; that was a declaration of changing ideological identity to the relevant interlocutors. If only identity had radically changed in favor of democracy; it turns out it was a taqiyya (dissimulation) tactic applied until the culmination of power centralization.

The reaction to Caliph Uthman was so high that even Aisha, the daughter of the First Caliph Abdullah b. Abi Quhafa, who was actually Uthman's supporter, was inciting the rebellion. She was not behind the uprising but was trying to prevent it from escalating. In her rather antisemitic provocation, she is recorded in history as having shouted, "Kill the Jewish bearded man" (Tabari, 2011: 3/12). The sentence in the text reads, "Kill that Na'sel." "Na'sel" was the name of a Jew in Medina whose long beard was his distinguishing feature. Aisha was likening Uthman to this man because of his long beard. Lexicographers also give the meaning "stupid old man" to "na'sel" (Ibn Manzur, undated: 4470). But that, too, was apparently said with the intention of insulting the same man.

The Original Story of Taking Off the Shirt

Aisha was inciting the crowds to kill Caliph Uthman by waving the shirt the Prophet was wearing at the time of his death. According to Ya'qubi's narration, she was shouting to the rebels with the Prophet's shirt in her hand: "O Muslims, this is the shirt of the Messenger of Allah. It has not worn out. But Uthman has worn out his Sunnah." Uthman then said upon hearing these words: "My Lord, avert his plot from me. His plot is truly great" (Ya'qubi, 1939: 1/152).

When the people overthrew Uthman and elected Ali, Aisha joined the opposing front against Ali and began to narrate things about Uthman from the Prophet that had never been heard before. The most famous is this: "Uthman, Allah will clothe you with a shirt. When the hypocrites want you to take it off, do not take it off" (Tirmidhi 3705, Ibn Majah 112, Ahmad 24566). If she claimed the Prophet said such things, why was she using the Prophet's shirt as a banner to incite the people for Uthman's overthrow, and even his murder? Some companions apparently asked this.

Tabari relates that Aisha, after the rebellion she had vigorously incited ended, met Ubayd b. Umm Kilab on her way back to Medina. Ubayd was an Alawite companion, a supporter of Ali. Aisha learned from him that Uthman had been killed. She asked, "Then what did they do?" When she received the answer, "They agreed upon Ali b. Abi Talib," she said, "If the matter ended in favor of your man (Ali), this is not appropriate at all." She gave up and returned to Mecca. As she left, she was muttering: "By God, Uthman was killed unjustly. I will definitely demand his blood." Ibn Umm Kilab called out after her: "Why? You were the first to demand his elimination. You used to say: Kill the Jewish bearded man [na'sel], because he has become an infidel" (Tabari, 2011: 3/12).

Aisha met with former governors of Basra and Yemen, Zubayr b. al-Awwam and Talha b. Ubaydullah, in Mecca to plan an uprising against Ali. Marwan, a famous Umayyad who never abandoned his enmity towards the Prophet, was also present at the meeting. They decided that the excuse they would put forward for civil war would be Uthman's blood (Ubayy al-Maliki, 1910: 8/246, hadith 47-2414).

Uthman's "shirt of power," which he refused to take off claiming God had clothed him with it, cost him his life when he was overthrown by a popular uprising. It then became a campaign flag in the hands first of Aisha, then of Mu'awiya. "Uthman's bloody shirt" was a very important propaganda item for Mu'awiya's armed uprising against Ali.

When Uthman was killed by the rebels, his wife Na'ila bint Farafisa sent his bloody shirt to Mu'awiya, along with a letter asking for his revenge. Mu'awiya read the letter to the people of Damascus and placed the sent items on the pulpit in the Damascus mosque, ensuring that all the inhabitants could see them (Dawadari, 2014: 3/242).

Caliph Uthman's explanation of political authority with the metaphor of "the shirt God has clothed me with" would, in time, transform into the doctrine of "God's shadow on earth" that sacralizes the state. In other words, the concept of "zillullah fi'l-arz" (God's shadow on earth) emerged in the early period of Islam and over time became the undisputed political culture of Islam.

Ethno-Political Condition for God's Shadow on Earth

The innovator of the concept of "God's shadow on earth" (zillullah fi'l-arz) is the person nicknamed "Abu Hurayra" (d. 678), who came to Medina only three years before the Prophet's death (Nisaburi, 1997: 4/135, hadith 6933). The ethno-political condition in the other important principle of Sunni political theory related to "zillullah fi'l-arz", namely "the caliphate being from the Quraysh," was also introduced into the culture by Abu Hurayra's narration (Ahmad, 8226). Abu Bakr used this strange narration during the caliphate discussion that took place while the Prophet's funeral was still pending, arguing that the Medinan Muslims (Ansar) could not be candidates or leaders (Ibn Hajar, 1989: 4/111-114).

The fact that such an important matter was unknown to the Medinan Muslims, meaning that none of them had heard such a saying from the Prophet, is naturally problematic. Those who transmit the narration are apparently aware of this. They tried to dispel the doubt with a backup narration. The person to whom the narration is attributed is Jabir b. Samura (d. 696). He says, "I heard from the Prophet. He said: 'Islam will not decline as long as there are twelve caliphs.' Then he said something in a low voice, and I did not understand. I asked my father what he said. He said, 'All of them will be from Quraysh'" (Ahmad 21020, Bazzar 4284, Tabarani 1795).

The implication is that the Prophet lowered his voice when saying that the caliphs would be from Quraysh, so that the Medinans would not hear. The message to be conveyed is clear: This is why the Ansar were unaware of this saying.

Belief in the Sultan as God's Shadow

According to the claim of the narration that constructed the political culture of Sunnism, which is the majority among the Muslim population worldwide and in Turkey, the Prophet also said: "The Sultan is God's shadow on earth. Whoever honors him, Allah honors him. Whoever humiliates him, Allah humiliates him" (Ibn Abi Asim, 1980: 492, hadith 1024). This is a narration with many technical flaws, as admitted by hadith scholars. For this reason, they could not comfortably call it "sahih" (authentic). There is a category called "hasan" in the card, which they use when accepting flawed narrations, and they defined the validity level of the narration with it. But before this, they should have seen the strangeness and impossibility of the Prophet, whose lifestyle and demeanor are well-known, praising sultanate. They did not.

Another version of the same narration, attributed to Anas b. Malik (d. 711), states: "The Sultan is God's shadow on earth. Whoever deceives him has gone astray. Whoever advises him has been guided" (Ali al-Qari, 2001: 7/268; Nabhani, 2010: 288).

Al-Munawi, who commented on the hadith, provides an explanation for the sentence in the narration: "If he acts tyrannically or unjustly, the sin is on his shoulders. The people must endure it." He explains: "The people must be patient. It is not permissible to rebel against him unless he commits apostasy" (Munawi, 1972: 4/142). Although Munawi remained cautious, he did not neglect to quote al-Haythami's view that Said b. Sinan, in the chain of the narration, was considered a liar and no hadith should be taken from him.

Ibn Taymiyyah's "Lord State"

Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), the political theorist of Sunnism, while defending the doctrine, "The Sultan is God's shadow on earth," compares political authority to Allah's attribute of "Lord" (rabb) to emphasize its meaning and importance. According to him, this shadow (the Sultan being God's shadow) is necessary for the affairs of servants to proceed smoothly. Without the shadow, societal affairs cannot be managed. Thus, this situation is equivalent and analogous to the secret of Allah's attribute of "Lord" (rububiyya), which ensures the existence of humanity and the continuation of life (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2005: 35/30).

I hope that the admirers who create heroic figures of Ibn Taymiyyah as a defender of monotheism and a warrior for justice through fictional stories will be disappointed.

Qadizade Mehmed (d. 1635), a member of Ibn Taymiyyah's extremist Salafi school, when supporting Murad IV's tobacco ban, argued that the Sultan's prohibition was the same as Allah's prohibition when an objection came that tobacco and coffee were not forbidden by Allah (Yılmaz, 2012: 42/5-9; Karagöz, 2020: 518).

The Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092) also attributed a divine status to the Sultan. According to him, the Sultan is the person chosen by Allah from among the people in every age and time. He makes him responsible for worldly affairs and the peace of his servants. When he expands his majesty and awe in the hearts and eyes of the people, the people, feeling secure with him, desire the continuation of the state (Canatan, 2009: 203).

"State's Survival" as the Doctrine of Eliminating Opposition

Nizam al-Mulk's desired magnification of the Sultan's majesty and awe in the eyes of the people, meaning the continuation and survival of the state apparatus, is possible only if it remains untouchable and immune to law. For example, the First Caliph Abdullah b. Abi Quhafa (Abu Bakr) had sent an army under the command of Khalid ibn Walid against Malik b. Nuwayra, a Yemeni tribal chief who opposed both his election as caliph and his administration. When Khalid killed Malik and the leading figures of his tribe, Abu Bakr refused to punish Khalid for this crime. He said, "I will not sheathe the sword of Allah drawn against the polytheists" (Ibn Hajar, 1995: 5/561).

Malik b. Nuwayra was the Prophet's representative in the Yemen region. He also collected zakat (Belazuri, 2013: 66). He deemed Abu Bakr's controversial caliph election illegitimate and rejected his leadership. Instead of sending the collected zakat to the new leader, he redistributed it to the people. Thereupon, Khalid ibn Walid, sent to Yemen by the Caliph with the mission of suppressing opposition, despite the contrary testimonies of important figures among the companions like Abu Qatada and Abdullah ibn Umar (Ibn Sa'd, 2001: 6/166), propagated that Malik had apostatized and rounded up him and the leading figures of his tribe from their homes, carrying out the massacre that would go down in history as the "Butah massacre."

Religious Culture Defining the Caliph's Authority to Kill Opponents

The Caliph justified his right and authority to kill a political opponent who did not pay zakat to the caliph, even if he was a believer fulfilling his religious duties, by placing himself in the Prophet's stead and assuming the Prophet would have acted similarly if alive. This incident, the earliest example of political authority using force against opposition, was later used as evidence in political fiqh (jurisprudence), and it was recorded that those who did not pledge allegiance to the caliph and did not pay zakat would be deemed apostates (Ghumari, 1987: 5/17).

The ruling that opponents who do not pay zakat to the caliph, as it is a symbol of allegiance and obedience, have apostatized and must be fought is based on Caliph Abu Bakr's words announcing his intention to fight his opponents: "By God, I will certainly fight those who distinguish between prayer and zakat. Zakat is the right of wealth. If they do not give me even a single goat that they gave to the Messenger of Allah, I will fight them" (Nasa'i, 4318). Here, Abu Bakr's intent was not to fight those who did not pay zakat as a religious obligation, but those who did not pay zakat to the caliph. Moreover, even if it were not paid as a religious obligation, there is no sanction for it in the Quran, nor did the Prophet ever attempt to take anyone's life for it. Abu Bakr's action was a customary/secular decision aimed at preserving his power.

The culture of "state's survival" was considered so sacred, sublime, and a supreme value in the Ottoman Empire that a fatwa (religious edict) was issued allowing the Sultan to even execute his own brothers to preserve unity, and this was codified into law (Halaçoğlu, 1991: 6. For the full text of the law: Özcan, 2011: 29-51).

Powerful Center Inherited from Ottoman to Republic

Shils argues that sacralized societal values, which he calls the "cultural center," cannot be thought of separately from the authority that embraces them (Shils, 1975: 5). It has been shown in various studies that the political tradition which made the Ottoman state an unrivaled and powerful center drew legitimacy from the cultural sphere and was also financed by the timar system (Anievas and Nishancıoğlu, 2021: 121). The timar system, within the Ottoman theo-economy, appears to have been the guarantor of power and strength that made the Ottoman political center unparalleled compared to contemporary states.

It is not wrong to place the obligation of the state to control the economy at the top of the list of characteristics describing the Ottoman political system, in order to keep a heterogeneous society together and under control. The elites of the patrimonial service sector attached great importance to controlling all sources of power. From this perspective, keeping the economy, which financed power, under control was crucial (Mardin 1969: 259). The reason why the current representation of conservatism has changed the tender law 200 times through trial and error to find the most effective method for resource transfer is the same.

In Weber's patrimonial model (Duran and Çamlı, 2019: 11), which is quite explanatory in understanding the Ottoman state order, the Ottoman country was considered a single property, and the owner of this property was the Sultan (İnalcık, 2015: 218). This applies both in terms of ownership (mülkiyet) and sovereignty (melikiyet). That is, the country belonged to the Sultan in terms of both its immovable property and its governance, sovereignty, and authority (wilaya).

While in the West feudalism, by sharing power with the central state in the tension of conflict-consensus, paved the way for the emergence of civil society, this process did not occur in the Ottoman Empire due to its land system and power structure. No intermediate mechanisms capable of forcing the central authority to share its power emerged in the Empire. On the contrary, these intermediate institutions became functional and effective parts that would increase the political organization's power.

The Ottoman Empire Without Civil Society, Coveted by Conservative Autocracy

According to Şerif Mardin, the Ottoman Empire lacked the "intermediate" structures that Machiavelli and Montesquieu referred to for the difference between Eastern despotism and Western feudalism. There was no structural component, independent of the central government and based on property rights, which Hegel called "civil society" (Mardin, 1969: 259).

In the Ottoman Empire, the state did not grant civil society status to peripheral segments and did not allow these segments to play a role in state administration (Heper, 2006: 70). Due to the Empire's developed network of institutions, there was already a strong center. This prevented the formation of a civil society and the resulting intermediate mechanisms, unlike in the West (Mardin, 1990: 35).

Official Religiosity to Raise Generations Loyal to the Sultan

Starting from 1826, the Tanzimat's agenda of participating in Western-style modernization and integrating with the West ended the kind of centralism focused on the Sultan. The cluster of powers in the hands of the Sultan, who was the brain of the state organization (Williamson, 1987: 26) and both the material and spiritual head (Kiya, 2017: 103) in classical periods, largely passed into the hands of the bureaucracy. In other words, the autocratic character of the state was transferred as a genetic inheritance to the bureaucracy this time.

Abdülhamid II tried to ensure the reproduction of absolute monarchy by using education. Through this, the official ideology and official history would be systematized and institutionalized. The purpose of sacralization as an important part of the official ideology was to raise a generation loyal to the Sultan (Alkan, 2005: 390). However, this move was recorded as an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the historical course.

The Swap Between the Sultan and the Bureaucracy

The new era was the birth phase of the modern centralized state, and the political actor of this period, the bureaucracy, began to govern the state by taking over power from the Sultan (Velidedeoğlu, 1989: 3). Undoubtedly, the urgent agenda of the Tanzimat bureaucrats was to save the state, and they largely managed to remain outside the power-opposition tension. Therefore, the ideological ancestor of the "bureaucratic state" or "bureaucratic oligarchy," frequently mentioned in political literature since the second half of the 1990s, might be the Young Ottomans who politicized the bureaucracy (Ortaylı, 1985: 1547-1548). If so, in the Constitutional Monarchy, which codified the monarchical regime based on 'irade-i seniye' (imperial will) with a constitution, 'irade-i milliye' (national will) was not made sovereign. On the contrary, by replacing the Sultan with the bureaucracy, the established order contented itself with a swap of actors.

Although the right of sovereignty/authority belonging to the nation was much debated during the Constitutional Era, no reform proposal ever surpassed the official cult(ure). The volume and influence gradually attained by the centralized state, one of the most distinct outcomes of the modernization process, did not allow for the formation of a civil society during either the Constitutional Monarchy or the Republican periods.

The Prebendalism Regime Attaching Elites to the State

One reason for the failure of civil society to emerge in the Ottoman state was the tight economic, political, and religious control that prevented the formation of economic and political power independent of the state. Another reason was that the elites expected to form civil society were attached to the political society (state) through the prebendalism system. Mardin states that this inheritance was also transferred to modern Turkey, noting that the state in Turkey has always provided economic opportunities for its high-level employees. If used wisely, it can be a better springboard than starting a business with entrepreneurship. According to Mardin, this is not because salaries are high; state service salaries are actually poor. However, connections with the bureaucracy can open necessary doors for business. Therefore, the best way to succeed in the private sector is to start as a civil servant (Mardin, 1969: 280).

The Essence of the Political Structure from Ottoman to Republic

Despite a radical paradigmatic shift from the Ottoman monarchical order to the Republican regime, the genetic code that remained unchanged is the "official cult(ure)." The essence of this hidden, mysterious, secret, and partly esoteric cult(ure) is the sacred state and its survival. It would not be wrong to establish patrimonialism and prebendalism as the two fundamental characteristics of this culture inherited from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic.

There are claims that the Republic, formally based on popular will, can be considered a neo-patrimonial regime (Yıldırım, 2012: 8). Neo-patrimonialism is defined as a presidential system where all powers are concentrated in a single person, except for the delegation of insignificant decisions (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997: 63).

Seyyid Bey's Struggle Against the Sacred State

Mehmet Seyyid Bey, the Deputy of Izmir, who made very important intellectual and political contributions to the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate, strongly opposed giving the President the power to dissolve the Assembly with the Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu (Constitutional Law) in February 1924 (Erdem, 1999: 23). The most probable reason for this was that a hybrid political regime, which would lead to the re-embodiment of the "sacred state" from the old monarchical regime in the Republic, would emerge.

The Ottoman modernization's goal of strengthening the state was also the political principle of the Republic's founding cadres. In political history studies, this unchanging characteristic, which transferred Abdülhamid II's autocratic regime as an inheritance to the opposing Committee of Union and Progress, and from there to the opposing CHP, is emphasized. Eric Jan Zürcher suggests that the idea of centralizing power in a single hand for modernization was present in the minds of the Republic's founding fathers from the very beginning. This idea would, over time, establish an authoritarian regime and then acquire a totalitarian character, controlling all social life (Zürcher, 1999: 242-256).

The Ideological Ancestor of Power-Obsessed Conservatism

The ideological ancestor of today's power-obsessed conservatism is precisely that foundational period it condemns in every sentence. The accusations are likely designed to distract from the fact that the spirit of that period has reincarnated within the conservative body.

The Republic of Turkey was born in a very heterogeneous social environment amidst conflicts. It's true that the fear of division was a strong tendency among the new state's founders. This concern formed the backdrop of the state's founding philosophy throughout the one-party period, which ended in 1950. For this reason, the state established by the modern republic is considered reactive. İnönü is thought to have bureaucratized this state, which is another manifestation of the transcendent (strong) state tradition (Heper, 2006: 8-9).

Analyses that define the Republican state tradition as a secular version of the Ottoman state simultaneously argue that the new regime is not derivative and that the center-periphery relations from the Ottoman era were inherited by the Republic.

The Hegelian Republic: A Reflection of the Divine State

The Republican party-state can be described as a Hegelian state, endowed with the obligation to protect the country's interests and the corresponding authority. It is an "earthly state" as a secular version of Augustine's "Divine State," and in this regard, it is as absolutist as the first (Cassirer, 1946: 263).

The experiment with the Free Republican Party, which was allowed to be established to dispel the impression of divine dictatorship, quickly turned into public reaction against the party that founded the state. Consequently, independent social and cultural organizations that had survived since the Committee of Union and Progress era were banned, and all cultural and intellectual life in the country was brought under control (Zürcher, 1999: 262). This move aimed not only to consolidate political influence but also to protect the state.

The nation-state (center) that the Republic sought to establish believed it was possible to transform the periphery into a modern self. However, in doing so, it denied cultural identities and the reality of symbolic identities instead of recognizing them. This marks the breaking point of the organic and homogeneous understanding of the nation.

State-Nation Identity in the Paternalistic Tradition

In the founding ideology of the Republic, the state and the nation are one and the same. The nation referred to here expresses a national will based on a foundation of undifferentiation. The state was the organization where this will materialized (Köker, 2010: 155). In this abstraction, the clear and simple definition of the state that the citizen had to recognize was: "The state must possess influence over the nation to ensure the freedom of individuals, and it must possess its own influence and power to maintain the independence of the nation and the country" (Afet [İnan], 1930: 33).

As Tanıl Bora points out, Kemalism, by Ahmet İnsel's definition, is an ideology that can be better understood in comparison with the paternalistic state tradition that considers itself the sole guarantor of society. In this sense, there has always been a Kemalism adapted by the left, the center-right, and conservative politics. This is nothing more than the manifestation of the centralist political tradition, which has continued since the Tanzimat, in various identities (Bora, 2017: 189). Therefore, the rejection of a paternalistic authority could only mean betrayal (Sarıbay, 2021: 170).

Everything Changes, the Official Cult(ure) Never Does

The official cult(ure), at every opportunity and occasion, issues its warnings and reminders, bringing to the surface from the collective subconscious the notion that it is the sole constant in the political historical cycle full of variables.

The patrimonial state (Özbaran, 2004: 16, citing Halil İnalcık), which flows from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic with its dual structure based on an irresponsible leader who derives his right to sovereignty from God and a responsible/obligated tax-paying populace, has managed to endure without change not solely due to the irresistibility of its power. This powerful and unrivaled state derives its legitimacy from the political culture deeply embedded in society. In this culture, "Allah accepts no partners, and the state accepts no rivals" (Bozdağ, 2014).

This dominant culture is "a symbol and expression of the absolute patrimonial sovereign rule of the Sultan. Patrimonial culture manifests itself in every aspect of life outside the palace" (İnalcık, 2010: 11).

The idea that the massive state is the biggest obstacle to a pluralistic social fabric—where differences can coexist peacefully, rights and freedoms are fully realized, and high political participation is possible—should not be overlooked. Perhaps the minarchists' view of the state as a "necessary evil" and the anarcho-capitalists' objection to the state as an "evil to be avoided" (Uslu, Summer-Autumn 2007: 144) may hold a degree of justification for individual and societal good.

What makes capitalist anarchism illegitimate is not its critiques of the state, but its inhumane, unjust, and primitive ideology that believes in inequality and accepts abandoning the weak of society to oppression, even death, as an acceptable cost. Entrusting the individual as a real person to the pressure of the abstract market dominated by financial interests (Nozick, 2000: 48) against the colossal abstract state is, of course, not a safe path.

We know that the power-obsessed conservative, gorged from the river of wealth and power, laid prostrate like Saul's army, listens to all this with an indifferent, unconcerned, emotionless, and mocking smile. We also know that they will not heed the warning, "Why are you laughing, this is your story I'm telling." But our concern is not to convince them or shake them into change. We are as indifferent about them as they are. We are merely putting it on record.

Translated by Gemini

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